Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Derecho Público "Dr. Humberto J. La Roche"
de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas de la Universidad del Zulia
Maracaibo, Venezuela
Publicación cientíca en formato digital
ISSN-Versión Impresa 0798-1406 / ISSN-Versión on line 2542-3185
Depósito legal pp 197402ZU34
ppi 201502ZU4645
Vol.40 N° 75
2022
ISSN 0798- 1406 ~ De pó si to le gal pp 198502ZU132
Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas
La re vis ta Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas, es una pu bli ca cn aus pi cia da por el Ins ti tu to
de Es tu dios Po lí ti cos y De re cho Pú bli co Dr. Hum ber to J. La Ro che” (IEPDP) de la Fa-
cul tad de Cien cias Ju rí di cas y Po ti cas de la Uni ver si dad del Zu lia.
En tre sus ob je ti vos fi gu ran: con tri buir con el pro gre so cien tí fi co de las Cien cias
Hu ma nas y So cia les, a tra vés de la di vul ga ción de los re sul ta dos lo gra dos por sus in ves-
ti ga do res; es ti mu lar la in ves ti ga ción en es tas áreas del sa ber; y pro pi ciar la pre sen ta-
ción, dis cu sión y con fron ta ción de las ideas y avan ces cien tí fi cos con com pro mi so so cial.
Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas apa re ce dos ve ces al o y pu bli ca tra ba jos ori gi na les con
avan ces o re sul ta dos de in ves ti ga ción en las áreas de Cien cia Po lí ti ca y De re cho Pú bli-
co, los cua les son so me ti dos a la con si de ra ción de ár bi tros ca li fi ca dos.
ESTA PU BLI CA CIÓN APA RE CE RE SE ÑA DA, EN TRE OTROS ÍN DI CES, EN
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Re vicyhLUZ, In ter na tio nal Po li ti cal Scien ce Abs tracts, Re vis ta In ter ame ri ca na de
Bi blio gra fía, en el Cen tro La ti no ame ri ca no para el De sa rrol lo (CLAD), en Bi blio-
gra fía So cio Eco nó mi ca de Ve ne zue la de RE DIN SE, In ter na tio nal Bi blio graphy of
Po li ti cal Scien ce, Re vencyt, His pa nic Ame ri can Pe rio di cals In dex/HAPI), Ul ri chs
Pe rio di cals Di rec tory, EBS CO. Se en cuen tra acre di ta da al Re gis tro de Pu bli ca cio-
nes Cien tí fi cas y Tec no ló gi cas Ve ne zo la nas del FO NA CIT, La tin dex.
Di rec to ra
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OIRALITH
M. C
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P
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Co mi Edi tor
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Die ter Nohlen
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Asis ten tes Ad mi nis tra ti vos
Joan López Urdaneta y Nil da Ma n
Re vis ta Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas. Av. Gua ji ra. Uni ver si dad del Zu lia. Nú cleo Hu ma nís ti co. Fa-
cul tad de Cien cias Ju rí di cas y Po lí ti cas. Ins ti tu to de Es tu dios Po lí ti cos y De re cho Pú bli co
Dr. Hum ber to J. La Ro che. Ma ra cai bo, Ve ne zue la. E- mail: cues tio nes po li ti cas@gmail.
com ~ loi chi ri nos por til lo@gmail.com. Te le fax: 58- 0261- 4127018.
