Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Derecho Público "Dr. Humberto J. La Roche"
de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas de la Universidad del Zulia
Maracaibo, Venezuela
Publicación cientíca en formato digital
ISSN-Versión Impresa 0798-1406 / ISSN-Versión on line 2542-3185
Depósito legal pp 197402ZU34
ppi 201502ZU4645
Vol.40 N° 75
2022
ISSN 0798- 1406 ~ De pó si to le gal pp 198502ZU132
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avan ces o re sul ta dos de in ves ti ga ción en las áreas de Cien cia Po lí ti ca y De re cho Pú bli-
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Vol. 40, Nº 75 (2022), 694-716
IEPDP-Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas - LUZ
Recibido el 09/10/22 Aceptado el 26/11/22
SWOT analysis to assess the threat of
illegal arms tracking on the Ukrainian
border with the European Union countries
in the context of the war
DOI: https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.4075.42
Oleksandr Samoilenko *
Viktor Bereziuk **
Olena Zabolotna ***
Artem Chornyi ****
Oleksandr Adamchuk *****
Abstract
The problem of combating threats of illegal tracking of
arms, ammunition and explosives at the border points of Ukraine
with the countries of the European Union EU has become urgent
under martial law. The aim of the study was to develop an
optimal strategy for the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (hereinafter
referred to as “SBGSU”) to combat threats of illegal arms tracking at
border points with EU countries under martial law. A comprehensive
methodological approach combining the following scientic methods was
used: comparative method, systems analysis method, structural-functional
method, survey and group expert evaluation method, classication method
and determination of numerical characteristics. A model was developed to
assess the threat of illegal arms tracking on the border of Ukraine with the
EU countries under martial law based on SWOT-analysis. As a result, the
factors of strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats, which exist
in the Ukrainian border guard agency, were identied. It is concluded that
* PhD in Psychology, Head of the Department of Border Checks, Faculty of State Border Security, Bohdan
Khmelnytskyi National Academy of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, 29007, Khmelnytskyi,
Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5263-190X
** PhD in Pedagogics, Professor, Associate Professor of the Department of Border Checks, Faculty of
State Border Security, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi National Academy of the State Border Guard Service of
Ukraine, 29007, Khmelnytskyi, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8565-5441
*** PhD in Pedagogics, Associate Professor of the Department of Border Checks, Faculty of State Border
Security, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi National Academy of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine,
29007, Khmelnytskyi, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8501-0555
**** PhD in Psychology, Associate Professor of the Department of Border Checks, Faculty of State Border
Security, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi National Academy of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine,
29007, Khmelnytskyi, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5541-1910
***** PhD in Psychology, Associate Professor, Head of the Faculty of State Border Security, Bohdan
Khmelnytskyi National Academy of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, 29007, Khmelnytskyi,
Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0280-6334
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CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 40 Nº 75 (2022): 694-716
the results of this study cannot be applied to the border areas of Ukraine
with such countries as the Russian Federation, Belarus and Moldova.
Keywords: SWOT analysis; arms and ammunition; border security in
Europe; combating threats; illegal arms tracking.
El análisis FODA para evaluar la amenaza del tráco
ilegal de armas en la frontera de Ucrania con los países
de la Unión Europea en el contexto de la guerra
Resumen
El problema de combatir las amenazas del tráco ilegal de armas,
municiones y explosivos en los puntos fronterizos de Ucrania con los países
de la Unión Europea UE se ha vuelto urgente bajo la ley marcial. El objetivo
del estudio fue desarrollar una estrategia óptima para el Servicio Estatal de
Guardia de Fronteras de Ucrania (en lo sucesivo, «SBGSU») para combatir
las amenazas del tráco ilegal de armas en los puntos fronterizos con países
de la UE bajo la ley marcial. Se utilizó un enfoque metodológico integral que
combinó los siguientes métodos cientícos: método comparativo, método
de análisis de sistemas, método estructural-funcional, encuesta y método de
evaluación de expertos grupales, método de clasicación y determinación
de características numéricas. Se desarrolló un modelo para evaluar la
amenaza del tráco ilegal de armas en la frontera de Ucrania con los países
de la UE bajo la ley marcial basado en el análisis FODA. En consecuencia,
se identicaron los factores de fortalezas y debilidades, oportunidades y
amenazas, que existen en la agencia de guardia fronteriza de Ucrania. Se
concluye que los resultados de este estudio no pueden aplicarse a las zonas
fronterizas de Ucrania con países como la Federación Rusa, Bielorrusia y
Moldavia.
