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Majoritarian tendency and semi-presidential regime in Indonesia

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Abstract

This paper analyzed the majoritarian tendency effects of the coming into effect of the semi-presidential regime in the administration of the president SBY-Boediono and the Jokowi-JK government via qualitative analysis through in-depth interviews. As a result, characteristics of semi-presidential regimes in the Indonesian political system resulted in a gridlock of the cabinet coalition and the Semi Presidency creates a new harmonization in the construction of relationships between the executive and the legislature. In conclusion, the long process of the journey of democratization will face trials with the nature of the national political system with its various good oligarchy.

Keywords: Grid Lock, Majoritarian Tendency, Regime.

Tendencia mayoritaria y régimen semipresidencial en Indonesia

Resumen

Este documento analizó los efectos de la tendencia mayoritaria de la entrada en vigor del régimen semipresidencial en la administración del presidente SBY-Boediono y el gobierno de Jokowi-JK a través de un análisis cualitativo a través de entrevistas en profundidad. Como resultado, las características de los regímenes semipresidenciales en el sistema político indonesio resultaron en un estancamiento de la coalición de gabinetes y la semipresidencia crea una nueva armonización en la construcción de relaciones entre el ejecutivo y la legislatura. En conclusión, el largo proceso del viaje de la democratización enfrentará juicios con la naturaleza del sistema político nacional con su buena oligarquía.

Palabras clave: Grid Lock, Tendencia Mayoritaria, Régimen.

1. INTRODUCTION

Discussion about the concept of a form of government regime is a discussion that currently is apart and unseparate from the comparative study of politics. Some political scholars discussion about two of regimes in two large spectrum that is a presidential regime and parliamentary regimes (Linz, 1994). In the contemporary political both of these regimes having metamorphosis thereby, scholars and researchers have a different view, which is a moderate range of analysis and thought-provoking discourse are not on the superior of the two regimes (Alvarez et al., 1996). At the beginning of the year 1946, there were only three countries in Western European countries who practice a semi-presidential regime type such as Iceland, Austria and Finland. But as the historical development of

political governance regime is growing rapidly at the beginning of the year 1990 when the democratic revolution until the year 2002 the number of countries using this regime 22 percent of democracies around the world. The next democratic revolution progressed with the spectrum third wave democratization of increasing diversity among the democratic system in the world (Huntington, 1993). In the same year, there were also seventy-five countries democracy with a population of over one million, thirty-one Countries that use a form of Government with a parliamentary regime, twenty-five other presidential regimes and nineteen a semi-presidential regime (Hellwig & Samuels, 2008). The theoretical and conceptual semi-presidential regime has three great thoughts by the respective political and constitutional scholar-researchers as will be poured in: The first thought; Duverger (1980) in *Zaznaev* is the first scholar who mentions something special and separate form of Government than ever. The discovery of the Duverger contributes a new semi-presidential definition as a new discovery of a political system. In Duverger's research see how the new political system that combines institutional side, which is the most important factor of considerable presidential power as the legitimacy of democracy through direct presidential elections. This view is conceptually based on a delegation of authority based on the heart of representative democracy that is the ultimate democratic principal-delegate to the elected politician (Moe, 1984). As the following quote Duverger (1980) describes some elements of the semi-presidential regime as follows: The first question is raised by Duverger's original definition of semi-presidential as a political system in which:

(1) The president ... is elected by universal suffrage; (2) ... possesses quite considerable power; (3) [and] ... has opposite him ... a

prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them (Duverger, 1980: 166).