Vol. 40, Nº 75 (2022), 901-914
IEPDP-Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas - LUZ
Recibido el 26/07/22 Aceptado el 15/11/22
On the issue of choosing optimal
ways to overcome crisis phenomena
in the eld of political communications
against the background of large-scale
military aggression
DOI: https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.4075.54
Serhii Stavchenko *
Оlexandr Tokovenko **
Hanna Topchii ***
Vitaly Loginov ****
Abstract
The paper examines the choice of optimal ways of overcoming
crisis phenomena in the sphere of political communication in
the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Special attention was
paid to the theoretical explanation of the phenomenon of political
communication in terms of its scope and practical usefulness. The article
analyzes the features of the conduct of an information war by the Russian
Federation. The purpose was to investigate the optimal ways of overcoming
crisis phenomena (large-scale military aggression) by means of the tool
of political communication. The article is based on the use of two types
of research methods: general scientic (analysis, synthesis, induction,
deduction) and special political (structural-functional, historical, etc.). The
obtained results allow us to conclude that, on the basis of the analysis of
the Russian-Ukrainian war, communication solutions should be aimed
at fullling three tasks: neutralizing negative information, editing it and
disseminating alternative information. The work of communicators
during the war has certain limitations caused by their subordination to the
military command. Denitely, the problem of the Russian-Ukrainian war
* Doctor of Political Sciences, Associate Professor, Associate Professor, Oles Honchar Dnipro National
University, Faculty of Social Sciences and International Relations, Department of Political Science,
Dnipro, 72 GagarinAve. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4091-868X
** Doctor of philosophical sciences, Professor Oles Honchar Dnipro National University, Faculty of
Social Sciences and International Relations, Department of Political Science, Dnipro, 72 GagarinAve,
d.08.051.08. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1721-2205
*** Candidate of pedagogical sciences, Senior lecturer, Department of Social Sciences and Humanities Kyiv
Institute of the National Guard of Ukraine, 03179, 7 Oborony Kyieva St., Kiev, Ukraine. ORCID ID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3077-4942
**** Graduate student UA master's degree Department of Political Philosophy Cherkasy State Technological
University18006, Cherkasy city, Shevchenko boulevard, 460. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-
0002-6131-0737
902
Serhii Stavchenko, Оlexandr Tokovenko, Hanna Topchii y Vitaly Loginov
On the issue of choosing optimal ways to overcome crisis phenomena in the eld of political communications
against the background of large-scale military aggression
demonstrated the existence of a considerable number of problematic issues
in political communication in Ukraine and the world.
Keywords: political communication; overcoming the crisis; large-scale
military aggression; information context; Russian-Ukrainian
war.
Sobre la cuestión de la elección de las formas óptimas
de superar los fenómenos de crisis en el ámbito de la
comunicación política en el contexto de una agresión
militar a gran escala
Resumen
El trabajo examina la elección de las formas óptimas de superar
los fenómenos de crisis en el ámbito de la comunicación política, en el
contexto de la guerra ruso-ucraniana. Se prestó especial atención a la
explicación teórica del fenómeno de la comunicación política en términos
de su alcance y utilidad práctica. El artículo analiza las características de la
conducción de una guerra de información por parte de la Federación Rusa.
El propósito fue investigar las formas óptimas de superar los fenómenos
de crisis (agresión militar a gran escala) mediante la herramienta de la
comunicación política. El artículo se basa en el uso de dos tipos de métodos
de investigación: cientíco general (análisis, síntesis, inducción, deducción)
y político especial (estructural-funcional, histórico, etc.). Los resultados
obtenidos permiten concluir que, sobre la base del análisis de la guerra
ruso-ucraniana, las soluciones de comunicación deben estar dirigidas a
cumplir tres tareas: neutralizar la información negativa, editarla y difundir
información alternativa. El trabajo de los comunicadores durante la guerra
tiene ciertas limitaciones causadas por su subordinación al mando militar.
Denitivamente, el problema de la guerra ruso-ucraniana demostró la
existencia de un número considerable de cuestiones problemáticas en la
comunicación política de Ucrania y del mundo.
Palabras clave: comunicación política; superación de la crisis; agresión
militar a gran escala; contexto informativo; guerra ruso-
ucraniana.
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CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 40 Nº 75 (2022): 901-914
Introduction
The radicalization of the conict in Ukraine and the direct aggression
of the Russian Federation have actualized a number of political and social
problems of the modern world. The biggest and bloodiest European war
of the early twenty-rst century has demonstrated the unwillingness of
democratic elites to act decisively, and societies, overwhelmed by Russian
propaganda and misinformation, have split. Although sociological polls lean
toward support for Ukrainians, misunderstanding the cause and nature of
the war is still a danger. Let us note the role of political communication in
countering aggressors.
