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### Metaphilosophy: Ontological and Deontic Forms of Reflection

*Metafilosofía: formas deónticas y ontológicas de reflexión*

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#### ABSTRACT

The article explores the ontological premises of philosophizing. The author proves that these bases are key in the formation of a specific type of ontological reflection. The dominance of ontological reflection in the history of western philosophical tradition allowed many private sciences to take shape inside philosophy. The author shows that private sciences, separating from philosophy, alienate ontological reflection from it, which is the cause of the crisis state of modern philosophy and the exacerbation of problems of a metaphilosophical nature. The author formulates original concepts of ontological and deontic reflection, based on the ideas of Parmenides and Socrates.

**Keywords:** Metaphilosophy, philosophy, reflection, The Being, The Good.

#### RESUMEN

El artículo explora las premisas ontológicas del filosofar. El autor prueba que estas bases son clave en la formación de un tipo específico de reflexión ontológica. El predominio de la reflexión ontológica en la historia de la tradición filosófica occidental permitió que muchas ciencias privadas tomaran forma dentro de la filosofía. El autor muestra que las ciencias privadas, separándose de la filosofía, enajenan de ella la reflexión ontológica, que es la causa del estado de crisis de la filosofía moderna y la exacerbación de problemas de carácter metafilosófico. El autor formula conceptos originales de reflexión ontológica y deóntica, basados en las ideas de Parménides y Sócrates.

**Palabras clave:** El Bien, El Ser, filosofía, metafilosofía, reflexión.

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## **INTRODUCTION**

### **Ontological foundations of philosophizing**

The question of the beginning of the act of philosophizing can be reduced to the question of the premises of philosophical thought. Tackle obvious tangible objects, but how true is this evidence? Can the objects of the material world seem and think to me? Obviously, yes. Therefore, the boundary between thinking and the outside world is not so straightforward, because the reality that we discover is mediated by thinking and perception. It is possible to determine what is the initial ontological impulse of philosophizing only if we get to the limit of philosophical thinking and determine the boundary between the external and the internal, between being and thinking, between the real and the conceivable (Enyedí: 2016, pp.9-25).

Why are we even sure that there is something? Such a simple question is a metaphysical view of the problem of ontology. We are not asking about the essential filling of being, but about where in general and why the thought of being arises, and why do we actually believe that this thought is true? We are not trying to build some kind of ontological picture, and we are trying to clarify the foundation on which any other ontology is based. We can rephrase this very question and ask it as follows: why do we believe that being is? Obviously, this question cannot be answered by simply pointing out the analyticity of the judgment "being is" - being is insofar as the predicate "be" is embedded in the definition of being. Being is not a predicate at all, because "being" and "being something" are the same thing. When we say that something falls under a certain predicate, then along with this we already say that this something exists. And there is no need in addition to this particular predicate to ascribe a predicate of existence. D. Hume, for example, argues this point of view in this way:

... The idea of existence is identical with the idea of what we present as existing. Just thinking about a thing and thinking of it as existing is exactly the same thing. The idea of existence, attached to the idea of an object, does not add anything to it. Whatever we imagine, we present it as existing. Every idea, whatever we form, is the idea of some being, and the idea of some being is any idea, whatever we form (Hume: 1996, p.124).

We also find a similar point of view in Kant, who says that "if I think of a thing, by means of any predicates and any number of them (Welche und wieviel Prädikate ich will) (even defining it comprehensively), then by adding that this thing exists, nothing will join it" (Kant: 1999, p.733). Given the continuing interest in the ideas of Kant and Hume, one cannot dismiss this argument.

Therefore, when we ask why we are sure that there is something, we obviously do not ask whether it is legitimate to ascribe the predicate to "exist" to be. Our question is, why do we believe that what we attribute to predicates exists? On the other side of names and objects should be something that we define as an ontological foundation, ontological evidence. For example, in Kantian philosophy, such a basis is the "thing-in-itself", which can be considered as a special case of conceptualization of a certain general basis of philosophizing (Ilikova: 2019, pp.129-140).