Further research which puts the type of semi-presidential regime as a model of a new political system that tries to explore from different sides i.e. between the institutional or behavioral side, or mixing the two sides in a heterogeneous way. Elgie (1999) strictly defines this type of regime from the institutional side. Furthermore, as the antithesis of this presidential regime, however, it can be categorized as a study of the form of a semi-presidential regime which focuses on the institutional side through the prism of presidential power that is Shiaroff whose findings result in a contradictory conclusion about the very small power president of the institutional side of the prism. Second thought; by scholar Linz with his famous work the failure of presidential democracy which argues that the constitutional format divides the danger of presidentialism. In subsequent research, it translates semi-presidential as a different type of regime and leaves the question of the type of regime having different effects in politics. "Linz's argument that the perils of presidential affects semi-presidential too, and makes it a type of democracy prone to crisis and breakdown" (Linz, 1994: 10). This perspective is also supported by the object of different studies but still focuses on his research on the elaboration of the dangers of presidential regime form regime from previous Linz (1994) research. Linz's study also focuses on the theory of sovereignty that is crossed the road of how to test an electorate who has given his mandate as a representative of democracy to the discourse of Agent Theory (Schleiter & Jones, 2009). The agent in question here is an elected political official both as President (presidential) as well as an

elected legislator in assembly (parliamentary). Researchers supporting this synthesis are Cheibub & Chernykh (2009) discussing the dual conflict of democratic legitimacy between the directly elected President and the government supported by Parliament as the election of legislative election results directly elected by the people?

Third thought is by Shugart who emphasizes the constitutional format of a regime. In his research explains many constitutions in the regime of a New State applying presidential or parliamentary regimes tend to be prone to conflict and have a clash between branches of power. In his research explains many constitutions in the regime of a New State applying presidential or parliamentary regimes tend to be prone to conflict and have a clash between branches of power. The continuation of semi-presidential regime research is supported by several other scholars such as Cheibub (2007), Moestrup and Elgie Cheibub obtaining only three States of democratic regimes that adopt semi-presidential regimes in thirty years to years (Congo, Comoros and Nigerian Islands) and concluded in their comparative analysis that since 1946-2002 among State. Countries have made the transition of a regime that originated from a parliamentary regime of dictatorship to a democratic semi-presidential regime shows no symptom to an authoritarian political regime. As well as Moestrup (2011) mentions the small possibility of democratic damage to the presidential regime. Furthermore, Elgie & Moestrup (2008) explain that only the Nigerian state that uses the form of semi-presidential regime government suffers democracy damage due to the effects of dual executive cohabitation. Majoritarian is an implication of some theories and conceptual of political science and the sciences of administration which

synthesize how the construction of the form of government works with the party system, the electoral system in a political system in a State.

The presence of differences in government regimes that adopt the political system implicates some research advances, the study constructs the various social phenomena born of socio-political praxis in the community. In the terminology of democratic political regime, of course, philosophically, the power of using the Theory of Three Branches of Montesque Power Shackleton (1949) which in practice to control the nature of the political system does not give birth to oligarchic, despotic or tyrannical concept of check and balances mechanism is an inseparable part in the perspective of the regime democratic politics. This concept of check and balances mechanism is also an important control in the praxis of democratic governance regimes. The majoritarian tendency is a terminology of the theoretical and conceptual synthesis of the twentieth-century political distinction in contemporary political developments that will distinguish the type or form of government executed by a State whether to use a presidential, parliamentary or regime-type regime (as distinctive regimes type) (Linz 1994).

Since the philosophical thinkers of Politics have insisted that the institutionalized powers of the people as a form of social contract between the organized citizens and those in power with the mechanism of Checks and Balances (Montesque) in the Epic Spirit of the Law, characterized by independence and this principle are included into the Constitution of the United States of 1787. This thought as the basis or power must not be centralized but should be separated which aims to minimize or eliminate absolute power. This is also the breakthrough of the Republicans who

exercise the authority of the democratic State on a contingent basis. There are several reasons why Majoritarian tendency becomes an important terminology in the constitutional design of democracy of a presidential regime which in its development metamorphoses with many other dimensions, giving birth to a new discovery which in Linz (1994) is called a different type of regime. To see the tendency of the majoritarian tendency of a State then the process of democratization also becomes the thing that affects a regime.

