Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Derecho Público "Dr. Humberto J. La Roche"
de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas de la Universidad del Zulia
Maracaibo, Venezuela
Publicación cientíca en formato digital
ISSN-Versión Impresa 0798-1406 / ISSN-Versión on line 2542-3185
Depósito legal pp 197402ZU34
ppi 201502ZU4645
Vol.40 N° 75
2022
ISSN 0798- 1406 ~ De pó si to le gal pp 198502ZU132
Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas
La re vis ta Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas, es una pu bli ca ción aus pi cia da por el Ins ti tu to
de Es tu dios Po lí ti cos y De re cho Pú bli co “Dr. Hum ber to J. La Ro che” (IEPDP) de la Fa-
cul tad de Cien cias Ju rí di cas y Po lí ti cas de la Uni ver si dad del Zu lia.
En tre sus ob je ti vos fi gu ran: con tri buir con el pro gre so cien tí fi co de las Cien cias
Hu ma nas y So cia les, a tra vés de la di vul ga ción de los re sul ta dos lo gra dos por sus in ves-
ti ga do res; es ti mu lar la in ves ti ga ción en es tas áreas del sa ber; y pro pi ciar la pre sen ta-
ción, dis cu sión y con fron ta ción de las ideas y avan ces cien tí fi cos con com pro mi so so cial.
Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas apa re ce dos ve ces al año y pu bli ca tra ba jos ori gi na les con
avan ces o re sul ta dos de in ves ti ga ción en las áreas de Cien cia Po lí ti ca y De re cho Pú bli-
co, los cua les son so me ti dos a la con si de ra ción de ár bi tros ca li fi ca dos.
ESTA PU BLI CA CIÓN APA RE CE RE SE ÑA DA, EN TRE OTROS ÍN DI CES, EN
:
Re vicyhLUZ, In ter na tio nal Po li ti cal Scien ce Abs tracts, Re vis ta In ter ame ri ca na de
Bi blio gra fía, en el Cen tro La ti no ame ri ca no para el De sa rrol lo (CLAD), en Bi blio-
gra fía So cio Eco nó mi ca de Ve ne zue la de RE DIN SE, In ter na tio nal Bi blio graphy of
Po li ti cal Scien ce, Re vencyt, His pa nic Ame ri can Pe rio di cals In dex/HAPI), Ul ri ch’s
Pe rio di cals Di rec tory, EBS CO. Se en cuen tra acre di ta da al Re gis tro de Pu bli ca cio-
nes Cien tí fi cas y Tec no ló gi cas Ve ne zo la nas del FO NA CIT, La tin dex.
Di rec to ra
L
OIRALITH
M. C
HIRINOS
P
ORTILLO
Co mi té Edi tor
Eduviges Morales Villalobos
Fabiola Tavares Duarte
Ma ría Eu ge nia Soto Hernández
Nila Leal González
Carmen Pérez Baralt
Co mi té Ase sor
Pedro Bracho Grand
J. M. Del ga do Ocan do
José Ce rra da
Ri car do Com bel las
An gel Lom bar di
Die ter Nohlen
Al fre do Ra mos Ji mé nez
Go ran Ther born
Frie drich Welsch
Asis ten tes Ad mi nis tra ti vos
Joan López Urdaneta y Nil da Ma rín
Re vis ta Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas. Av. Gua ji ra. Uni ver si dad del Zu lia. Nú cleo Hu ma nís ti co. Fa-
cul tad de Cien cias Ju rí di cas y Po lí ti cas. Ins ti tu to de Es tu dios Po lí ti cos y De re cho Pú bli co
“Dr. Hum ber to J. La Ro che”. Ma ra cai bo, Ve ne zue la. E- mail: cues tio nes po li ti cas@gmail.
com ~ loi chi ri nos por til lo@gmail.com. Te le fax: 58- 0261- 4127018.
