


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Police Control Over Radical Groups

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Abstract

Differing from the Orde Baru era, in the Reformation era the police were limited on handling radical groups regarding the compatibility of democracy. Controlling radical groups is a long chain of prevention and counter-terrorism. That terror (terrorism) is the fruit of radicalism; although not all groups of radical or radical actors have always terrorized. The purpose of the paper is tracing how police identified radicalism; and how the police control the radical groups. This was done using the Focused Group Discussion method in three Regional Police (Polda), containing 15 sub-regional police. The findings, to identify radical groups, is based on the definition that is constructed by the social environment. To distinguish radical groups, police base this on “social construction”. So, it is not as done by the Crime Investigation Section that has a strict size in the legal norm. In fact, “social construction” is moving faster than the formal legal norms that the criminal investigation has in common.

Keywords: Radical Groups, Control, Social constructions .

Control Policial Sobre Grupos Radicales.

Resumen

A diferencia de la era de Orde Baru, en la era de la Reforma la policía se limitó a manejar grupos radicales con respecto a la compatibilidad de la democracia. El control de los grupos radicales es una larga cadena de prevención y lucha contra el terrorismo. Ese terror (terrorismo) es el fruto del radicalismo; aunque no todos los grupos de actores radicales o radicales siempre han aterrorizado. El propósito del documento es rastrear cómo la policía identificó el radicalismo; y cómo la policía controla a los grupos radicales. Esto se realizó utilizando el método de discusión grupal focalizada en tres policías regionales (Polda), que contenían 15 policías subregionales. Los hallazgos, para identificar grupos radicales, se basan en la definición que construye el entorno social. Para distinguir a los grupos radicales, la policía basa esto en la “construcción social”. Por lo tanto, no es como lo hace la Sección de Investigación de Delitos que tiene un tamaño estricto en la norma legal. De hecho, la “construcción social” se está moviendo más rápido que las normas legales formales que la investigación criminal tiene en común.

Palabras clave: Grupos radicales, Control, Construcciones sociales.

1. INTRODUCTION

As the social entity, ‘radical group’ by default refers to the understanding of the group that imposes the will (for example, NOOR HUDA ISMAIL, KOMPAS, 3 Feb 2017 quoted ROY (2002)). The imposition of the will is an interaction dimension that rests on the mind (Holy Quran interpretation) that is usually beyond the mainstream. Besides being labelled radical, the terminology towards such a religious behavior tends to have several variations, such as an extreme, fundamentalist, and militant (BAKRI, 2004). The implication of the emergence of a radical movement is the emergence of a movement calling for unity between religion and the state and requiring religion to be treated as public life (MAKSUM, FEBRIANTO, & WAHYUNI, 2019). Of course, as a thought, radicalism is not necessarily present factually in the form of physical violence. Radical Islam has its origins in intellectuals and organizations that were not always radical or violent (WUTHNOW, 2007). It is a dilemma for the police, that character

of the task is almost always related to physical violence.

This group exclusively withdrew from social life that they think is secular. It is rising of social distance, then makes social segregation which becomes a potential tension in society (CELISO, 2018). Although existing radicalism groups (as thought) were not thought a form of crime in general, the police were deemed important to gain control. This research restricts conventional police work minus the special police sub-institution of Densus 88, because of a specially designed sub-institution (KARNAVIAN, 2014, KARNAVIAN, 2015).

Until the end of the 1990s, in the New Order era, the police were relatively effective in suppressing the movement of radical groups, at least at the symptomatic level. The Post-New Order style of policing was confronted with complex social and political realities, the police had to consider many factors in enforcing the law and maintaining public order. These conditions forced police to re-construct policing models (DEVROE, 2015). The existence of Islamic radicalism could not be restrained for ideological reasons, as manifested in a repressive-antagonistic state policy (MASDAR HILMY, 2015). In the reformation era police's response--a public security authority is limited regarding the compatibility of the instrument of democracy. The act number 15 of 2003 on the eradication of terrorism has not been sensitive to provide sufficient opportunities for the police to control radical groups.

Factually, concerns against the radical movement are backed by the two dimensions. First, in the constellation of the global establishment of religion-based radical group, the Islamic State Iraq Syria (ISIS). In this decade, ISIS became the most-massive organization in spreading radicalism. And, secondly, Indonesia chose democracy as a system of living. This means, in addition to the spaces of freedom (freedom of Association) to be a *conditio sine qua non*, on the other hand the 're-install' on the system. It means that the democracy (including the governance of security actors) are in the process of 'becoming' (NUGROHO,2012).