The democratization of the authoritarian regime to the democratic regime becomes an important influence so that the legitimate behavior of elites and oligarchs who are still enthroned and embedded in the political culture of a political system largely determines the direction of the structure and order of a prevailing regime. As a comparison of the democratic political regime defined by Cheibub & Gandhi (2004), namely a political regime is defined as a dictatorship (1) the chief executive is not elected; (2) the legislature is not elected, (3) there is no more than one party, and (4) there is no alternation in power. Sing (2010) mentions that the pull of a regime also explains that the power struggle in the political arena claimed through elections is a multidimensional factor in addition to the power of civil society in influencing the output of policies issued by a powerful political system. As is usually the case with a majority of political contestation is an absolute thing that becomes essential in any political competition regardless of the institutional design factor and its constitutional format.

Furthermore, in the dynamics of magnetic attraction between the structure and political culture in different polar systems between the

presidential pole and the parliamentary poles have implications for the semi-presidential regime as a new political system Duverger (1980) the factor of domination becomes something that cannot be ignored. The power factor influences from the political side quantitatively is an important point to become a playmaker in the regime other than being the ruling party. In line with this idea, theoretical research of Hammond & Butler (2003) explains the formal model of the policy-making process in the presidential and parliamentary regimes clarifying how the legislative process works across the political system. In addition, the majority interpreted how the poles of the born magnet policy are determined by the variation strength factor in Alemán & Schwartz (2006) veto decision and veto. One question that needs to be answered as conceptually and theoretically from various perspectives so that the existence of the Republic of Indonesia can be regarded as a regime or form of government can be categorized as a semi-presidential regime. Linear with such thoughts so that the study of Schleiter & Jones (2009) suggests that much work remains to be done on the effect that semi-presidential institutions have on policy implementation and the control of bureaucrat.

2. METHODOLOGY

This research uses qualitative approach through case study with analysis unit at SBY-Budiono (2009-2014) and Jokowi-JK (2014-2019) government. Determination of key informants was done purposively (purposive sampling) to 10 informant representatives of a dominant political party (PDIP, Golkar, Democrat, PAN, PKS, PKB, PPP, Gerindra, Hanura and Nasdem. To further strengthen the validity of data of key

informant also come from outside party, which are actor from print media, NGO 5 election activists, data collected from January to July 2017 in Jakarta through in-depth interviews of all (15) key informants and through literature studies from various sources of information (books, newspapers, journals) Furthermore, the data analysis was done descriptively explanative using the concept of Linz (1994) semi-presidential regime.

3. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

3.1. Grid Lock of Presidential election 2009 and Presidential election 2014

During the 2009 presidential nomination, the pattern of political party support for the candidate of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)-Budyono in 2009 was that almost all the support parties were Islamic-based parties, except the Democratic Party because SBY was one of the founders and owners of the party. Although the majority of Islamist-based parties but the influence of a very strong democrat party, affection from an Islamic-based party does not have a large space to dominate the interests of Islam.

After the winning of SBY Budyono in the 2009 presidential election (73,874,562 or 60.80 percent) the elected President and Vice President from 2009 to 2014 period then formed his government cabinet by way of a fairly fat coalition that is by involving many political parties. The fragmentation of the interests of political parties is so great, making SBY-Budyono more compromise. Coalition considerations are based on

several aspects, namely first; professionalism, second; political power-sharing with party and third; public pressure response. This is used to meet various interests. The strategy becomes problematic when it comes to the dominant role in the SBY coalition trying to reach out to many, but still does not want to lose the dominant element, this makes the coalition formation run long enough and tend to be careful. This result is in line with the regime model run in Indonesia because it is not a pure presidential regime that uses multiparty electoral systems causing complexity in the accommodation of multiple interests. As the results of this study are explained by Duverger that the elected President should have considerable powers so as not to be fettered by a mechanism for the formation of a cabinet of government despite having a high level of democratic legitimacy as presented by Duverger: "The first question is raised by Duverger's original definition of semi-presidentialism as a political system in which: (1) the president ... is elected by universal suffrage; (2) ... possesses quite considerable power" (Duverger, 1980: 20).