Palabras clave: análisis FODA; armas y municiones; seguridad
fronteriza en Europa; combate a amenazas; tráco
ilegal de armas.
Introduction
On February 24, 2022, with the beginning of the full-scale aggression
of the Russian Federation (hereinafter - RF) against Ukraine, our state was
forced to counteract a number of security risks and threats on the state
border, the impact of which has signicantly increased. In particular, such
696
Oleksandr Samoilenko, Viktor Bereziuk, Olena Zabolotna, Artem Chornyi y Oleksandr Adamchuk
SWOT analysis to assess the threat of illegal arms tracking on the Ukrainian border with the
threats include potential attempts to smuggle weapons, ammunition and
explosives (hereinafter - WAE) to the European Union (hereinafter - EU) at
border crossing points, which currently continue to operate on the western
area of the border after the introduction of martial law on the territory of
Ukraine.
The conduct of combat operations in the southeaster part of Ukraine
has caused the intensication of the trac of WAE through its territory.
In general, the entire amount of WAE that are currently on the territory of
Ukraine can be divided into two categories: 1) WAE that had been on the
territory of Ukraine before the war with RF began; 2) WAE that Ukraine
had received from partner countries (EU, USA, etc.) during the war.
Today, there is a high probability of intensication of illegal elements’
attempts to smuggle WAE at border crossing points on the western border
of Ukraine (to the following EU countries: Poland, Hungary, Slovakia,
Romania) using caches, hiding places, the structural features of vehicles
of foreign destination and by attempts to involve border guards in illegal
activities at border crossing points.
Taking into account the aforesaid, it is reasonable to nd new eective
ways to combat illegal tracking in WAE at border crossing points, to take
appropriate measures to improve the eectiveness of control at border
crossing points over the tracking in prohibited items and materials that
threaten the security of the state.
It should be noted that under the martial law, this problem is especially
relevant on the borders of Ukraine with EU countries. The Strategic Risk
Analysis 2022, developed by the FRONTEX Agency (2022), emphasizes
the crucial role of risk proling in the eld of illegal tracking in weapons
across the border, including from Ukraine. The GRIP report (Seniora and
Poitevin, 2010) emphasizes the importance of interaction at dierent
levels and joint risk analysis to combat illicit tracking in small arms. The
information about the illicit tracking in rearms and the possible threat
of weapons supplying from Ukraine to the European Union is provided in
UNODC (2020) and Savona and Mancuso (2017).
The results of the analysis of the views of Ukrainian and foreign scientists
have shown that a number of researchers have studied the application
of risk analysis and threat assessment in the eld of border and national
security in their works. For example, Prezelj and Gaber (2005) considered
the problem of cross-border tracking in Slovenia and measures to combat
illegal tracking in weapons, including the use of a risk analysis system.
Horii (2016) devoted his article to the role of FRONTEX in risk analysis,
in particular how information is collected and analysed, what is considered
a “risk” to external borders of EU and how such analysis is subsequently
used, while Paul (2018) discusses the growing signicance of FRONTEX
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Vol. 40 Nº 75 (2022): 694-716
risk analysis in the eld of migration management. Csaba (2012) in his
article considers the problem of risk proles at dierent levels and focuses
on advanced information systems and their role in risk reduction and trade
facilitation through their positive impact on the border crossing point
capacity.
Ackleson (2005) studied several technology-oriented border control
systems: screening, biometrics and information technology. The
dissertation research of Thoreson (2011) is devoted to technical aspects of
detecting materials for nuclear weapons. Peterka-Benton (2012) studied
the issue of Transnistria as a security threat, including illegal weapons
trading. Mackenzie (2020) speaks about the consequential eects of arms
tracking.
Makhnyuk and Kyrychenko (2012) studied approaches to conduct
monitoring of threats and their classication. In their article, the authors
considered certain issues of information and analytical support of
integrated border management, in particular the development and creation
of a database of border security threat passports, suggested the form and
structure of the threat passport. Scientists Mosov, Salii and Chukanov
(2020) considered the issue of dierent approaches to the methodology for
identication and assessment of challenges, dangers and threats to border
security of the Republic of Kazakhstan based on risk analysis.