Vol. 40, Nº 75 (2022), 855-867
IEPDP-Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas - LUZ
Recibido el 26/08/22 Aceptado el 24/11/22
Parliamentary opposition and
democratic transformation issues: Central
and Eastern Europe in focus
DOI: https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.4075.51
Vitaliy Kovalchuk *
Iryna Sonska **
Taras Harasymiv ***
Ivan Terlyuk ****
Maiia Pyvovar *****
Abstract
The article presents a framework for comparing the
policy-making rights of the parliamentary opposition in the
parliamentary democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (Czech
Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine). The right of
the parliamentary opposition to oppose the government formed
by the ruling majority is a fundamental feature of liberal democracy.
The application of constitutional values (democracy and rule of law)
in Central and Eastern European states demonstrates the actual level of
fragmentation, polarization and cartelization of the opposition. The Rule
of Law Index 2021 explicitly shows that, among the Central and Eastern
European countries surveyed, Lithuania ranks 18th, the Czech Republic
22nd, Poland 36th, Hungary 69th and Ukraine 74th. The Rule of Law Index
refers to limitations of government powers, absence of corruption, open
government and other issues related to the mission of the parliamentary
opposition. It is concluded that, the distance (not only ideological) between
the ruling majority and the parliamentary opposition is based on the ability
to form government, participation in policy making, scrutiny of strategy
and (populist) government policy.
* Dr.hab., professor Department of Theory of Law and Constitutionalism
Department National Univesity Lviv Polytechnic Kn. Romana 1/3, 79005,
Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7523-2098
** Dr.hab., professor Theory of Law and Constitutionalism Department National
Univesity Lviv Polytechnic Kn. Romana 1/3, 79005, Ukraine ORCID ID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3853-7626
*** Dr.hab., professor Theory of Law and Constitutionalism Department National
Univesity Lviv Polytechnic Kn. Romana 1/3, 79005. ORCID ID: https://orcid.
org/0000-0002-4627-4774
**** Dr.hab., associate professor Theory of Law and Constitutionalism Department
National Univesity Lviv Polytechnic, Kn. Romana 1/3, 79005, Ukraine. ORCID
ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0900-4388
***** Dr. PhD, Theory of Law and Constitutionalism Department National Univesity
Lviv Polytechnic Kn. Romana 1/3, 79005, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.
org/0000-0001-5495-5361
856
Vitaliy Kovalchuk, Iryna Sonska, Taras Harasymiv, Ivan Terlyuk y Maiia Pyvovar
Parliamentary opposition and democratic transformation issues: Central and Eastern Europe in focus
Keywords: parliamentary opposition; government-opposition relations;
parliament in Europe; public policy making; democratic
transformation.
Oposición parlamentaria y cuestiones de
transformación democrática: Europa Central y oriental
en el punto de mira
Resumen
El artículo presenta un marco para comparar los derechos en la
elaboración de políticas de la oposición parlamentaria en las democracias
parlamentarias de Europa Central y Oriental (Chequia, Hungría, Lituania,
Polonia y Ucrania). El derecho de la oposición parlamentaria a oponerse
al gobierno formado por la mayoría gobernante es una característica
fundamental de la democracia liberal. La aplicación de los valores
constitucionales (democracia y Estado de Derecho) en los Estados de
Europa Central y Oriental demuestra el nivel real de fragmentación,
polarización y cartelización de la oposición. El Índice del Estado de Derecho
2021 muestra explícitamente que, entre los países de Europa Central y
Oriental investigados, Lituania ocupa el puesto 18, Chequia el 22, Polonia el
36, Hungría el 69 y Ucrania el 74. El índice del Estado de Derecho se reere
a las limitaciones de los poderes del gobierno, la ausencia de corrupción, el
gobierno abierto y otras cuestiones relacionadas con la misión de la oposición
parlamentaria. Se concluye que, la distancia (no sólo ideológica) entre la
mayoría gobernante y la oposición parlamentaria se basa en la capacidad
de formación de gobierno, la participación en la elaboración de políticas, el
escrutinio de la estrategia y la política gubernamental (populista).
Palabras clave: oposición parlamentaria; relaciones gobierno-
oposición; parlamento en Europa; elaboración de
políticas públicas; transformación democrática.