The same pattern of support also took place in the 2014 presidential election when Jokowi JK stepped forward as a candidate for President. The same problem with the form of government which is a blend of presidential and parliamentary forms still influences in the pattern of political party support and when it will form a cabinet of its government. As a result of this paper, the Jokowi-JK Political Parties are not based on ideological preferences, but office seeking (political interests). The acquisition of Jokowi-JK party supporters is not a majority in parliament. Therefore, the cabinet positions are partially filled by professionals. There is. But lately, two parties, namely PPP and PAN chose a coalition with Jokowi JK (Red and White Coalition). PPP and

PAN which joined the red and white coalition did not become the cabinet composition changed significantly, although the joining of the two parties became the majority in the government. Jokowi-JK keeps putting up professional faces to run his cabinet.

Both President SBY- Budiyo and Jokowi JK in 2014 are in line with Shiaroff's prism of presidential power thesis on the very small power of the president from the institutional side of the prism. In addition, the same pattern is found in the formation of Government Cabinet in each Government Era either SBY Budiyo 2009-2014 or (jokowi-JK) 2014-2017 get a challenge to become Grand Coalition so that every output policy resulting from executive and legislative slices does not become a major undertaking that locks the wheels of government (Grid Lock). In line with this study described by Schleiter & Jones: "First advanced the debate in the direction that they argued that a central quality of semi-presidential constitutions is their ability to produce stable outcomes (rather than gridlock or escalating conflict) in the cabinet appointment and dismissal game" (Schleiter & Jones, 2009: 18).

Another finding is the status factor of party stewardship of presidential candidate Jokowi. Megawati as the PDI-P Party Chairman has a great role to process related to the formation of names of who sits in the cabinet of the Government. Megawati's interests so coloring preference to the interests of the cabinet. This becomes a critical point against a political party, membership of the political officials who have no power in the party is not uncommon in the tradition of democratic States as Adagium Rossiter in Katz & Crotty (2014) does not exist Democracy without politics, and there is no Politics without a

political party. Another important feature of the article was SBY's position as president during the period (2004-2009) as the incumbent presidential candidate who advanced in the next period (2009-2014) became the decisive victory of a political official because it controlled the supra political structure and political infrastructure as well as research Ismail et al. (2014) which states as The Incumbent de Factor Power (Hermawati & Runiawati, 2019).

3.2. Harmonization in Pseudo Coalition

After looking at the pattern of support of political parties with the format of semi-presidential government form from two different government era and using multiparty system, proportional representation election system which tend to have similarity to find the existence of deadlock in support of government. Differences in issues, programs, ideologies are also factor in consideration of the formation of coalition processes. Especially with the basis of the semi-presidential regime that is still using the basic principle of parliamentary regime that uses winner take all then the praxis communication patterns between state institutions distributed in three branches of power stalemate both in the formation of coalitions and gave birth to the agreement of a government policy. The pattern of support built is a coalition with many parties that have garnered more than 60 percent of support in parliament.

This means that the support built not only to collect minimal support requirements to be a couple of presidential candidates and vice presidents, but more on the support of securing the course of government,

considering this is the second period of SBY administration. Due to the great support made the process of forming a cabinet was not separated from many factors. First, the coalition of party supporters must necessarily enter the cabinet, so the sentiment for the seats is inevitable. Second, the effort to build a professional working cabinet blocked the demands of party supporters who sometimes included their party cadres in the cabinet more political considerations. Conflicting barriers between political considerations or professional judgment, skills required in a cabinet. Generally, political considerations are prioritized over professional judgment. Accommodative aspects are stronger. So that the government cabinet which is a coalition of supporters in the presidential election is directly proportional to the formation of the cabinet because these coalition participants are interested in entering the government cabinet as a consequence of political support.