## **METHODOLOGY**

Following Parmenides, we can take the next step to the beginnings of philosophizing: "For that which is not there can neither be known (will not succeed) nor explained... for thinking is the same as being" (Fragments of the early Greek philosophers: 1989, p.576) If you look closely, then with this phrase Parmenides demonstrates how we can find that something is, that is, something is independent and apart from our language. The identity of being and thinking, first of all, gives us a way to verify the certainty of being, i.e. that something is objective. It would be a great exaggeration to say here that everything conceivable exists or in some way "is". Obviously, the thought of something else does not create this something; the thought of

something is not the essence of this something. To defend such a point of view would require considerable flexibility in the position regarding the interpretation of the connection between being and thinking, for example, introducing a special kind of existence - the non-material being of ideas, mental states, etc. In this case, great difficulties arise in arguing the legitimacy of their special ontological status. For Parmenides, the mere presence of thought clearly demonstrates that something really is (Lugosi: 2018, pp.210-233). The implementation of any thinking, even the most inaccurate and incorrect, stems from the immediate clarity and obviousness that there is something beyond the limits of this thinking. For example, we may be mistaken in the content of this thought, but it is impossible to doubt that it is based on the premise of the obviousness of being. In other words, thought as potency is possible only because there is something, or being is (Pirro&Róna: 2019, pp.603-626).

Descartes did a similar procedure, looking for a reliable basis of knowledge. If in the process of sceptical reduction, we reject all that is doubtful, then the only thing that remains is thinking itself, the act of which makes its ontological basis reliable and certain. "I think. Therefore, I exist" - this is the result of the Cartesian doubt, in which thinking is associated with the ontological concept of existence. Descartes demonstrates that the truth, falsity, accuracy or vagueness of thinking does not matter, because even from the very fact that we can be mistaken, we are able to deduce an absolutely certain idea that something is, and this "is" does not apply to our thinking, and what exists besides thinking (Melikhov: 2014). In this, we fundamentally disagree with Descartes, because we believe that in the implementation of thinking for us it becomes obvious not only that thinking exists, but that there is something that allows this thinking to be realized.

A very simple example, if we take the famous thought experiment called "brains in a flask", it becomes clear that I can be exactly the same illusion as the rest of the content of thinking. Hilary Putnam describes this experiment as follows:

...Imagine that a human being (you can imagine this to be yourself) has been achieved to an operation by an evil scientist. The person's brain (your brain) has been removed from the body and placed in a vat of nutrients which keeps the brain alive. The nerve endings have been connected to a super-scientific computer which causes the person whose brain it is to have the illusion that everything is perfectly normal. There seem to be people, objects, the sky, etc.; but really all the person (you) is experiencing is the result of electronic impulses travelling from the computer to the nerve endings (Putnam: 2018).

This experiment may demonstrate that the evidence of the belonging of thought in the act of sceptic reduction that Descartes insists on is not so obvious. If all my thoughts, as in the case of a super-computer, including these reasonings, are dictated by something external, then I cannot conclude "I think", rather, just "think". Therefore, from this, we simply "think" we can conclude not to personal existence "therefore, I am, "as Descartes does, but to simply" exists ". At the same time, since existence is not a predicate, it is completely impossible to say what this "exists" refers to. Therefore, we have the only immediate evidence that something exists, but there is no way to say what, because the predicates of this are inaccessible to us, and existence is not (Stojarová: 2018, pp.32-45).

Confidence that something is acting as a driving force for the implementation of the cognitive process, without going into the problems of the possibility of its implementation and the boundaries of human knowledge. Cognition and understanding is essentially an attempt to fill the Parmenides intuition about being with some content. However, such attempts are initially doomed not to be exhaustive, since the knowledge gained is always incomplete with respect to intuition about being, i.e. it is impossible to have such knowledge about being that would be exhaustive regarding the content of ontological intuition. This contradiction between the ontological intuition about being and its content is fixed by Parmenides as a contradiction between

"knowledge in truth" and "knowledge in opinion". Parmenides himself determines the reason for the appearance of opinion (doxa):

"Mortals have decided so: to name two forms  
Of which one should not — and this is their error. "