In his study, Farion (2021) researched issues related to the strategic
criminal analysis of threats to border security based on the tools used in
the SOCTA methodology. In the article “The Use of SWOT Analysis in
the Field of National Security Planning” (Bratko et al., 2021), the team
of authors investigated the methodology of planning of operational and
service activities based on defense planning in the national security system
based on opportunities, using SWOT analysis. Reznikova (2022) studied
the state of the security environment of Ukraine, formed on the eve of a
full-scale war launched by RF against Ukraine in February 2022, as well as
the changes that took place after these events; predicted the tendencies of
the Ukrainian security environment development in the post-war period.
The author has identied the sources of the main threats to the national
security of Ukraine, as well as vulnerabilities, advantages and opportunities
for the development of the state and society in the new conditions (Reznikova
et al., 2020).
Braga et al. (2002) investigated the problem of illegal supply of rearms
in America from the juridical point of view, as well as Buhaichuk (2021)
studied the current state of legal regulation of civilian rearms circulation in
Ukraine. Shevchuk and Kotiuk (2020) explored the methods of smuggling
of rearms and ammunition in the structure of criminalistic characteristics.
Feinstein and Holden (2014) studied legal mechanisms of reduction in
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Oleksandr Samoilenko, Viktor Bereziuk, Olena Zabolotna, Artem Chornyi y Oleksandr Adamchuk
SWOT analysis to assess the threat of illegal arms tracking on the Ukrainian border with the
arms tracking. Bastien Olvera’s (2014) investigation deals with the ways
of combatting illegal transfer of small arms and light weapons (SALW) to
non-state actors, in particularly by means of arms embargoes sponsored by
the United Nations Security Council.
Beznogykh (2021) in his article analyses the potential of the illegal arms
market in Ukraine and possible risks of weapons smuggling into European
countries taking into account the characteristics of the local market for
illegal weapons and ammunition.
A comprehensive assessment of the situation in Ukraine related to
illegal tracking in weapons from the war zone to European countries is
represented by Buscemi et al. (2018) and Martyniuk (2017). The problem
of tracking in ammunition from Ukraine to Europe is studied in the work
of Schroeder and Shumska (2021) and Dziundziuk et al. (2020).
At the same time there is an urgent need to increase the eectiveness
of counteraction by ocials of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
(hereinafter - SBGSU) to threats at border crossing points, in particular
on the illegal tracking in weapons and ammunition, so the purpose of
the article is to determine the optimal strategy of the SBGSU to combat
the threat of illegal tracking in WAE at border crossing points with EU
countries under the martial law.
In accordance with the set purpose, the following main tasks of the
study have been identied:
1. To develop a model for assessing the threat of illegal tracking in
WAE on the border of Ukraine with EU countries under the martial
law.
2. To identify the factors of strengths and weaknesses, opportunities
and threats that exist in the border guard agency of Ukraine, to
assess the level of their potential impact on the process of illegal
tracking in WAE at border crossing points of Ukraine with EU
countries under the martial law.
3. To develop practical recommendations for SBGSU ocials to
improve the eciency of border guard units in order to combat the
threat of illegal tracking in WAE at border crossing points with EU
countries under the martial law.
1. Research methodology
In order to solve the tasks of the study, a comprehensive methodological
approach has been used, which involved the use of a number of techniques
and methods, the combination of which made it possible to achieve the
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CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 40 Nº 75 (2022): 694-716
purpose of this study. The basis of the approach was the idea of synthetic
theorizing, which led to the use of various scientic approaches not as
oppositional, but as complementary to each other.
The comparative method has enabled to determine the degree
of inuence of each strategic factor from four categories (strengths/
weaknesses, opportunities/threats) on the problem studied. The method
of system analysis made it possible to determine the relationship of each
element in a complex system structure. The structural-functional method
has been used to develop a model for assessing the threat of illegal tracking
in WAE on the border of Ukraine with EU countries under the martial law.
In addition, the study has been conducted using the following scientic
methods:
theoretical – analysis, generalization, systematization and interpretation
of a number of scientic sources and materials;
empirical – surveys – to identify the factors that aect the process of
illegal tracking in WAE at border crossing points of Ukraine with EU
countries under the martial law; the method of group expert assessments
– to determine the correlation of strengths/weaknesses, opportunities/
threats that exist in the border guard agency of Ukraine;
mathematical and statistical methods - the method of ranking and
determining numerical characteristics - to systematize, analyze and process
the data obtained and establish relationships between the problems studied.