The control of radical groups is a long chain of prevention and counter-terrorism. This proposition is about insisting that terror (terrorism) is the fruit of radicalism; although not every group/radical actor has always been groups/people who do terror. The deradicalization project was promoted

by the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) as a soft strategy in tackling terrorism. This project is the involvement of the civil society, namely the leaders (informal) community, religious institutions, campus, and family counseling. This is basically in addition to police carrying out the institutions responsible for security and order of the community (ZUHRI, 2017). If deradicalization occurs in a policy-program aimed at the terrorist convicts by giving a package of social, legal, political, educational, and economic assistance (GOLOSE, 2010), on the other hand not every radical group consists of inmates. This paper describes the police in controlling the Indonesian radical groups; In the process, the way police identify radical group entities is an important part.

2. RESEARCH METHOD

There are two dimensions of radical group articulation: First is the dimension of thought; and second aspects of the action, namely imposition of will. The research statement of the paper puts the police in identifying both dimensions. Specifically, there is undiscovered research published on this matter, except for its proximity to the research of police activities in democratization. For example, Hung-En Sung, explained the influence of democratization by the police work in managing security (www.emeraldinsight.com/1363-951X.htm). Public demand for security in the democratic process shifts the way away from police work: from which the police originally intended to be autonomous in cooperating or participating in the community. Extension and intensification of social relations with various social ties in society is a new skill demands for the police in 'define of reality' (VICTOR LEVASHOV, 2002). Thus, it becomes fundamental for this paper to describe how the police relations with the public identify the sense of security bearing upon radical groups.

This research uses qualitative methods. Focus Group Discussion (FGD) technique is a main instrument, because the subject matter of the research it is a social process -- that primarily concerns police thinking (strategy or ways) and acts on controlling over radical groups.

Research areas in three provinces or Regional Police, namely: Central Java, West Java, and Yogyakarta. For each Regional Police (Polda) are taken three Sub-Regional Police (Polres) which are considered by the Polda as districts (Polres area) vulnerable to radical groups. At the Polres there

are at least 5 participants of FGD. Participants on discussion are limited to the officers-managing at regional police (Polres) and community leaders. The officers-managing at regional police are represented by some head of operations. They consist of Security Intelligence Section, Crime Investigation Section, Uniformed Unit, Community Development Section (Bimas). And, community leaders represented by Ulama (local ulama). He could be a member of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) and a member of religion-based community organizations like Nahdhatul Ulama or Muhammadiyah. Thus, all participants in the three Regional Police numbered 9 Sub-Regional Police. So, that the FGD participants consisted of 15 times 3, totaling at least 45 participants. Membership discussion adjust profile (movement) radicalism or radical groups in the field. FGD method with a variety of participant possibly occurs with mutual confirmation of data and thoughts directly. The study of document is done through the study of official documents in regional police. The search for the document concerns: a) the existence of radical groups; b) control over radical groups; c) cooperation with stake holders covering religious groups, community leaders, Pesantren, schools and others.

3. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

3.1 (Re)Construction Of Radical Groups

At any discussions (Focus Group Discussion), the police in controlling religious behavior cannot be separated from the frame of relations of the state with religion. This is because police conducting in controlling religious groups have parallels with the behavior of the state. As Max Weber's about ideal type says, the state should behave: then, police officers articulate state behavior. Without an ideal framework of this kind, orientation of this research will not be directed. "Does the state manage religion?" Indonesia, as a secular country, certainly has a state that manages religion. But, of course the closeness of the state with religion in Indonesia is not similar to Iran or Saudi Arabia. In the extreme points, distinguishing from Indonesia from secular countries such as America, France, Japan, and others. Some of these countries do not manage religion. The distance of relations of the state with religion is not constant, so this diverse phenomenon shows us that the secularism is not a uniform or singular concept. The basic of secularism has parallels with democracy, that the state does not administer/manage religion, because religion is seen as a private affair. In

the democratic concept, the attendance of the state only takes care about the public.

So the issue is how far does the state manage religion? Police do not fully care about religion in the theological sense (whether perverted or not), But the issue of radical groups (radicalism) can also be sourced from theology.