Thanks to timely informing the society and power elites of Ukraine
and the world it was possible to prevent even greater casualties and to
consolidate Ukrainian politicians and ordinary citizens. Therefore, the
study of methods of political communication is the actual task of modern
science, though it is important to compare theoretical bases with real steps
in crises. Actually, the article aims to analyze the choice of optimal ways to
overcome crises in the sphere of political communication (on the example
of the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022). Although the military actions
are not completed, the actions of the Ukrainian government deserve an
explanation from a political science point of view and can be recognized as
certain patterns of behavior in the occurrence of future conicts.
1. Materials and methods
Two types of research methods are used in the work: general scientic
and special political methods. First of all, we used general logical methods:
analysis, synthesis, induction, and deduction. With the help of the method
of analysis, it was possible to divide the subject of research into separate
components (denition of political communication, characterization of
information war between Russia and Ukraine, denition of propaganda
mechanisms of political communication of the Russian federation,
characterization of optimal ways to overcome the crisis phenomena in the
eld of political communication on the background of military aggression).
The synthesis managed to combine previously selected parts into a
complete study and draw specic conclusions. The historical method and
the work used the method of projections, the application of which consisted
in superimposing general recommendations to overcome crisis phenomena
against the background of Ukrainian realities.
Thanks to this method it was found out to what extent theoretical remarks
have success to be used in practice. In addition, the article is built on the
application of special political research methods, in particular, structural-
904
Serhii Stavchenko, Оlexandr Tokovenko, Hanna Topchii y Vitaly Loginov
On the issue of choosing optimal ways to overcome crisis phenomena in the eld of political communications
against the background of large-scale military aggression
functional. This method is based on the characterization of public problems
as integrated parts of the general global political discourse. At the same
time, the article is formed based on the principles of conictology.
This theory assumes the creation of productive mechanisms for
resolving various kinds of crisis (conict) situations. The article also
uses other methods: synchronous, retrospective, comparative, etc. The
mentioned methods are auxiliary for the study of the problem of choosing
the optimal ways of overcoming crisis phenomena in the sphere of political
communication based on the analysis of the Russian-Ukrainian war.
2. Literature Review
This work is formed based on the properties of modern political literature.
Note that given that the topic of the development of the Russian-Ukrainian
war through the prism of various dimensions is relevant, so there are many
works on this issue in the scientic opinion. The scientic literature used
can be divided into two types: 1. Professional works of foreign scholars. 2.
The work of Ukrainian authors. From the rst category, let us highlight
Park (2019), who investigated the main ways of solving conict political
problems. Piumatti et al. (2017) studied the importance of mediation on the
development of modern politics. Davis et al. (2020) in a general monograph
characterized the features of the formation of the phenomenon of political
communication, the authors paid special attention to the importance of
media in the system of political communication.
At the same time, this study is formed based on the analysis of modern
historiography of the Russian-Ukrainian war. In particular, Kuzio (2021)
characterized the peculiarities of the conduct and distribution of the
Russian-Ukrainian war. Bînă and Dragomir (2020) investigated the
problem of the development of the Russian-Ukrainian information war and
analyzed its distribution and key mechanisms of its conduct. Also weighty
for our study are the theoretical works of the denition of hybrid warfare.
Let us note that it is information warfare that is a component of this type
of modern armed conicts. For example, Manolea (2021) characterized the
main aspects of hybrid war, its components, and mechanisms of use based
on the analysis of the Russian-Ukrainian war. So, as we can see, the problem
of Russian-Ukrainian confrontation is a popular topic for modern scholars.
However, still little studied many aspects of this war, primarily because
of its active development, which is dicult to analyze and foresee. Let us
note that the problem of the information component of this war, which has
noticeable importance in hybrid wars, remains poorly investigated.