Introduction
Democracy, a fundamental value internationally (on UN and European
levels) and globally, is mentioned in many international agreements, but
none provides an explicit denition. A similar situation relates to the
opposition as minority groups in parliament. In this article, we try to focus
merely on government-opposition relations. We support an argument
that contemplative ‘parliamentary rules that allow opposition parties (in
857
CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 40 Nº 74 (2022): 855-867
parliament) to have a more signicant impact on the policy-making process
lead to increasing opposition fragmentation’ (Maeda, 2013). Furthermore,
opposition parties deprived of particular political inuence usually tend to
reduce such fragmentation.
One of the primary indicators of the level of development of democracy
is the observance of the principles of pluralism and freedom, which usually
guarantee equal rights and opportunities for both the current government
and the opposition (Michel and András, 2012).
It (political opposition) is formed by one or more political parties elected
to the parliament but are not involved to form the government. They oppose
the government (primarily ideologically) and take opposite measures (to its
initiatives, plans, and strategies).
1. Literature review
Its primary mission is to question and scrutinize the work of the
government (monitor and criticize government actions) and participate
in policy-making (in or directly inuencing on legislative production)
(Louwerse and Otjes, 2018). The parliamentary opposition parties have
two specic motivations to disclose and highlight dierences within the
governing coalition and intra-coalition tensions and unveil ongoing policy
conicts and ministerial drift within the governing coalition (Whitaker and
Martin, 2021). Dahl identied six possible dierences of the opposition:
organizational cohesion (discipline, concentration), competitiveness, goals,
site of the encounter, distinctiveness or identiability, and strategy (Kersell
and Dahl, 1966).
Every democratic state worldwide should respect values of pluralism
and freedom and share responsibility, and it cannot exist without checks
and balances amongst dierent state (public) institutions; loyal and
constructive cooperation amongst all state bodies; guaranteeing political
change and allowing ecient decision-making.
Every constitutional democracy should be full of freedom, pluralism,
checks and balances, loyal cooperation and respect for institutions,
solidarity towards the society, the possibility of alteration of power, and
ecient decision-making. The opposition, which represents the interests
of the minority in parliament, should be on an equal footing with the
governing party, which represents the will of the majority. Each of them
performs its inherent functions, and control over the activities of power
is by denition an act of domination since control over power should be a
pure manifestation of power.
858
Vitaliy Kovalchuk, Iryna Sonska, Taras Harasymiv, Ivan Terlyuk y Maiia Pyvovar
Parliamentary opposition and democratic transformation issues: Central and Eastern Europe in focus
Simultaneously, we should emphasize that there can be a change of roles.
Those who represent the majority can become the opposition, and those
who represent the minority - the state government. Such a situation usually
implies specic rules of eective interaction between two elements of the
power mechanism: tolerance for those who have gained broad powers and
caution for those who have lost them. Such interaction is due primarily to
pragmatic considerations, which include, at least, the potential variability
of power.
The collapse of the communist system in Central and Eastern Europe in
the late 1980s, which preceded the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, was
a landmark event for everyone. This transformation was not instantaneous
but resulted from a highly complex transition from authoritarianism
to democracy. A classic example of successful transit we saw in Poland,
Czechia, and Hungary, those Eastern and Central European countries
where the formation of political institutions took place simultaneously
with constitutional reform (Waldron-Moore, 1999: 32-62). Visible proofs
of positive developments in these countries are the growth of the indexes of
democracy, happiness, freedom, and the rule of law.
Figure 1. Index of democracy (2006-2021)
Source: own elaboration based on information provided by Economist Intelligence
(2022).
859
CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 40 Nº 74 (2022): 855-867
We should consider EU Eastern enlargement 2004 when Czechia,
Hungary, Lithuania, and Poland joined the EU; and political paradigm
change after the Lisbon treaty came into force in 2009. The process
of democratization is crisp and much more complicated in the newest
sovereign states, which emerged due to the collapse of the USSR (except
the Baltic countries). This occasion also applies to Ukraine since it has
signicantly lagged behind its western neighbors by declaring universal
values and adherence to European standards of democratic development
declared in the Constitution of Ukraine (1996).