This is a meaning, what happens is for the seats, especially from the supportive political parties. The support pattern is the attachment of the political contract between the party and the candidate pair. The debate takes place between whether the professional background and the political party are worthy of occupying a ministerial seat. Some policies collapse, do especially about the rise in fuel prices and the formation of the right questionnaire Century Bank case in the SBY administration era. The way to break the deadlock (Gridlock) between the executive and the legislative is by: First; political communication, secondly: the lobbying of political lobby especially between the elite of party leader and faction leader in DPR. The findings of this article further explain that the policy of presidential couple SBY Budiyo (2009-2014) such as problems in the success of policy of fuel price hike and the establishment of questionnaire

of bank case Century in the era of government became one form and proof of how the solidarity process of the idea of a coalition of presidential candidates who metamorphosed into a coalition government cabinet SBY Budiyo 2009-2014.

In the dynamics of the success of the policy such a pattern as in the parliamentary regime that is the faction of the Party's political supporters (The Ruling Party) who are contesting with the opposition faction is a necessity. But in the semi-presidential praxis the formula cannot be a solid reference of a coalition so that it can be called a pseudo coalition. One of the key findings of this article is that combining presidential regimes and parliamentary regimes is the result of a combination of political will of the executive and legislative in pushing a policy as a consequence of the regime's blend if not properly consolidated will undermine the democratic regime of policy paralysis from Cheibub & Svitlana his said:

Many countries since 1990 have adopted the semi-presidential constitutions, which are primarily because of the potential for conflict between the assembly-supported government and the popularly elected president. Such conflicts are said to lead to unstable government, policy paralysis and the eventual undermining of the democratic regime (2009: 20).

After Jokowi JK was inaugurated as President and Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia in 2014-2019 period there were also obstacles in the formation of government working cabinet. There are several obstacles in forming the first cabinet coalition; because the absence of a political party capable of mastering parliament entirely winner takes all makes the elected president work hard in drafting his government coalition. Second; the background of the minister, whether the

professional or the party. Even though the fact in Jokowi JK campaign promise is not appropriate anymore the fact remains hostage to empiric conditions for the chair. In the Jokowi-JK period there is relatively no policy-related deadlock, but only in some policies, such as Freeport, especially the case of papa asking for shares that have the name of the president, unfortunately, the case is not continuing. Several ways to harmonize policies processed in DRRRI are compromised at the elite level to the way of completion. So the relative political harmony is maintained and stable, although the political issues still affect the economic turmoil. So that in a semi-presidential regime without harmonization between State agencies will result in some potential deadlock, conflict, crisis and harmful to the democratic regime. This is in line with Linz's study which explains the following:

Linz's concern with semi-presidentialism affects democratic survival. Extending his critique of presidentialism to semi-presidential regimes, Linz is focused on the potential for conflict, gridlock and breakdown, which is semi-presidential regimes may entail (1994: 20).

The synthesis of theoretical concepts with the research results of this article shows us that the form of semi-presidential regime government in Indonesia can be saved from various conflicts, deadlocks and threats to the democratic regime through harmonization among state institutions.

4. CONCLUSION

Forms of Government a regime which is a combination of the presidential regime and parliamentary regime get various examinations in

praxis governance especially in Indonesia. The long process of the journey of democratization will face trials with the nature of the national political system with its various good oligarchy, despotic will continue to color the course of the semi-presidential regime in Indonesia. Various conflicts, deadlocks obtained through the harmonization between the institutional design and the constitutional design of a semi-presidential regime in Indonesia will continue to confront the efforts of the nation's children to consolidate its democracy. So the next research will contribute to Political Science especially in Indonesia according to the social-cultural character of Indonesian society politics.

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