Objects (as meaningful content) are limited being, but this limitation is the introduction of non-being into being. It penetrates there along with the fact that "mortals" feel the need to name what is. The perception of being, the thought of it and the representation in the language are not holistic for obvious reasons - a person cannot perceive infinite being, it is tied to a specific place and time, in addition, perception is heterogeneous in itself; it, for example, testifies that one area of being is different from another. A concrete illustration is the border of the subject, and this is a difference in perception: I lead my palm along the smooth surface of the countertop, where it ends, my perception suddenly changes - I no longer perceive what I perceived. When a holistic perception suddenly changes, it means that I have reached the boundary, and I place these boundaries as the boundary of the subject, although all we have is that our perception at this point is different from perception at another. The conditional point between one perception and another is imagined as a boundary. Moreover, the mechanical addition of one perception to another does not give a holistic understanding of what is (Nihad: 2006, pp.11-29).

The field of opinion is a necessary element of cognitive activity. It may seem unnecessary that, having described the true knowledge of being, Parmenides considers it necessary to move on to the field of the void - imaginary, probably erroneous, ideas. According to Reinhardt's thought, this is not an accident, because, in this area, a person authorizes a mistake, and at the same time, the opportunity to make mistakes for himself, since opinion (doxa) is a sphere of representation and expression of how being is represented to a person (Reinhardt: 1974, p.293-312).

Therefore, the second part of Parmenides' poem is not a curtsy in the direction of public representation and the desire to please the widespread point of view. This is an area of living, moving thinking. Immovable, static thought is truth because it coincides with being, for which no change is already characteristic. The opinion is developing thinking, possible only through error, i.e. by assuming non-being. It is impossible to rethink the truth, to change it in some way, since it is clear that if such a change occurs, then the conceivable was not true (Prostova et al.: 2020).

It should be especially noted that "knowledge in truth" and "knowledge in opinion" are not correlated in this case as "truth" and "falsehood", their relation is, rather, the relation of absolute and relative truth in the process of scientific knowledge. The relativity of truth in opinion is a dynamic change in human representations in the movement of thought to absolute truth. This type of philosophizing can be called ontological. And it is precisely his dominance in the Western philosophical tradition over a long historical period that is the reason for the development of scientific knowledge. We argue that specialization and the allocation of private, scientific disciplines are closely related to the development of a special philosophical type of thinking - ontological reflection. Along with this, the causes of the modern crisis of philosophy associated with its self-determination are being clarified. Ontological reflection used to be an integral function of philosophy itself, only because private sciences were dissolved in it, however, as their independence grew, various sciences separated from philosophy, gradually alienating the function of ontological reflection from philosophy. Therefore, the modern crisis of philosophy is a crisis of the fact that for centuries the dominant function of philosophy no longer belongs to it. Explains and cognizes being, i.e. realizes ontological reflection, it is science, and philosophy has remained with the painful task of finding a new function, a different type of reflection and philosophizing. Next, we will try to clarify the picture of the alienation of ontological reflection from philosophy in the process of specialization of private sciences (Gagak:2020).

## RESULTS

### Ontological reflection and its alienation from philosophy

Having discovered that philosophical thought unfolds in the field of opinion, we must also assume, on the basis of ontological grounds, that this thinking should be a mixture of being and non-being. In other words, philosophical thought should, in some way, bring non-existence into being. In this confusion, an object appears as a way of segmented knowledge of integral being. An object not only penetrates our perception, but it appears when perception is comprehended from the point of view of the content of a certain concept. The object itself then appears not just as what is indicated in the real world with the help of a concept, but what symbolizes the content of the concept used. From the position of the Parmenides ontology, objectivity is the opinion of a person regarding what exists, i.e. rather, a person invents an object based on his own imperfect sensory experience. Therefore, when we, for example, fix in thinking that an orange lies in front of us, then we fix not the object itself, but what for us symbolizes the content of the concept of "orange". In this sense, the orange itself is also a symbol of the orange, i.e. that conveys the content of the human concept of orange. We find a similar thought in Losev, who writes: "After all, every real thing, since it is thought by us and perceived by us as directly and independently existing, is, we said, a symbol. This tree, growing in front of my window, is just what it means: it is a tree and means a tree" (Losev: 1994, p.919). In this case, orange and tree symbolize the content of the concepts "orange" and "tree".

