Restoring Epistemic Credibility for Expert Communities in Sub-Saharan Africa
Resumen
In this paper, we engage with Heidi Grasswick’s argument on epistemic distrust as an epistemic value. We show how expert communities have in the past perpetuated epistemic harm to people of colour as recipients of knowledge. We highlight the adverse effects of these harms in our social milieu by limiting our discussion to COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy in sub-Saharan Africa. We then conclude that the scepticism of the COVID-19 vaccines by people of colour within the aforementioned locale can be understood in the context of epistemic distrust. Finally, We show how epistemic credibility toward the expert community, precisely scientific communities, by the non-expert community can be restored.
Descargas
Citas
Aanuoluwapo, A., & Olayinka, S. (2020), “Dealing with Vaccine Hesitancy in Africa: The Prospective Covid-19 Vaccine Context,” Pan-African Medica Journal, 38(3):1-7.
Adler, J. (2015), “Epistemological Problems of Testimony”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/testimony-episprob/>.
Agulanna, C. (2010), “The Requirement of Informed Consent in Research Ethics: Procedure for Implementing a Crucial Ethical Norm in African Communal Culture,” European Journal of Scientific Research, 44 (2): 204-219.
Anderson, E. (1995), “Knowledge, Human Interests, and Objectivity in Feminist Epistemology,” Philosophical Topics, 23: 27–58.
Baier, A. (1986), “Trust and Antitrust,” Ethics, 96: 231–60.
BBC News, (2020), “Coronavirus: Africa will not be Testing Ground says WHO,” [Online], Available At: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52192184
Brandt, M. (1978), “Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,” Hasting Centre Report, 8(6): 21-29.
Dotson, K. (2011), “Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silence,” Hypatia, 26(2):236-257.
Dotson, K. (2012), “A Cautionary Tal: on Limiting Epistemic Oppression,” Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, 33(1):24-47.
Frost-Arnold, K, (2014), “Imposters, Tricksters, and Trustworthiness as an Epistemic Virtue,” Hypatia, 29: 790–807.
Fricker, M. (2007), Epistemic Injustice:Power and the Ethics of Knowing, New York:Oxford.
Fricker, M. (2013), “Can There Be Institutional Virtues?” In: T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne eds., Oxford Studies of Epistemology 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grasswick, H. (2018), “Understanding Epistemic Trust Injustices and their Harms,” The Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 84: 69-91.
Jones, K. (1996), “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” Ethics, 107:40-25.
Makoni, M. (2020), “Covid-19 Vaccines Trial in Africa,” [Online], Available At: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanres/article/PIIS2213-2600(20)30401-X/fulltext
Marti, M., de Cola, M., MacDonald, M., Dumolard, L., & Ducious, P. (2017), “Assessments of Global Drivers of Vaccines Hesitancy in 2014-Looking beyond Safety Concerns,” PLoS One, 1;12(3):e0272310.
Ngutjinazo, O. (2021), “Why Many Africans are Wary About Covid-19 Vaccines,” [Online], Available At: https://www.dw.com/en/why-many-africans-are-wary-of-covid-19-vaccines/a-56774599
Ogungbure, A. (2011), “The Tuskegee Syphilis Study: Some Ethical Reflection,” Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya, 3(2):75-92.
Pohlhaus, G. (2017), Varieties of Epistemic Injustice, In: I. Kidd, J. Medina, and G. Pohlhaus eds., Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. UK: Routledge;pp.13-26.
Zipprich, J., Winter, K.,Hacker, J., Xia, D., Watt, J., & Harriman, K. (2015), “Measles Outbreak-California, December 2014-February 2015,” Centres for Disease Control and Preventions, 65(06):153-154.