When the research was underway, many analyzed, by some observers and also by the police, that the terror change was happening. For example mentioning Kompas, 30 May 2017. The spread of radicalism increasingly reveals its complexity. Police saw that radicalism is produced on a two-dimensional face. Namely, radicalism is the consequence of the thought or interpretation of the Holy Quran (Theologik); And radicalism is a product of social environment (sociologic). They have no instrument to detect the theological dimensions. Besides the regulatory factors (Anti-terrorism act) which in-sensitive to the spread and rise of radicalism, the absence of instrument- theological detection could be a cause of police conceded for acts of terror.

Thus, the term of radical groups in the findings of discussion in the Sub-regional Police (Polres) is defined loosely, namely accrue to community religion or religion group that has the potential to carry disturbing on public order and security of the majority people. This is more of a sociological definition than theological, refers to the means of the imposition of wills known as the intolerant group. In some areas, the group has a different understanding (different theology) with the mainstream was not categorize as radical. The most powerful illustration, for example, in Wonosobo.


The results of discussions with some police in sub regional police have similarity with Security Development Board (Baharkam) view. Head of Security Development Board In the Seminar of "Police role in the management of radical in Indonesia to maintain security stability in the country before the 2014 election" in Yogyakarta, 11 June 2014, definition of a radical group refers to the group that wants to change or update social or political condition in a drastic way, even thoughts on the violent ways. This view gives the consequence that radicalism is not necessarily only related to religion. If this radicalism has a religious face, radicalism merely uses symbols or religions taken as justifications. This kind of view is no different, for example with the Yogyakarta Police chief. In the material

presentation he explained, define radicalism as “a thought that is made by a group of people (Ormas) who want a change or social and political differentiation drastic using violent means.”

The head of the Security Development Board’s paper above elaborates that radicalism is not only a monopoly of the religious group, but also happens to all fanatics on ideology that performed in a bigoted and revolutionary way. The term fanatic refers to action, not merely theological thinking. Similarly, radical Islam does not depart from the interpretation of the axis on the concept of “jihad”. But, merely interpretation (understanding) is not enough, the important thing is the manifestation in action for what is being thought. For example, the Islamic Defender Front (FPI) is categorized as radical not because of a theological aspect or a such religious understanding an sich, But on the behavioral aspect/action that the imposing the will. The ‘sweeping’ icon is attached to Islamic Defender Front. The implications of this icon are the social distance with the governments and authority of public security.

However, not every region gives the same category to FPI even if this exception is not too significant. For example, Yogyakarta sees FPI as an un-radical organization because it tends to be cooperative with governments. In Solo, region that is the most complete has a radical groups, the petition FPI is very weak against other radical groups, like such as The Muslim Warriors (Laskar Umat Islam), the Islamic Congregation Of Syariah (Jamaah Ansyarut Syariah), and the Community of Ansyarut Daulah (Jamaah Ansyarut Daulah). Through the construction a radical group is easily formulated within the group’s relationship with the official authorities. As follows,

Picture 1
The Radical Group and Relation with Formal Authority



The Radical group and its relation with formal authority

This scheme illustrates the gradation of radical group categories that are based on social distances to governments. The term ‘social distance’ is more broadly dimensional meaning more than just cooperation. Cooperation is only one aspect of the practice of the social distance dimension. Thus, the term social distance in this framework is understood in the psycho-cultural framework. This scheme illustrates that having social distances with governments is more radical to the community organization. In the simplistic framework, the diagonal straight line “cover” the category of radical “captured” in the organization, while the untracked group in this straight line means it exceeds the average mystery of the radical group. This means that such organizations are cells that are not detected by conventional police organs such as the Community Development Section (Bimas).

How to track this social distance is the same as how the police ‘define’ a group which is said to be radical. The police did not define it in the theological framework. However, he refers to the radical definition constructed by the mainstream group. For example, and foremost is the definition of Nahdhlīyin and Muhammadiyah. So, it could be, for example the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) is more radical in the area but not in other areas. So basically in social practice, disruption of community order is a benchmark of radicalism.

Solo type

Not all regions have complete various radical groups as a kind of Solo region as figured on schemed above. Solo is an area that is complete with a variety of radical groups. These radical groups are even neatly organized in containers that are relatively ‘fuse ‘ in Dewan Syariah Surakarta (DSKS). “Solo scheme” is only a model, so tends to be loosely worn in a number of areas. Yogyakarta, for example, has a quite ‘complete’ radical groups in existence, but is not as fused as Solo Type.