If objectivity is deprived of conceptual content, then, in fact, there will be no object, there will be something indefinite within its borders, which is given to us in perception. Therefore, some logicians, when it comes to the medium of truth (truth in a logical sense, not Parmenidian), prefer to talk about propositions, not facts. For example, the famous line by Gotlob Frege: "Facts, facts, facts" cries the scientist if he wants to bring home the necessity of a firm foundation for science. What is a fact? A fact is a thought that is true " (McGrath et al.: 2018). A statement is true in a logical sense, not because it is consistent with the subject, but because the subject and factuality express the same meaning as the given statement.

For the implementation of philosophical thinking, this understanding is fundamentally important, since it begins not as an objective thought, but as a thought of objective thought. This reveals to us the reflexivity of philosophical thought. When a philosopher reflects on a subject, it is no longer a thought about the content of a concept, but a thought about the thinking of a given concept. Here, it would seem, everything is clear, for the implementation of philosophizing it is necessary to take a reflective position, this can be stopped. However, if you carefully consider this issue, it turns out that reflection can be carried out in different ways.

If we look, for example, at an orange, then perceiving it as an object, we comprehend it from the point of view of the content of the concept. We may not have a clear definition, but in our thinking, we fix, assume that it is citrus, its color, shape, approximate taste, etc. All this is the content of our thinking regarding objectivity, which is the content of a concept that is used to designate a given subject and which this subject specifically symbolizes. Carrying out reflection, we do not think in a meaningful way the object itself, but in our meaningful thinking. In other words, we are problematizing the very way we think about this subject. Perhaps we can think of it somehow differently? Then an orange ceases to be just an orange, and you can add some more meaning to it.

Then, in addition to objective factuality, we can see some additional reflective meanings. For example, an orange can be a symbol of death, as in the films of Kopolla, when the viewer sees an orange on the screen, then in addition to the factual content of this object, he also sees an omen of death, since any appearance of an orange means the speedy death of one of the characters in the film. If this method of reflection is used for speculative purposes, then it turns out that anything can mean anything, because such an understanding of things is based on simple human imagination, when some metaphorical, allegorical image is ascribed to an arbitrary object. Such is the way of absolutely free, unshackled reflection on the subject (Wu & Brenner: 2017, pp.22).

## **DISCUSSION**

Philosophical ontological reflection becomes scientific when thinking limits itself to the scope of permissible speculation. If in an act of truly philosophical reflection (not burdened with anything), an object can be interpreted as anything, through any metaphor or allegory, then scientific reflection strictly defines the boundaries of this understanding. These boundaries of scientific ontological reflection are created by the procedural description language (having established unambiguous terms), as well as by the specific methodological apparatus. The boundaries of scientific reflection are designed to prevent excessive speculation about objects, while free non-methodological, non-procedural ontological reflection of philosophy is completely free in a speculative definition. For example, if for philosophy an orange can mean anything, and in the act of reflection it can be made a symbol of anything ("orange-death"), then, from the point of view of botany as a science, an orange is a type of fruit tree, as well as the fruits themselves, a kind of citrus. No other interpretation or speculation is possible for botany (Usubjonovna: 2020).

Free, methodologically vague philosophical reflection gives rise to the scope of scientific methodology, which should further limit the excess of unlimited philosophical speculation. The ontological reflection that unfolds in opinion must necessarily limit itself in order to have some stationary certainty of the content of being. Thus, ontological reflection, which began in the bosom of philosophy as an attempt to answer the question "what exactly is there?" (the content of intuition about being), develops towards the most refined and unambiguous speculation regarding the content of being. This is how the methodology of specific sciences takes shape, which gradually leaves the wing of philosophy, leaving behind the function of the most rigorous ontological reflection. Therefore, the current crisis state of philosophy can be understood as the result of separation from philosophy of the most accurate forms of ontological reflection, which once, before the separation of any special science, were part of its function. Hence the desperate attempts to transform

## **CONCLUSION**

Thus, it is clear that philosophy is not a form of cognition of the external world, if the thinker wants to know what the world is; then he needs to turn to the unrecognizable naturalized areas of once philosophical thought - physics, chemistry, biology, etc. These areas have emerged from under the wing of naturalistic speculation that can be considered the most plausible. The point of philosophy is to carry out deontic reflection and, bearing in mind that it exists in the field of opinion, one can try to formulate some methodological principles.