However, recently even in those successful (completed) democracies,
there occurred problems regarding transposing fundamental values of
constitutionalism into ongoing politics. Finally, in 2021, Czechia decreased
from full democracy in 2006 to 29 places (awed democracy), Lithuania –
40, Poland – 51, Hungary – 56 stayed in a awed democracy, and Ukraine
also decreased from awed democracy to 86 (hybrid regime).
Why? What is the possible background (and impact in the visible future)
of such changes? What are the primary circumstances of such changes
related to the state power and (political) opposition? Therefore, this article
wants to answer these vital questions, quoting essential inuencers in
law and politics, and projecting the existing situation with parliamentary
opposition in Central and Eastern European countries on Ukraine.
2. Materials and methods
Our main task is to make a comprehensive analysis of the parliamentary
opposition, particularly its legal status and regulation of interrelations with
the authorities (government) regarding the democratic transformation
in Central and Eastern Europe and Ukraine, and search for practical
recommendations to improve it.
We use general scientic research methods (like systematic and
axiological analysis, synthesis, analogy, generalization, prognosis) to
achieve the main objective, which considers pluralism and freedom as
fundamental principles of a democratic society that ensure respect and
tolerance between political opponents in parliament and outside. Apart
from them, we use other specic methods (data-analyze, statistical,
comparative) to emphasize that the parliamentary opposition is a group
of MPs representing some part of citizens who disagree with the political
course of the current government (because it pursues policies, and even
strategies, that do not really align with voters’ preferences).
Usually, there is one main precondition for becoming parliamentary
opposition: losing condence (no-condence motions (NCMs) being in
860
Vitaliy Kovalchuk, Iryna Sonska, Taras Harasymiv, Ivan Terlyuk y Maiia Pyvovar
Parliamentary opposition and democratic transformation issues: Central and Eastern Europe in focus
government (besause of bias and corruption, for example), therefore
dissolution of parliament, and decreasing MPs cast in a newly elected
parliament.
All these methods help depict the legal status of the opposition and
legislative regulation of relations between the parliamentary minority and
the majority in Central and Eastern Europe and Ukraine. The historical and
legal approach allowed us to study specic features of the formation of the
opposition in the period of democratic transit, regarding the values, legal
tradition, and cultural ties of every country in concern.
The system analysis method allowed us to determine the political and
legal phenomenon as constructive and destructive (populist) opposition.
The nal point is hidden in attempts to scrutinize the interaction of
the parliamentary opposition and the ruling majority in the context of
democratic transit in Central and Eastern Europe and Ukraine.
The article analyzes the constitutions, laws, and bylaws (regulations
and statutes) of particular Central and Eastern European countries and
Ukraine, directly (or indirectly) related to the legal regulation of the
parliamentary majority and minority, draft legislation on the opposition.
The sociological method is used to express the clear vision and mission of
the government and opposition and their eective interrelations to show
a level of democracy in particular countries (specic attention we paid
to European Commission for Democracy Through Law (further - Venice
Commission) reports regarding the rule of law). Among all the philosophical
approaches we used in this article, the axiological method is considered the
exact one to show researched dichotomy (government and opposition) as a
vital necessity (especially now, in Spring 2022).
Venice Commission, in its Opinion on Draft law on the parliamentary
opposition in Ukraine (2007), stated that activity of parliamentary opposition
should be based on the following principles: 1) the state’s recognition of
the oppositional activity as a necessary condition for the functioning of a
democratic state based on the rule of law and the parliamentary opposition
– as an essential component of its political system; 2) the rule of law; 3)
voluntary commencement or termination of the oppositional activity;
4) equality; 5) legality; 6) openness; 7) the state’s guarantees of free and
unimpeded activity of the parliamentary opposition.
3. Research and results
A precise analysis of the constitutional processes during at least the last
twenty years in Central and Eastern European countries, from one side,
and the republics of the former USSR, from the other, shows a negative
861
CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 40 Nº 74 (2022): 855-867
trend of ousting the opposition from the political eld after the election.