Radical groups and culture

To categorize social groups as ‘radicals’ is not necessarily parallel to every community. It is not in every region that the FPI is categorized as radical. Seeing FPI as ‘radical’ because it caused the difficulty of this group was accepted its existence. In Celegon and Wonosobo, for example, are two areas that have extreme cultural distance to this group. So, the Front Islamic

Defender cannot be a living space here. On the almost contrary, the FPI phenomenon in Cilegon and Wonosobo are extremes opposite Solo. The Islamic Defenders Front in Solo slowly drowned not because of the culturally rejected as such in Cilegon and Wonosobo, but precisely because of the heterogeneity of the radical group in this city. These 'radical' groups (also in Solo case) compete with each other. It can be said that relation radical groups among them tend to be conflictual. They are fragile or very easy broken.

So, at least, they weaken one another. Islamic Defenders Front is one of the illustrations that has become a victim of radical group competition. What makes it weak is that the organization feels defamatory by other 'radical' organizations that its leader is contaminated by syi'ah. Because of Syi'ah being issued, there is a kind of 'struggle' radical group which is precisely staged FPI. Although they (radical organizations) scramble for influence, on the other hand in certain cases, they organize themselves into one.

3.2 Control Over Radical Groups

The police define radicalism or radical groups who do not base their actions on thought (or theology). It is actually a record for researchers, in limited discussion (FGD) with local religious figures (ulama lokal), that taking radical categories through theological is not fully held firmly. Because theology was facing social conditions, and then being transformed or shifted. For example, if radicalism is addressed to wahabism it turns out that the wahabism transformed. However, sociologically – still in that discussion – this transformation does not entirely succeed. Only a small fraction of the move from radical-Wahhabi to moderate without losing its character. Most of them are still tending to be radical. It is not easy also to get an answer on how and why these followers are no longer a supporter of radicalism.

However, thought or theology is primarily held on acts or actions that impose the will. This definition face the complexity when bearing on issue of the majority relationship with the minority. The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) in many regions is categorized as radical, because in addition to his talk that tends to criticize the government, the group was known for the harsh actions preceding law enforcement. When the 'impose of will' is

performed among the majority (mainstream) against minority, like Ahmadiyah or Shia, it cannot be labelled/categorized as radical group. So, the way that the police used to categorize radical groups besides on action imposing will, social distance with the government, and relation of majority with minority.

Once again, the side of theology (religious thought) is not a concern. In fact, referring to the chairman of PB NU Said Aqil Syiraz, the aspect of the thinking that is based on radical action: violence (OKEZONE.COM, 2016). Said Aqil's speech seems to only be relevant to radical groups at high degrees (look scheme above, radical groups and its relation with formal authority). Meanwhile, in the democracy framework, the thought or theology is positioned as a "private room", so it cannot be touched by the police. In this aspect, police as an authority of public security tend to late in anticipate violent acts. The late response is certainly also a contribution from the regulatory aspect (act on terrorism).

Primadona control function: Community Development Section (Bimas) and Security Intelligence Section.

The sociological trait of the radical group lies in the exclusion, and can be mentioned as strategies for an action system; and his thoughts were detached or exclusive from the formal institution neither participating on formal institution. It means that the thought of radicalism is circulated freely from all ties. The police work is on this sociological level. Community Development Section as a police instrument works through in an open network with community elements. When Community Development Section categorize of radical groups, it following the footsteps of the community, in particularly through organization of Nahdhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.

The Community Development Section personnel at the sub-regional police level generally are "local boy", so they understand deeply the cultural context of the region. Involvement in the forums of open-study haloqah becomes the primary source for defining whether a radical-categorized religious group or not. In this kind of Bimas framework is an environmental reflection of the its culture: the definition of the group (radical or not) is guided by social environment, not by the police itself. Here, Bimas is the most effective police instrument in identifying sociologically radical

groups. The identification of groups conducted as a strategy for the treatment of action and thinking systems from certain institutions.

On the other hand, Community Development Section certainly do not have the ability to ‘enter’ further in groups that have been themselves identified ‘closed’ among the public. What Bimas do is control the spread of radical thought. Technically, collaboration with elements of authority in the community to control over dai or public-religious speakers. They then also form the Dai Kamtibmas Community, that the member is the similar vision with the police.