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At the same time, the issue of overcoming crisis phenomena in the
sphere of political communications against the background of large-scale
military aggression needs a thorough analysis. In addition, the issue of
predictive development of the Russian-Ukrainian war based on the use of
political mediation is poorly studied. The authors of this article will attempt
to characterize the problems outlined above.
3. Results
3.1 Political communication: peculiarities of functioning in
Ukraine
A kind of mediator between politicians and society is the media, whose
inuence on political communication is very high. The mass media have
now invaded the entirety of human life. Yes, mass communication is a
social process that connects individual parts, i.e., social groups of the
general society with each other. Thus, this process performs the task of
disseminating the information component in society. Despite this, the
means of communication can be manipulative in nature. As the experience
of the Russian Federation shows, it is common to manipulate the mass
consciousness under the slogans of freedom, and equality, that is, under
topical appeals (Bînă and Dragomir, 2020). At the same time, despite such
glaring slogans, it should be remembered that it is information manipulation
that is the most eective aspect for the suppression of freedom. For the
individual, the process of manipulative action takes place unnoticed.
Often under the manipulative inuence, the thinking of the consumer is
not even formed, because the autonomous sense-making of the subject is
replaced by intrusive considerations, values, and beliefs. The phenomenon
of the process of manipulation today is a really signicant social problem
because the context of aggressiveness of manipulation is explained by the
fact that it is a fairly new tool, at the same time adequate social response
to it has not yet taken place. Consequently, society must understand the
information environment as an environment for creating and shaping its
consciousness (Davis et al., 2020).
The phenomenon of political communication - the transmission,
exchange of political information, which systematizes political work
and gives it new meanings, roles, forms of public opinion, and political
socialization of citizens - stands out prominently in the system of mass
communication. Broadly speaking, political communication is the process
of transmission of political information, which takes place from one part of
the political system to another, thus there is circulation between political
and social systems, as well as between political groups, structures, and
906
Serhii Stavchenko, Оlexandr Tokovenko, Hanna Topchii y Vitaly Loginov
On the issue of choosing optimal ways to overcome crisis phenomena in the eld of political communications
against the background of large-scale military aggression
individuals. In part, political communication also permeates all social
levels, but traditionally it is identied with large masses, and thus it is
related to the phenomenon of mass communication (Park, 2019).
In Ukraine political communication has a systemic and permanent
nature. In times of crisis, the functioning of political systems is unstable
because in this period many dierent threats can lead to the destruction
of the existing system. Thus, public attention to information ows when
various kinds of crises are spreading noticeably increases; citizens must
critically analyze the main messages coming from the common information
space (Davis et al., 2020). However, if the authorities are not able to meet
the information needs of the population, or are not simply engaged in
communication with society, the evaluation of their work will be low.
At the same time, key ocials of the state, before introducing a specic
model of communication in times of crisis, should thoroughly approach
the process of determining the schemes of action regarding a particular
phenomenon, event, condition, or process that concerns society of the
country.
However, a separate diculty for the authorities at present is not only the
understanding of the real situation but also the structuring of information
ows according to the type of crisis process (Bînă and Dragomir, 2020).
One type of information must become public in order to cover the ocial
opinion, to explain the real state of aairs, and to overcome the panic
moods in the society. At the same time, there should also be the second
type - closed information. The main purpose of the latter is to maintain
stability in the state.
Such circumstances lead to a noticeable transformation of political
communication in the top leadership of Ukraine at the time of the crisis,
which requires a detailed study. Let us note that such areas of the political
system as social institutions, politics as part of public discourse, and politics
as an element of the daily news image are under the signicant inuence of
political communication.
Subjects in political communication are citizens of the state, social
groups, political institutions and individual politicians, associations of
citizens, parities, national and international organizations and movements,
political parties, state and local authorities, and governmental, non-
governmental, and international organizations. The peculiarity of political
communication is that the directions of communicative action can change,
and the subject and the object can change.
For example, when elections take place in cities and districts, the direction
of communication can go from local authorities to citizens (because the
subject in such a relationship is a simple voter) (Davis et al., 2020). Note
also that there are horizontal and vertical levels of political communication.