In order to choose the optimal strategy of SBGSU activity on combating
the threat of illegal tracking in WAE at border crossing points with
EU countries under the martial law, we have applied SWOT analysis.
The purpose of the analysis was to identify the strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats of the Ukrainian border guard agency and to
assess their potential impact.
It should be noted that in the process of applying SWOT analysis, we
considered strengths and weaknesses as the subjective factors on which
SBGSU has a planned and managerial inuence, and opportunities and
threats as the objective factors on which the border guard agency has no
direct inuence.
If we interpret the strengths and weaknesses as the internal factors of
the border guard agency, and the opportunities and threats as the external
ones, as a result, they can be attributed to one of the following strategies:
aggressive, conservative, competitive or defensive one. In our opinion, it is
the determination of the optimal strategy of SBGSU activity that will be able
to increase the eectiveness of combating the threat of illegal tracking in
WAE at border crossing points with EU countries under the martial law.
700
Oleksandr Samoilenko, Viktor Bereziuk, Olena Zabolotna, Artem Chornyi y Oleksandr Adamchuk
SWOT analysis to assess the threat of illegal arms tracking on the Ukrainian border with the
To conduct this study, a group of 10 experts had been selected and formed.
The total number of candidates was 58 representatives of the scientic and
pedagogical sta. The category of persons who had been included in the
group of experts was determined on the basis of the following criteria: more
than 20 years of general experience in SBGSU units; more than 15 years of
practical experience of service at border crossing points; more than 10 years
of experience in teaching cadets of the specialized disciplines (experience in
working with personnel); scientic degree; knowledge in the eld of risk
analysis and threat assessment that aect the quality of border checks (as
conrmed by a certicate of completion of appropriate advanced training
courses).
The group of experts brainstormed the factors for each of the 4 criteria
(S, W, O, T) that could potentially aect illegal tracking in weapons and
ammunition across the state border. 7 factors per each criterion, which, in
the experts` opinion have the greatest impact on the threat, were chosen,
and the weight of the impact of each of these factors was determined on
a seven-point scale from 0 (lowest level of impact) to 7 (highest level of
impact).
2. Research results
The study has been conducted in three stages.
At the rst stage, in order to eectively assess the threat of illegal
tracking in WAE at border crossing points on the western border of
Ukraine with EU countries under the martial law (from February 24, 2022
to the present), a corresponding model was developed (Figure 1).
The model reects schematically the relationship between the internal
and the external factors. The internal factors include: strengths and
weaknesses that exist in the border guard agency and may have a potential
impact on the process of illegal tracking in weapons and ammunition at
border crossing points on the western border; the external factors include
opportunities and threats that exist in the state and may have an impact
on the intensication of the tracking in weapons and ammunition.
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CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 40 Nº 75 (2022): 694-716
Figure 1: The Model of Assessment of Threat of Illegal WAE Tracking on the
Border of Ukraine with EU Countries under the Martial Law.
The result of the study at the second stage was the identication of
factors for each of the 4 criteria (S, W, O, T).
The strengths included:
1. level of training (professional competencies on vehicle inspection
by dierent categories of military personnel performing the tasks at
border crossing points);
2. border checks technical aids provision (hereinafter – BCTA) (a
large quantity of BCTA for vehicles inspection, which increases the
eciency of WAE detection in persons and vehicles crossing the
state border);
3. personnel experience (a signicant period of tasks performance at
border crossing points, which is conrmed by multiple facts of WAE
detection during the vehicles inspection);
4. databases use (check of persons and vehicles crossing the state
border using available information databases, which increases the
eective risk analysis);
702
Oleksandr Samoilenko, Viktor Bereziuk, Olena Zabolotna, Artem Chornyi y Oleksandr Adamchuk
SWOT analysis to assess the threat of illegal arms tracking on the Ukrainian border with the
5. personnel motivation (correlation of desire to perception of
importance and responsibility for border checks at border crossing
points);
6. risk proles application (national, regional, local, based on the
identication of risk indicators at border crossing points during the
tasks performance);
7. ecient interaction with the other subjects of integrated border
management (the Ministry of Internal Aairs, the Ministry of
Foreign Aairs, the State Customs Service, the Security Service of
Ukraine, the National Police, the National Guard, the Armed Forces
of Ukraine, local authorities, etc.).