The role and activity of political opposition in the parliament usually
depend merely on: type of the electoral system of a particular country
(majoritarian, proportionate, mixed), type of government (parliamentary,
semi-presidential, or presidential), its structure (bicameral or unicameral),
etc.
In Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine, the intensity
of this process is some way dierent. Usually, it happens after the victory
of one of the parties in the elections, when the winner ‘takes all’ (‘Prawo
i Sprawiedliwość’ in Poland, 2015, ‘Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség’ in
Hungary, 2010, “Sluha narodu (Servant of the people)” in Ukraine, 2019).
Figure 2. Governing parties (Poland, Hungary, Ukraine).
Country Poland Hungary Ukraine
Country proler
Parliamentary
unitary republic
Semi-presidential
unitary republic
Parliament Bicameralism Unicameralism
Party
parliamentary
regime
Multi-party
Party name
Prawo i
Sprawiedliwość
Fidesz-Magyar
Polgári Szövetség
Sluha narodu
Foundation year 2001 1988 2017
Governing/ in
majority
2015 – till now 2010 – till now 2020 – till now
Coalition 2005–2007 1998–2002 -
In opposition 2007–2015
1990–1998;
2002–2010
-
Party proler
- right-wing
populist;
- national-
conservative
- centrist
Source: authors.
In these states is formed the parliamentary opposition, which has almost
no voice in the political establishment (minimal participation in policy-
making, no inuence on election and appointment to public oces, etc.).
The winning party (sole or in coalition with its allies or satellites) is trying to
oust the opposition from the political process (particularly policy-making).
As a result, laws are passing without proper consideration (and scrutiny)
under the accelerated procedure.
The opposition is losing all possible inuence regarding the appointment
to key positions within parliament and other public institutions. The
862
Vitaliy Kovalchuk, Iryna Sonska, Taras Harasymiv, Ivan Terlyuk y Maiia Pyvovar
Parliamentary opposition and democratic transformation issues: Central and Eastern Europe in focus
challenges (even danger) of such processes are apparent; it leads to the
monopolization of power and the loss of instruments of political control
over the majority’s actions.
Another feature of transit democracies is the emergence of an
unconstructive (populist) opposition, which blocks any cooperation
with the pro-government majority. Populist parties show disagreement
in almost all spheres of political life in the country (even in those where
the partnership with the majority is possible in principle, reasonable and
plausible). The consequence of such an unconstructive policy is a prolonged
boycott of the parliament work activity with a senseless obstruction of any
legislative initiatives and essential appointments to public oces. Such
destructive behavior is inecient, provokes chaos, and inability to make
crucial decisions for society and the state.
It causes a real challenge to ‘young’ democracies in both cases.
Therefore, developing an eective mechanism to prevent these negative
manifestations is one of the government’s main tasks and the opposition
in these countries. Today there is no single standard and rules for building
a democratic society where the parliamentary majority and the opposition
would interact eectively, which would be reected in international acts.
Not many international documents related to ‘soft law’ are associated
with this issue. The Recommendations of the Venice Commission are
primary documents in this sphere. The rst one is contained in the Report
“On the Role of the Opposition in a Democratic Parliament” (2010). And the
second one is in the Report “On the relationship between the parliamentary
majority and the position in democracy” (2019). The rst, Report of Venice
Commission (2010), did not really deal with the political opposition in
the society in general, with the level of human rights and freedoms, or
basic constitutional choices. It described the situation primarily when the
opposition parties were in the minority.
Therefore, they need some level of protection to perform the basic
legitimate opposition functions necessary to ensure eective and sustainable
democracy in the particular country. In particular, the latter Report (2019)
primarily concerns the interaction of the pro-government majority and the
opposition in the parliaments of democratic transit countries, where the
principles of pluralism and freedom are still quite fragile.