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Vol. 40 Nº 75 (2022): 901-914
On the horizontal level, primarily roughly equal institutional components
or social actors (e.g., city mayors or party group leaders) communicate.
The goal of vertical political communication is to establish communication
between hierarchically dierent levels of the political structure. Establishing
the feedback necessary for vertical communication is electoral races and
voter participation, public opinion polls, etc.
3.2 Mechanisms of the Russian Information War against
Ukraine
The Russian-Ukrainian confrontation, already eight years old in
eastern Ukraine, is characterized by two basic dimensions: the real and the
virtual. During 2014-2015, Ukrainians became victims, on the one hand of
direct military aggression and, on the other hand, of unprecedented anti-
Ukrainian propaganda deployed in the Russian media (Ghilès, 2022). The
realization of manipulative inuence on the pages of newspapers, therefore,
can be qualitatively traced on the example of anti-Ukrainian hysteria,
which is characterized by Russian newspapers. A typical feature of the anti-
Ukrainian information war was that Ukraine experienced almost the entire
arsenal of repressive discourse techniques - Russian media purposefully
and unwaveringly denied all evidence that somehow conicted with the
ocial Kremlin version of the interpretation of political phenomena in
Ukraine (Johnson, 2022).
The uncompromising stoicism in demonstrating the military struggle in
Donbas became a specic alibi even for the global media, whose credibility
in the Western world was not questioned (Materniak, 2020).
By its typical messages, style, and internal logic, the disinformation and
information-psychological pressure operation launched by the Russian
Federation around the problems of the “will” of the residents of the
autonomous republic of Crimea and the southeastern regions of Ukraine
is a “puzzle” of a more complex and much broader special information
campaign. which reaches at least November 2013. - the course and results
of the events of Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity (Materniak,
2020).
Practically since the end of February 2014, the overwhelming majority of
the Russian traditional media have taken up information and psychological
ght against Ukraine, trying to shape the conduct of an army attack against
Ukraine. For example, such well-known Russian newspapers and news
publications as Izvestia, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Moskovsky Komsomolets
(Kommersant), Vzglyad (Vzglyad), and the entire powerful RIA Novosti
(Russian News Agency), ITAR-TASS (ITAR-TASS), ROSBALT, AIS (AIS),
etc., not only actively disseminated inaccurate information but also
formulated and replicated deliberately false information.
908
Serhii Stavchenko, Оlexandr Tokovenko, Hanna Topchii y Vitaly Loginov
On the issue of choosing optimal ways to overcome crisis phenomena in the eld of political communications
against the background of large-scale military aggression
For example, since the winter of 2014, the same publications Izvestia,
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Kommersant, Vzglyad, and
others have been spreading false information about the transfer to Russia
of the agship of the Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet, the frigate of the Ukrainian
Navy, Hetman Sagaidachny.
The prevalence of destructive hostile propaganda since the spring of
2014 and the replication of untrue news through newspaper distribution
in the occupied territories of eastern Ukraine was one of the main reasons
for the considerable spread of anti-Ukrainian sentiments and separatist
rhetoric among people (at 0 20%). Some publications actively use Internet
resources and do not forbid administrators of their sites to use ctitious or
false information to spread propaganda information messages (Bînă and
Dragomir, 2020).
Such a source is, for example, Pravda.ru. The history of this resource
is indicative because it was among the rst Russian information and
analytical publications to emerge on the Russian-language Web. If you
trust the information posted on its website, Pravda.ru has a respected
reputation and high ratings among Russians. Every day, more than 250
thousand unique users come to the Internet resource’s page, browsing
through at least a few of the materials on oer. Upon closer examination of
the materials on this site, it is not dicult to notice that much information
is openly propagandistic in nature and does not reveal the true nature of the
events described. In addition, the “journalists” of this resource resort to the
use of a number of methods that openly indicate the presence of custom-
made propaganda purposes.