### **Deontic reflection and Socrates method**

Exploring other ways of implementing reflection, we can assume that to understand a particular object does not mean its explanation from the position of what it is. For us, explanation and understanding is made in terms of what the subject should be. Philosophical thought rushes away from factuality to nonexistence in the sense that the philosophizing mind is trying to answer the question of what the subject should become. An idea, in this sense, should be a goal for objectivity. She does not justify reality, but seeks to capture her best image. For example, when a person's problem arises before the philosophical mind, he sees the essence of not a real person and not some collective abstraction, but that person who, in his opinion, should become a person and, first of all, he himself. The idea for the philosopher is his desire, which does not coincide with the real one, and in this desire the potential is gained for striving for this idea. The unthinkable is grasped in an intuitive philosophical act, for granted and desired. Of course, you need to understand that philosophical thought, which affirms something due, is wholly and completely unfolding in the field of opinion. Consequently, the philosopher cannot be guided by a certain universal obligation. There and then, when a certain philosophical thought becomes the only idea of what is due, it ceases to be philosophical in the sense that it

is already conceived not as an opinion, but as a dogma. Bearing in mind that due is only a modest statement of a particular philosopher, then philosophy exists as long as there is a discussion of the due.

Thus, the goal of teaching philosophy is to instill in a person the desire to formulate and think about ideas that would be for him models of the desired and the best, and which he would like to correspond with. It seems to us that Socrates, the great teacher of all Western philosophy, understood this very well. So, for example, when Socrates introduces the concept of good, he does not introduce it as a formulated and definite idea that we can contemplate. Fortunately, as we understand it, in the Socratic sense, this is the very internal intention or orientation of the philosopher to the perfect idea of anything, which would be a model and goal for the existing factuality. Fortunately, there is rather a prism, or in our case, a methodological principle through which all objects are considered by the philosophical mind. At the same time, it is also a problem over which the philosopher permanently works, and it is important not the final definition, but the constant updating of the problem of the good that we set for ourselves. This is also explained by the fact that a person has only an opinion about the good, which he must constantly double-check, revise, and over which he should reflect. Thus, Socrates replaces the ontological intuition of being that Parmenides had with the deontic intuition about good.

In our view, such an understanding of reflection is required that, on the one hand, would allow us to move from factual to mental objectivity, and on the other, would not allow speculativeness, at any of the levels. By such a way, we see a rethinking of the main question when we feel the need or need to implement a reflective philosophical act. Usually, when trying to understand the essence of reflection, the simplest explanation is the statement that this is thinking about thinking. The thinker observes some objectivity, but the object of thinking is not the object, but this object itself, the thinker, i.e. in thinking considers his thinking of the subject. Intuitively, such a formulation suggests that reflection is carried out in resolving the question of how I think this subject. In this "how?" can be seen, some unrecognized in the initial objective thinking meanings related to the subject, in other words, the thinker can understand that what he thought before as a conceptual content of the subject can be thought differently. However, such a statement of the issue imperceptibly involves the thinker in speculation, since the temptation to think "in a different way" can be anything, having a rather rich and poetic imagination. In order to prevent such speculation, we believe that the question of reflection should not be thought of "how do I think this subject?", But "how should I think this subject?", Which corresponds to the transition from ontological reflection on the content of being to deontic reflection, i.e. reflection for granted.