The weaknesses identied by the experts were:
1. personnel overwork (increased involvement of personnel in the
practical tasks at border crossing points, which leads to a decrease
in the eciency of service due to physical fatigue and reduced
concentration);
2. insucient capacity of the border crossing point (leads to long
queues near land border crossing points, which negatively aects
the possibility of compliance with the regime in the places of border
checks);
3. insucient number of service dog instructors specializing in
weapons detection (the level of stang of border guard units with
service dog instructors used to search for WAE is not optimal, which
reduces the probability of detecting WAE in persons and vehicles
crossing the state border);
4. stress (unstable mental and emotional state of personnel due to
nervous concerns for relatives and friends because of the war);
5. the necessity of personnel rotation for participation in combat
operations (constant changes of personnel of border guard units,
which negatively inuences the level of coherence and interaction
during the border checks at border crossing points);
6. personnel corruption (unlawful activities of military personnel
performing border checks, which involves ineective performance
of their ocial responsibilities due to unlawful benets from
criminals and oenders at border crossing points);
7. impossibility of advanced training under the martial law (due to
restrictions on the right to relocate personnel, except in extraordinary
cases).
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CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 40 Nº 75 (2022): 694-716
Potential opportunities, according to the experts, were:
1. opening of new and modern border crossing points (they will
provide better conditions for border checks, vehicles inspection in
particular, and increase the probability of WAE detection);
2. strengthening the responsibility for illegal tracking in weapons
across the state border (amendments to the legislation of Ukraine
on strengthening criminal liability for illegal tracking in WAE
across the state border may lead to a reduction in the number of
persons engaged in this type of illegal activity);
3. providing units with the latest models of BCTA within the framework
of international projects, grants (constant improvement and change
of tactics of oenders at border crossing points on illegal tracking
in WAE requires systematic updating of BCTA, which will increase
the eciency of vehicles inspection by border details);
4. intensication of personnel training activities with the involvement
of national and international experts (the necessity to provide
trainings, exchange of experience, etc. despite the diculties arising
under the martial law);
5. systematic joint risk analysis on combating the threat of illicit
tracking in WAE (increasing the eectiveness of combating the
threat of illegal tracking in WAE across the state border through
constant joint risk analysis by the working groups of the countries
for which this threat is the most relevant one);
6. creation of an eective mechanism to encourage the local residents
for the assistance provided to SBGSU (nancial motivation of border
residents by paying them bonuses or reducing the tax burden);
7. strengthening the eective cooperation with the international
agency FRONTEX under the martial law (reorientation of training
courses on vehicles inspection at border crossing points to the online
format using eective Internet platforms).
The following threats were identied:
1. a signicant increase in the passenger and transport trac on
the border of Ukraine with EU countries (will lead to the inability
to reorient this trac to other border crossing points, which will
negatively aect the level of social tension in the border areas of the
countries);
2. an increase in the trac of weapons and ammunition from Ukraine
to EU countries due to the rise in their total number on the controlled
704
Oleksandr Samoilenko, Viktor Bereziuk, Olena Zabolotna, Artem Chornyi y Oleksandr Adamchuk
SWOT analysis to assess the threat of illegal arms tracking on the Ukrainian border with the
territory (increase in the total number of WAE on the controlled
territory due to the assistance from the military coalition countries,
increased demand for weapons for self-defence, diculties in
controlling the process of its circulation);
3. an increase in the probability of illegal tracking in WAE in case of
a negative scenario on the frontline (depending on the development
of the theater of military operations, there is a risk of an increase in
attempts to illegally trac WAE across the state border of Ukraine
with EU countries and in their number);
4. abrupt changes in the socio-political situation in the world, in
neighbouring countries (increase in the number of countries directly
involved in the war with RF, serious social and political changes
in the countries bordering Ukraine, other global turbulence in the
world);
5. intensication of cross-border criminal groups in the eld of illegal
tracking in WAE across the state border (the emergence of new
or intensication of existing cross-border criminal organizations,
groups as a result of the increased demand for WAE in the world, in
Europe in particular);
6. changes in the legislation of Ukraine on the circulation of weapons
(simplication of the sale procedure, storage of weapons and
ammunition for self-defence can lead to a weakening of control over
their circulation both within the country and during their tracking
across the state border);
7. high probability of missile threat from RF (requires suspension of
control procedures and operations at border crossing points across
the state border at the time of the “Air raid alarm” signal, removal of
persons at border crossing points to safe places, which can be used
by illegal elements for illegal tracking in WAE across the border).