In connection with the military aggression of the Russian Federation
against Ukraine as one of the directions of the information war, the
aggressor uses war propaganda through TV channels (Bînă and Dragomir,
2020). Although objective television does not exist in contemporary Russia,
more detailed attention should be focused on the real “mouthpiece of the
Kremlin” - the TV channel Russia Today, whose product refers to aggressive
anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western propaganda. Russia Today is one of
the Russian state-owned television networks that broadcast primarily in
foreign languages and is intended for foreign audiences.
This project has been in existence since 2005, funded by Russian
taxpayers and headquartered in Moscow. The main working languages are
English, Arabic, Spanish, Russian and German. The management of the
channel positions the work of its journalists as an alternative view of the
problems covered by American and English journalists, in particular those
from CNN and BBC world channels.
The appearance of annexationist Russian propaganda fruit in the
information space of the USA and EU countries recently inuenced the
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appearance of concern of the leaders of these countries in the context of
strengthening of the latent information pressure on the citizens. It was
connected, rst of all, with the activation of the Russia Today channel. The
analysis of Russian television conducted by Business Insider journalists
received extensive publicity.
They noted that the conclusion of the week-long review of news
exclusively from the perspective of Russia Today sta was that there is
a powerful informational inuence on the viewer’s consciousness. This
inuence, according to experts, should create and validate a distorted
view of certain events as the only true one and exclude any alternative
interpretations of these events (Manolea, 2021).
Unfortunately, Russian television as a whole as of the rst half of 2022
has turned into a collective “Russia today”: Russian news agencies do not
present truthful information, and when they even notify and actual events,
they do not forget to add certain ideological Russian content to them. The
Russian media is a weapon of hybrid warfare unleashed by the authorities
against countries and ethnicities, mostly belonging to the Western
democratic world (Cieślik and Gurshev, 2020). First of all, this concerns
Ukrainians, who may fall into the “tenets” of Russian “journalists” and
perceive exclusively distorted reality. This requires appropriate political
communication on the part of the Ukrainian government and individual
politicians.
4. How to organize political communication under conditions of
Russian aggression?
First of all, we should note that the communication mechanisms applied
by the leadership of the state in a crisis should have an oensive and creative
character. If the top ocial does not take a dominant position from the
beginning of the crisis situation, it will be dicult to correct the situation
and overcome negative trends later on. However, if the crisis phenomenon
(as in the case of the Russian-Ukrainian war) will increase rapidly, then
the obligatory condition for the implementation of such communication
remains its promptness.
The beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2014 demonstrated that the
complexity of unpredictable political crises is manifested in the novelty that
aects the uncertainty of the functions of the main actors of the state (Kuzio,
2021). Note that, in part, top ocials may be unprepared for such a crisis
situation, so decisions may not always be made that are most appropriate.
On the other hand, the complexity of the emergence of an unpredictable
crisis event lies in its dynamic development (Schläpfer, 2016). Despite
this, the rapid development of the crisis can be counteracted by the urgent
response of the communication team.
910
Serhii Stavchenko, Оlexandr Tokovenko, Hanna Topchii y Vitaly Loginov
On the issue of choosing optimal ways to overcome crisis phenomena in the eld of political communications
against the background of large-scale military aggression
Considering the unpredictability of crises, communication solutions in
such circumstances should focus on such tasks (presented in Table 1).
Table No. 01. The main tasks of communication solutions in crises
Main tasks Terms of execution
1. Neutralizing (or blocking) the
ow of negative information Performed at any period of appearance
and dissemination of negative
information.
2. Editing negative information Is carried out at any stage of the
dissemination of negative information.
3. Dissemination of alternative in-
formation. This is done when necessary. For
example, in the situation of the
Russian-Ukrainian war - dissemination
of truthful information to counter
Russian propaganda.
At the same time, as the experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war shows from the mass
media from the country’s main speakers, information should be disseminated on such
important grounds (presented in Table 2). Source: authors.