Control over the radical groups and radicalism performed by Bimas (Community Development Section) has a uniform pattern, which distinguishes on the intensity. In controlling radical thought, Bimas is ‘equipped’, a kind of pamphlet or tool for facing/speaking of public. The pamphlet titled “Stop Terrorism Radicalism in Indonesia” consists of four pages, or about 500 words, was issued by the National Police Public Relations Division in 2016. Without pamphlet Bimas or Dai Kammtibmas relative does not have the material to be given to the audience.

Not as Security Intelligence Section, Community Development Section cannot enter the halaqoh of radical group (under cover). Nahdhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah are ahead in the open activities halaqoh. On many occasions these organizations quite effectively on minimize spread of radical thinking. The findings of this study strengthened (SAEFUDIN ZUHRI (2017). Zuhri measures the participation of civil society organizations to the deradicalization program proclaimed by BNPT.

While Security Intelligence Section – of course, are not equipped with the ability to grasp the theological issue – share information about the radicalism in Kominda. Specifically, regarding radicalism, the position of Kominda is very important for the police’s intelligent. Because, here, in Kominda the definition of radical groups is constructed. The criteria of radical group in a particular society at a certain degree is the result of the construction of a social structure definition. So the Security Intelligence Section cannot work alone. At a certain degree it is more important to “hear” and explore what is defined by the community about specific groups.

How Security Intelligence Section works, specifically in detecting radi-

calism differs from the way of drugs/narcotic intelligence works on and Crime Investigation Section. If Security Intelligence Section does not get information from Kominda, he was required to enter the network of authority to define the reality of radical. For example, this kind of authority can be found among mainstream religious actors, such as Nahdhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. At this level actually, the Security Intelligence Section's work is somewhat overlapping with Bimas's function. No Standard Operating regulates this kind of 'working division'. In limited discussions with two sub-police institutions, it is apparent that the Security Intelligence Section is more controlling the problem field than Community Development Section.

In Yogyakarta the average area of Central Java Dai Kamtibmas is relatively more vibrant. Dai Kamtibmas mean member of Community Development Section who are fostered to give religious lectures in mosques or mushala. In a number of these areas Dai Kamtibmas are 'equipped' as a pamphlet as a provision for public hearings. But, not all territorial units have pamphlets. The pamphlets was printed by the Police Public Relations Division in 2016. This pamphlet entitled "Stop Radicalism Terrorism in Indonesia" consists of four pages, or about 500 words.

The general pattern used by the Bhimas or Dai Kamtibmas in controlling radical groups is to collaborate with relevant agencies to invite or be involved in community groups. Of course, unlike the intelligence unit, the Community Development Section cannot enter the halaqoh of radical groups. They can only enter on open halaqoh which is usually done by NU and Muhammadiyah. On many occasions, two organizations (NU and Muhammadiyah) in halaqoh are quite effective at stemming the spread of radical thinking. This study strengthens SAEFUDIN ZUHRI (2017), that he measured the participation of civil society organizations in the deradicalization program launched by the BNPT. These are, in haloqah held by NU and Muhammadiyah, supported seriously by police.

While Intel's function - which of course is not equipped with the ability to distinguish radical theological, sharing initial information about radicalism from his colleagues in Kominda. Specifically, regarding the issue of radicalism Kominda's position is very important for intelligence because it is all about defining reality. It means that the criterion of radical groups in a society is to some degree the construction of its social structure. It is

in the context of defining this reality that intelligence cannot work alone, to some degree it is more important to “hear” and explore what is defined by society about certain groups.

The organizational level

Organizationally, the control of the radicalism is generally not the same pattern. At least, from the side of emphasis and the most neat and powerful at the level of regional police (Polda) is West Java. It has a Sawala Program. The Program is called in Sundanese as ‘*urun rembug*’, meaning discussions by all members of the community with police. Here, they generally discuss security concerns, sometimes regarding the suspicion of the radicalism dissemination. This kind of forum is an early warning. This is formed at the Polda level to equalize organizational movements until to the corners of the sub-regional police organization (Polres) and sector police (Polsek). So, the program organically becomes an effective attraction involving the citizens in the process of consolidating on handling radicalism.

Indeed, the Sawala Program is not specifically for controlling radical groups, at the same time it was felt as a ‘side-effect’ for the control of radical groups. Performance on handling radicalism in a literal sense cannot be expected in this kind of activity, however there are benefits in the radical group control process. At least this conventional activity serves to “isolate” radicalism spreading entry in the mainstream group. Furthermore, consolidation of moderate doctrine reinforcement gets more effective opportunities. The problem, the more radical groups -- the more it has the distance to the program designed by the government.