Speculative reflection is aimed at being and asks "what is an object?", And deontic reflection asks the question "what should an object be like?", That is, it is aimed not at the existing, but at the ideal discretion of objectivity, what Socrates called the concept of Good. Two intuitions are contrasted here: ontological intuition about being and deontic about good. When we ask for reflection in reflection, we do not consider objectivity from the point of view of what a given subject is. After we reconstructed the Parmenid ontological intuition that there is something, we realized that it was completely meaningful empty, since any attempt to answer the question: "what exactly is there?" it turns out that we are instantly transferred from the realm of true knowledge to the realm of opinion. For sophists, this stay in "opinion" becomes an occasion to level the truth even as a goal. There is no point in trying to endow the ontological intuition with the most accurate content if any attempt always somehow turns out to be just an opinion. For example, we can find a clear understanding of this in the views of the senior sophist Gorgias, who believed that any opinion was ultimately false (Wolf: 2014). It is impossible to express Being in the sense that its content is not directly accessible to us, or it may not be available in principle, therefore there is no need for truth. Any object can be anything, any objectivity in an act of speculative reflection can be attributed to any meaning or value. And this meaning will be as false as any other. No, from Gorgy's point of view, there is a fundamental difference in saying that "the rose is red" and that "the rose is love" - all this is equally far removed from the real state of affairs, i.e. from true being. Philosophical thinking aimed at the content of being, i.e. trying to answer the question of what is, it turns out to be speculation on the motive of objectivity. Then ontological intuition itself loses all its meaning, because what does a person care about being if he cannot answer the question of what it is. At the same time,

philosophizing itself is reduced to the level of ericism. Therefore, Gorgias takes the argument of the Elean school and proves the exact opposite that nothing exists at all, because the ontological intuition about being no longer plays any role for him. Whether there is something or not, it does not play any role, since a person is locked up in the dungeon of his own opinion. The sophists' thought, which turns into speculation and relativism, is the realization of a naturalistic ontological reflection. In contrast, Socrates puts forward deontic reflection on the due, which obviously is not a part or content of being. The due is added to factuality as a missing item (Freeks: 2016, pp.236-248).

This is also the non-naturalization of the philosophical act of deontic reflection - this is not a form of cognition, but rather a form of understanding in the aspect of the due. Philosophy does not know a certain natural object of the world, philosophy in this sense is artificial, as purely human, but it is absolutely real, as the norms and rules of culture are real for us. Thought is naturalized only in speculative reflection, when it, driven by the desire to know the content of being, imperceptibly slides into opinion. In such a reversal, it is clear that the naturalness of thinking is more unnatural, since human opinion gives out as the real content of being. While artificial reflection on the due becomes a natural reconciliation with one's opinion, when words and objects are understood as what they are - just words and objects, but not being. The naturalness of deontic reflection is the awareness of the thinker of his stay in artificiality, in opinion, and if it is artificial, then I can comprehend it better, through the prism of good, and then human stay in this artificiality of opinion can become a little better, a little more perfect.

It is easy to see that different people can differently understand the due. And the deontic implementation of philosophy, in contrast to speculative reflection, is clearly aware of this. If for speculative reflection the conceivable should be a reflection of the real content of being, i.e. the opinion formulated in this reflection is affirmed as true, then deontic reflection knows that it is only an opinion. And she does not truly, once and for all, seek to fill the deontic intuition with some concrete content. Deontic reflection as the implementation of philosophizing should occur constantly. Firstly, because if we think of a certain result of philosophical reflection as final and final, then all philosophizing ends there and there, the philosopher becomes an ideologist or preacher who wants to inspire or spread the result of his reflection. Hence, for example, the Socratic hostility to the written word, since there is a big difference between the result of philosophizing and the very implementation of philosophical reflection. The written philosophical text, not philosophy anymore, is the final ossified result. Therefore, when teaching philosophy, it is not necessary to disseminate texts and ideas, this is secondary, it is necessary to attach to philosophical non-speculative reflection. Secondly, it is impossible to constantly possess the result of thinking, since we possess a thing. For example, if in deontic reflection I formulated principles and norms of behavior worthy of a person for myself, this does not mean at all that all my subsequent behavior in the future will necessarily be subject to this understanding. Reflection is required to be carried out constantly, producing the same result or checking own conclusions. More generally, it can be said that each new generation must again in a reflective act receive the cultural norms of its own society, since the norms inherited from the elders (generations) are something external and foreign, which is ideologically and forcefully imposed. Therefore, deontic reflection should not be carried out as a result, i.e. to be only a norm or a philosophical text, but as a permanent reflection itself. In addition, since deontic reflection openly accepts its opinion, it should be at the same time an invitation to philosophizing, i.e. Conscious of their artificiality, i.e. own generation of opinion, reflection should initially be predisposed to dialogue and polylogue. A completely different question is what should be some kind of philosophical institution that would provide such a space of reflection. However, at the moment we are not talking about this.

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