Table No. 02. Basic principles of information ow dissemination in case of
crisis (military) conditions
Principles of information ow dissemination in case of crisis conditions
1. bad news should be reported rst. The point is that other sources (in this
case, Russian propaganda resources) should not be allowed to get ahead
of the bad facts.
2. The tone of reporting should be entirely based on truthful facts and alle-
gations made public
3. If there is no reliable information at a certain point, you should thoroughly
argue the reasons, frame the situation, and outline the likely timing and
method of presentation.
4. The communicating authority should be sure to honor its own promises.
5. Do not provide private comments about the situation, certain rumors, pre-
dictions, etc.
Source: authors.
Note that the work of communicators during a military threat is subject
to certain restrictions due to their subordination to the military command.
For this reason, many information cannot be disseminated. If we examine
military conict as a special kind of crisis management, three prerequisites
of media information support must rst be provided (Manolea, 2021).
First, it is a real-time process of information delivery. Second, messages
must contain truthfulness (or at least plausibility).
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In addition, openness to communication and interactivity remains
important. Let us note, however, that political communication is a special
interaction of one society with another. For this reason, interaction shapes,
supports, transforms specic social functions, rules, or norms in a particular
social group or culture.
Given the Ukrainian practice of the political process, this kind of
crises requires a structured work plan from ocial communication
actors, because the key process of crisis deployment has certain phases,
so during each period, appropriate communication activities should be
organized to prevent the escalation of a threatening situation. Despite this,
it is obvious that unpredictable crises are complex in terms of dynamism
and novelty. Consequently, it requires the Ukrainian authorities to react
swiftly, rationally in the managerial sphere and to provide clear operational
information to citizens in the prism of communicative work.
However, unpredictable crises are dened in terms of basic parameters,
therefore, for their media coverage and providing citizens with information
in order to create appropriate perception by the public is quite likely to
develop certain communication algorithms (Moore, 2020). It should be
noted that the presence of communication plans and strategies of the top
leadership of Ukraine for the time of crisis creates a pledge of loyal views in
the society regarding negative events of political development, prevention
of certain threats to the national security of the state.
We believe that society should trust, above all, accurate sources of
information. As we can see, the major Russian media are instruments of
propaganda, so a fair move by the Ukrainian government was to ban the
broadcasting of Russian TV channels (subsequently the press and other
ways of transmitting information). This step required a political decision
and the will since it bordered on censorship, unpopular in post-Soviet
countries. Such a decision paid o: as a result, even the leading states of
the Western democratic world eliminated Russian TV channels from their
broadcasting networks.
After the outright military aggression began in February 2022,
Ukrainian ocials chose the right strategy. Rejecting all accusations, the
Ukrainian authorities did a lot to strengthen the social and informational
space of Ukraine. In particular, they noted the dierent origins of Russian
and Ukrainian statehood. While Russians take their roots from the Golden
Horde, Ukrainians developed in accordance with European trends in the
powerful Keevan Rus (later the Galicia-Volhynia state) (Mereniuk and
Parshyn, 2021).
Additionally, it should be noted that communication during crises is
quite dierent from that existing in the case of a stable and predictable
political system. An important mission is now entrusted to the highest
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Serhii Stavchenko, Оlexandr Tokovenko, Hanna Topchii y Vitaly Loginov
On the issue of choosing optimal ways to overcome crisis phenomena in the eld of political communications
against the background of large-scale military aggression
ocials and persons authorized by them, who turn into VIPs, whose actions
should be aimed at eliminating public panic, asserting stability and calm in
society.
To ensure a successful confrontation with the military crisis in the eld
of political communication, it is necessary, rst of all, to classify the crisis.
In particular, according to experts, crises are divided into long-, medium-
and short-term according to the criterion of urgency. While according to
the criterion of predictability they can be predictable and unpredictable.
Therefore, it is necessary to choose a political communication strategy
based on understanding the essence of the crisis. In February 2022 Ukrainian
politicians well understood the scale of the threat and united around the
President of Ukraine. A strategy of promptly informing society about the
military successes and defeats of the Ukrainian army was also chosen. The
trust that was established between society and the state “disperse” panic
and discord among the population and presented to the West exclusively
their own point of view (as they did in 2014 with Crimea).