The Constitutions of Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine
enshrine only the principle of pluralism and freedom, as well as certain
rights of deputies or their small groups to initiate essential decisions: to
submit bills to parliament (Constitution of the Czech Republic, Article 41
(2): a draft law may be submitted by [...] groups of deputies), and also to
amend them (Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Article 119 (2): the
right to introduce amendments to a bill in the course of its consideration
863
CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 40 Nº 74 (2022): 855-867
by the Sejm shall belong to [...] Deputies [...]), to make a submission to the
Prime Minister or Minister of Interpellation (Constitution of the Republic of
Lithuania, Article 61 (2): at a session of the Seimas, a group of not less than
1/5 [one-fth] of the Members of the Seimas may direct an interpellation to
the Prime Minister or a Minister), to establish temporary commissions of
investigation (Constitution of Ukraine, Article 89(3): to investigate issues
of public interest, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine establishes temporary
investigatory commissions, if no less than one-third of the constitutional
composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has voted in favor thereof).
Another important issue concerns the right of the opposition during
parliamentary debates. First, the parliamentary opposition must have
enough time to criticize the bills proposed by the (governing) parliamentary
majority. Suppose you give the authority to regulate the time for speeches at
the discretion of the parliament’s governing body or personally the speaker.
In that case, likely, the opposition will not get enough opportunities to
inuence the legislative process. The Venice Commission believes that
legislation, particularly parliamentary rules, should lay down basic rules to
prevent haste in the adoption of laws, such as intervals between readings
and discussions in committees.
It primarily concerns the procedure for amending the constitution,
which should be ‘slow and gradual’ to allow the opposition to resist the
constitutional changes proposed by the governing majority. The procedure
to amend the Constitution of Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, and
Ukraine is ‘rigid’ (regarding the relation between the rank of constitutional
law and the rules for constitutional amendment) both in the number of
successive stages of its implementation and in the number of legal entities,
which allows the parliamentary opposition to control its course.
The intent to require a supermajority in parliament to amend the basic
law (constitution) is, inter alia, aimed to provide a consensus in majority-
opposition relations and a framework in which the political competition
can take an orderly, peaceful and eective route. In case of simple majority
necessary to amend the Constitution, its functioning might be put at risk
since it becomes a perfect political instrument in the hands of the governing
majority. In addition, the parliamentary minority may initiate amendments
to the basic law proclaimed in the Constitution of Lithuania (Article 147(1)),
the Constitution of Poland (Article 235), the Constitution of Ukraine (Article
154).
Regarding adopting ordinary laws, the parliamentary opposition
should have enough time to discuss bills and make suggestions for their
improvement. The Venice Commission recommends introducing more
transparent rules for equal time distribution for debates between the
parliamentary majority and the opposition. However, the regulations
of Poland, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic do not provide such
864
Vitaliy Kovalchuk, Iryna Sonska, Taras Harasymiv, Ivan Terlyuk y Maiia Pyvovar
Parliamentary opposition and democratic transformation issues: Central and Eastern Europe in focus
preconditions, and minority deputies take part in parliamentary debates on
a general basis as ordinary members of parliament.
This issue is partially regulated by the Statute of the Lithuanian
Parliament, which stipulates that the Speaker of the Seimas may change
the order of speeches to provide more proportional representation in the
debates of factions, committees, arguments for and against (Article 105(2)).
Also, if the decision to stop the debate is opposed by the opposition and
is supported by one-third of the members of the Seimas present at the
meeting, they will continue (Article 108(7)).
It is also vital to allow the opposition to formulate an agenda, propose bills
and amendments to them by a governing majority. Only in the Lithuanian
Seimas, the parliamentary opposition has the right to determine the order
of the evening sitting every third Thursday (Article 97(5)). Establishing a
xed time for consideration of issues proposed by the minority is one of the
main demands of opposition factions in transit countries where such a right
has not been formally enshrined. As for the right of legislative initiative
in policy-making and amendments to bills allows the parliamentary
opposition to become an actual participant in the legislative process.