A common pattern on synergetic state instrument on controlling radicalism begins with discussion in Regional Leaders Communication Forum (Forkominda). Then, this forum expands to consolidating state-civil society to be alert of the symptoms of radical group. This strengthens Hung En Sung that public demand for security in the democratic process shifts the way of police work: from which the police originally tended to be autonomy to cooperation or participation of the community. In particular, the groups are already known as organizations. This pattern is almost common in all areas of the country. For example in Solo, as elaboration above that area have complete existence of various radical groups, synergetic state-civil society can be said effective enough. Forkominda looked

very urgent to give special attention the mosques that was “occupied” by Jama’ah Ansyarut Daulah. This pattern is similar to some areas in Central Jawa. Even in the Pekalongan of mass organization (non-state) through the religious communication Forum rejected the establishment of the mosque by the group AL Arqom, identified as an affiliate of the Indonesian Mujahidin Assembly. The mosque and mushala was neglected by jama’ah-majority (mainstream jama’ah) usually can be occupied by radical group. Usually mosques and mushala away from the city.

Indonesian Ulama Council and Police

Among the MUI officials, they conducted intensive religious studies and considered the principles of *tasamuh* and *wasathoniyah*. *tasamuh* and *wasathoniyah* meaning middle way (moderate) and put the interests of order first. Then often makes fatwas. But, many times fatwas were present long time before social upheaval or riots. This happened in two phenomena. First, on the issue of the concept of *bughat* or undermining the joints of life together, it was stated long before the flailing of the HTI ban. Second, the issue of vaccines containing pigs in the community.

MUI hopes for the security authorities, especially the police, that the fatwas on radicalism get attention. Because of this fatwa the legitimacy of mainstream religious understanding. Even if it is necessary to consider it to enter into positive legal norms. Thus the synchronization between the religious authority (MUI) and the police is firm and clear. Of course, it is realized by the MUI, it is not necessary that all fatwas need to be processed into positive law. The Draft Submission of materials *Dai Kamtibmas* should refer to the mainstream Islamic understanding, which is a legitimate of MUI. Relationship MUI with the police confirms thesis of NUGROHO (2012) about Indonesian democracy who is looking for an ideal type. Or, Indonesia’s democracy is in the process of ‘becoming’. Then it becomes a big homework about how much power the state enters in the civil space which takes care of the beliefs of its citizens.

4. CONCLUSION

Police did not have the instruments to identify radical groups. The way that is done to identify radical groups is based on the definition that is constructed by social environment. On controlling over radical groups, police

adaptive to the social environment that continually moving social contextually. Radical groups have gradations occur on a scale of disturb of social order rather than on formal-legal and theology factor (the interpretation of the Holy Quran).

The term ‘impose the will’ used in defining radical groups is ambivalent. The concept of radical tends to apply only to minority groups; not to the majority group. This is used to label minority groups that are self-righteous, imposing wills, and give criticism especially to the government. When the violence or coercion (imposing wills) differs according to its level, the degree of radical also varies. Meaning, the radicalism groups is a multilevel or stratified, as in the above scheme. On the other hand, violent action – even done in violation of the law – the majority group to minority group could never be subject to radical labels. The minority groups, for example in these case are Ahmadiyah and Shi’a. This why that the of definition of radical groups construct in concerning of security perspective. It is maybe such a pragmatic sense. Consequently, the construction of radical definition is still inviting discussion issues in the perspective of the justice in treating groups in society. The issue is that the state’s treating to any groups in society is not equal.

Institutionally control radical groups placed on these two functions, namely Community Development Section and Security Intelligence Section. Community Development Section moved more agile entered halaqah . The use of uniform police --like done by Community Development Section -- in ceramah or religious public indicates the presence of state authority. In the perspective of symbolic interactionism the presence of uniform (sign the police force), which has the sense of the presence of the state in the Assembly or halaqah is important. Often police have detected the presence of radical groups, but not (bold) take action emphatic because there is no finality protection regulation.

The work of the Community Development Section and the Security Intelligence Section in handling radical groups very different other police members. Because, radicalism in the foundation of a “social definition”, not as done by crime investigation section that has a strict size in the legal norm. In fact, this “social definition” is moving faster than the formal legal norms that the criminal investigation has in common.

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