5. Discussion
One eective method of establishing political communication during
crises is to conduct an active and generally honest dialogue at the vertical
level of communication. The apex of this has been shown to be the president
of Ukraine, high-ranking military ocials, and other ocial speakers. It is
they who relay relevant information for wider use. Military actions showed
that the strength of Russia was in its ability to wage a “hybrid” war, using
propaganda and agents of inuence to substitute concepts, sow discord,
and panic. In this, they were assisted by a wide network of state media,
which were used as another weapon of moral, psychological, and political
inuence.
Ukraine’s centralized information delivery system dealt a blow to the
Kremlin’s tactics. Although many pro-Russian intellectuals, businessmen,
and cultural and educational gures advocated the continued existence
of ties between Russia and the civilized world, their inuence diminished
considerably. The continued emphasis on Russia’s war crimes “ties the
hands” of the Kremlin lobbyists.
A successful example of political communication in Ukraine was the
unity of political elites around the personality of the President of Ukraine.
Despite the disagreements in the vision of the future of Ukraine. Among
politicians, there is an opinion that unity is the key to success. We should
also note the asco of pro-Russian political parties, whose activities were
investigated by the security services and banned or disbanded. It remains
to be regretted that this step has been taken only now.
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Vol. 40 Nº 75 (2022): 901-914
For a long time, adherents of these political forces have positioned
themselves as defenders of Russian-speakers, imposing a pro-Putin vision
of the problems in political communications. The danger, however, has
not been overcome, because the people who participated in the lobbying
of foreign interests have never been punished. Theoretically, they could
nominate themselves in the future, and therefore, in all likelihood, a partial
representation of Kremlin stooges will remain. Though they will not be able
to act openly.
The 2022 war demonstrated that Ukraine’s political elites are capable of
negotiating with their European counterparts. Successes on the diplomatic
front have ensured the provision of sophisticated weapons, trainers,
shelters for millions of refugees, etc. Regular consultations increase
trust between the Ukrainian side and European and American partners.
However, some people from President Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s entourage
are believed to have ties to Russia. For this reason, the active participation
of the democratic world in the war against it is also important because of
the internal resistance of some undisclosed agents.
Conclusions
So, in the narrow sense, political communication is the transmission,
exchange of political information, systematizing political work and giving it
new meanings, and roles, forming public opinion and political socialization
of citizens. In a broad sense, the term refers to the process of political
information transmission through circulation between political and social
systems, as well as between political groups, structures, and individuals.
The Russian-Ukrainian war demonstrated a signicant crisis in political
communication.
It was Russia’s hybrid aggression, which was disseminated in several
powerful ways: through pro-Kremlin media, through external and internal
active propaganda, through agents of inuence, and through opinion
makers. Thanks to this authoritarian Russian regime and. Putin managed
to partially camouage the real unfolding of events in eastern Ukraine
and Crimea in 2014. At the same time, already during the open Russian
aggression (February 2022), the Ukrainian side was much better prepared
for the confrontation.
Political communication acquired a clear vertical orientation, and
public trust in the Ukrainian armed forces and ocial spokespersons of
the Ukrainian government was established. This immediately dramatically
reduced the inuence of Russian propaganda. As the practice of political
communication in Ukraine in the conditions of information society showed
a more or less open dialogue with the society, partial provision of relevant
information has an advantage over direct propaganda, which is resorted to
by the Russian side.
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Serhii Stavchenko, Оlexandr Tokovenko, Hanna Topchii y Vitaly Loginov
On the issue of choosing optimal ways to overcome crisis phenomena in the eld of political communications
against the background of large-scale military aggression
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Esta revista fue editada en formato digital y publicada
en diciembre de 2022, por el Fondo Editorial Serbiluz,
Universidad del Zulia. Maracaibo-Venezuela
Vol.40 Nº 75