First, the opposition should have enough time for public consultations,
which will allow it to inuence the content of legislative initiatives in policy-
making. Public consultations should be accompanied by (informal) public
discussions in the media and civil society. If in Lithuania, Poland, and the
Czech Republic, such a practice has become common, in Ukraine, it is only
being introduced and is often formal. One of the last steps in this direction
is to establish a scientic advisory council and attract highly qualied
specialists in law to write law drafts, make expertise on draft laws, and
prepare scientic opinions on law-making.
Second, the parliamentary opposition must have reasonable access
to law-making (bills and accompanying documents). The agenda for
consideration of the bill should be published; the necessary materials should
be distributed in advance to the opposition and the public to prepare for the
successful debate. Such a requirement should prevent the harmful practice
of the cavalier legislative (‘legislative rider’) used by the pro-government
majority to avoid checking its legislative proposal.
The internal rules of parliaments should ensure the clarity of the texts
proposed for voting and the possibility for opposition deputies to read them
in advance on the eve of the vote. Adoption texts cannot be changed after
the vote (except for purely technical amendments that do not aect the
bill’s content). Failure to comply with these requirements is expected in
the parliaments of ‘young’ democracies and harms the constitutional order.
865
CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 40 Nº 74 (2022): 855-867
4.Discussion
Third, the opposition must be allowed to amend the bills proposed by
the majority without bias and hindrance. To this end, it is necessary to
regulate the initiatives of pro-government factions to adopt bills under the
accelerated procedure, particularly when it comes to regulating essential
aspects of a political or legal nature. However, the parliament speaker should
be able not to put to the vote amendments that were previously rejected or
not relevant to the substance of the bill under consideration. It is necessary
for the eectiveness of the legislative process. The opposition should not
use its procedural rights in law-making for a long and meaningless blocking
of parliament or other branches of government.
The destructive actions of the opposition or governing minority are
another obstacle to the establishment of consolidated democratic regimes
in Central and Eastern Europe and Ukraine: so-called ‘parliamentary/
legislative/amendment spam’, dened as an abuse of parliamentary
powers in law-making. For example, in Ukraine, in 2020, more than 16,000
amendments were submitted to the draft law 2571-d (the so-called ‘Anti-
Kolomoisky bank law’, nally adopted by Ukrainian parliament on Mai 13,
2020). Imagine, one MP himself submitted 6,000 amendments (one-third
of the total amount).
Afterward, possible ways to circumvent the amendment spam through
Article 119 of the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.
In such a situation, restricting some rights of the opposition might be a
suitable solution. Still, it carries signicant risks associated with a monopoly
on power in the long perspective.
Conclusions
To conclude, we argue that the opposition (its ocial status, role, and
place in the parliament and government) should be determined in the
constitution of every democratic state, laws, and bylaws. Possession of
strong parliamentary opposition but not just a hologram ensures scrutiny
(even review) of planned governmental policy and strategy (probably
populistic) regarding unemployment, taxes and social care issues, migration
or environment protection, etc. Economic growth and food security are
primary topics of interest for governing majority in the parliament to stay
in government as long as possible (even so, those claims are too populistic).
The institutionalization of the parliamentary opposition is essential
for several reasons for all ‘democratic transit’ countries. First, due to the
lack of a constitutional tradition of relations between the parliamentary
majority and the minority, the normative enshrinement of the latter’s rights
866
Vitaliy Kovalchuk, Iryna Sonska, Taras Harasymiv, Ivan Terlyuk y Maiia Pyvovar
Parliamentary opposition and democratic transformation issues: Central and Eastern Europe in focus
and guarantees of activity shapes its attitude as a crucial parliamentary
institution, which is an eective alternative to the pro-government coalition.
This approach emphasizes the value of the parliamentary opposition, which
performs specic functions and is much more than just a personal cast of
deputies being in the minority proportionally to the majority.
Secondly, legally enshrined and clearly dened rights and guarantees
are a more eective tool for the functioning of the parliamentary opposition
than exercising the powers of an ordinary parliamentary minority. It
establishes the status of the opposition, endowed with equal powers as the
governing coalition.
