Investor-expert interaction model in the innovation investment system with knowledge asymmetry

• Alim O. Gurtuev, Zaur Z. Ivanov Candidate of Economic Sciences, Department of Economics of Innovation, Institute for Computer Science and Problems of Regional Management of Kabardino-Balkarian Research Center of RAS, Nalchik, Russia
• Elena G. Derkach Researcher, Department of Economics of Innovation, Institute for Computer Science and Problems of Regional Management of Kabardino-Balkarian Research Center of RAS, Nalchik, Russia derkazh19@mail.r
• Halimat K. Kazancheva Doctor of Economic Sciences, Department of Economics of Innovation, Institute for Computer Science and Problems of Regional Management of Kabardino-Balkarian Research Center of RAS, Nalchik, Russia
• Aminat Kh. Dumanova Candidate of Economic Sciences, Department of Economics of Innovation, Institute for Computer Science and Problems of Regional Management of Kabardino-Balkarian Research Center of RAS, Nalchik, Russia

Palabras clave: innovation, investment, information, asymmetry, opportunism.

Resumen

The mechanisms of investing in innovation projects, when an objective evaluation of a project is impossible due to inherent uncertainty are subjects of increasing interest. As a method, the toolkit of non-cooperative games with communication is widely used in economics to model situations of information asymmetry. We propose a model of investor-expert interaction in the system of innovation investment. The model is a recurring game with imperfect information, deferred revenues and Bayesian re-evaluation of players’ own type.Different equilibria for some qualitatively different configurations of initial values of budgets, risk attitude, and distribution of player types are found.