Variabilidad intuicional y racionalismo modal naturalista: alcances y límites del escepticimo experimental

Intuitional Variability and Naturalist Modal Rationalism: Scopes and Limits of Experimental Skepticism

• Rafael Miranda-Rojas Universidad Católica del Maule – Talca, Chile http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6603-070X

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5648443

Abstract

Today, rational intuition is the subject of intense debate. Particularly, it is discussed what epistemic role it fulfills, if it fulfills some. Recently, Machery (2017) has proposed a modal skepticism regarding the validity of intuitions in the philosophical field, restricting with this moreover the scope of the philosophical discipline in general. The proposal of experimental philosophy would not only rules out the validity of intuitions in the philosophical field, but might through this debate put in question the very nature of philosophy, as well as its object of study. It is therefore a metaphilosophical discussion. In this paper I propose an anti-skeptical response to the role of rational intuitions, while at the same I discuss the scope of method of cases. I conclude that although an intuition does not justify or evidence any belief or knowledge, it fulfills a relevant propaedeutic role, which allows sustaining an rationalist naturalist position, empirically informed.

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