Finally, the legitimization of the parliamentary opposition in the
constitution, for example, provides, on the one hand, legal guarantees
within government-opposition relations to limit the political inuence of
the parliamentary (governing) majority on the minority. On the other hand,
it imposes on the opposition right to be with the governing majority on
equal footing; therefore, to be jointly legally responsible for the exercise of
power. So, the existence of the eective parliamentary opposition able to
scrutinize (populistic) policy of governing majority is a visible symbol of the
salvation of state political order and parliament itself.
Bibliographic References
COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS. 2020. “Parameters on the Relationship
between the Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition in a Democracy:
a checklist, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 119th Plenary
Session” (Venice, 21-22 June 2019). Available online. In: https://
www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2019)015-e.
Consultation date: 10/06/2022.
CONSTITUTION OF LITHUANIA. 1992. Available online. In: https://
www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lithuania_2019?lang=en.
Consultation date: 10/06/2022.
CONSTITUTION OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC. 1993. Available online. In:
https://www.psp.cz/en/docs/laws/1993/1.html. Consultation date:
10/06/2022.
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND. 1997. Available online.
In: https://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm.
Consultation date: 10/06/2022.
CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE. 1996. Available online. In: https://www.
refworld.org/pdd/44a280124.pdf. Consultation date: 10/06/2022.
867
CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 40 Nº 74 (2022): 855-867
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE. 2022. Democracy Index 2021: less than half
the world lives in a democracy. Available online. In: https://www.eiu.
com/n/democracy-index-2021-less-than-half-the-world-lives-in-a-
democracy/. Consultation date: 10/06/2022.
KERSELL, John; DAHL, Robert. 1966. “Political Oppositions in Western
Democracies” In: International Journal. Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 535-593.
LOUWERSE, Tom; OTJES, Simon. 2018. “How Populists Wage Opposition:
Parliamentary Opposition Behaviour and Populism in Netherlands” In:
Political Studies. Vol. 67, No. 2, pp. 479-495.
MAEDA, Ko. 2013. “Determinants of opposition fragmentation” In: Party
Politics. Vol. 21, No. 5, pp. 763-774,
MICHEL, Rosenfeld; ANDRÁS, Sajó (ed.). 2012. “The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Constitutional Law”. [S. l.]: Oxford University Press, E-book.
ISBN 9780199578610. Available online. In: https://doi.org/10.1093/
law/9780199578610.001.0001. Consultation date: 10/06/2022.
OPINION OF VENICE COMMISSION. 2007. On Draft law on the parliamentary
opposition in Ukraine. Available online. In: https://www.venice.coe.
int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL(2007)006-e).
Consultation date: 10/06/2022.
PARAMETERS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARLIAMENTARY
MAJORITY AND THE OPPOSITION IN A DEMOCRACY: A CHECKLIST,
ADOPTED BY THE VENICE COMMISSION AT ITS 119TH PLENARY
SESSION. 2019. 2019. And endorsed by the Committee of Ministers on
5 February 2020. Available online. In: https://www.venice.coe.int/
webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2019)015-e. Consultation date:
10/08/2022.
VENICE COMMISSION. 2010. “On the Role of the Opposition in a Democratic
Parliament” In: Available online. https://www.venice.coe.int/
webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2010)025-e
Consultation date: 10/06/2022.
WALDRON-MOORE, Pamela. 1999. “Eastern Europe at the Crossroads of
Democratic Transition” In: Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 32, No.
1, pp. 32-62.
WHITAKER, Richard; MARTIN, Shane. 2021 “Divide to conquer? Strategic
parliamentary opposition and coalition government” In: Party
Politics. p. 135406882110428. Available online. In: https://doi.
org/10.1177/13540688211042859. Consultation date: 10/06/2022.
www.luz.edu.ve
www.serbi.luz.edu.ve
www.produccioncienticaluz.org
Esta revista fue editada en formato digital y publicada
en diciembre de 2022, por el Fondo Editorial Serbiluz,
Universidad del Zulia. Maracaibo-Venezuela
Vol.40 Nº 75