The next stage was to assess the inuence of each parameter and their
correlation to each other (the results have been presented in Tables 1-4).
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Table 1. Correlation of Strengths and Opportunities.
STRENGTHS
OPPORTUNITIES
Level of training
BCTA provision
Personnel experience
Databases use
Personnel motivation
Risk proles application
Eective interaction with
the other subjects of IBM
Weight
Number of relationships
Product of weight and
relationships
Opening of new and
modern border crossing
points 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.211 30.633
Strengthening the
responsibility for illegal
tracking in weapons
across the state border
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.207 20.414
Providing units with the
latest models of BCTA
within the framework of
international projects,
grants
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.154 50.77
Intensication of
personnel training
activities with the
involvement of national
and international
experts
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0.136 50.68
Systematic joint
risk analysis on
counteraction to
the threat of illicit
tracking in WAE
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.15 60.75
Creation of an
eective mechanism
to encourage local
residents for the
assistance provided by
SBGSU
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.039 20.078
Strengthening the
eective cooperation
with the international
agency FRONTEX under
the martial law
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0.093
Weight 0.211 0.157 0.196 0.111 0.154 0.064 0.107
Number of relationships 4 2 34 7 4 5
Product of weight and
relationships 0.844 0.314 0.588 0.444 1,078 0.256 0.535
Sum of relationships 52
Sum of products 7.384
Source: authors.
706
Oleksandr Samoilenko, Viktor Bereziuk, Olena Zabolotna, Artem Chornyi y Oleksandr Adamchuk
SWOT analysis to assess the threat of illegal arms tracking on the Ukrainian border with the
Table 2. Correlation of Strengths and Threats.
STRENGTHS
THREATS
Level of training
BCTA provision
Personnel experience
Databases use
Personnel motivation
Risk proles
application
Eective interaction
with the other
subjects of IBM
Weight
Number of
relationships
Product of weight and
relationships
Signicant increase
in passenger and
transport trac on the
border of Ukraine with
EU countries
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.079 20.158
Increase in the
trac of weapons
and ammunition
from Ukraine to
EU countries due
to the rise in their
total number on the
controlled territory
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.143 20.286
Increase in the
probability of illegal
tracking in WAE
in case of a negative
scenario on the
frontline
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.146 20.292
Abrupt changes in
the socio-political
situation in the world
(in neighboring
countries)
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.171 20.342
Intensication of
cross-border criminal
groups in the eld
of illegal tracking
across the border of
WAE
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.214 20.428
Changes in the
legislation of Ukraine
on the circulation of
weapons
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.061 10.061
Missile Threat 1 0 1 0 0 010.186 30.558
Weight 0.211 0.157 0.196 0.111 0.154 0.064 0.107
Number of
relationships 1 - 1 - - 5 7
Product of weight and
relationships 0.211 0.157 0.196 0.111 0.154 0.32 0.749
Sum of relationships 28
Sum of products 4.023
Source: authors.
707
CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
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Table 3. Correlation of Weaknesses and Opportunities.
WEAKNESSES
OPPORTUNITIES
Personnel overwork
Insucient capacity of border
crossing points
Insucient number of service
dog instructors specializing in
weapons detection
Stress
(mental-emotional state)
Necessity of personnel
rotation for participation in
combat operations
Personnel corruption
Impossibility of advanced
training under the martial law
Weight
Number of relationships
Product of weight and
relationships
Opening of new
and modern border
crossing points
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.211 20.422
Strengthening the
responsibility for
illegal tracking in
weapons across the
state border
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.207 10.207
Providing units with
the latest models
of BCTA within
the framework of
international projects,
grants
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.154 30.462
Intensication of
personnel training
activities with
the involvement
of national and
international experts
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.136 10.136
Systematic joint risk
analysis on combating
the threat of illicit
tracking in WAE
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.15 10.15
Creation of an
eective mechanism
to encourage the
local residents for the
assistance provided by
SBGSU
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.039 10.039
Strengthening the
eective cooperation
with the international
agency FRONTEX
under the martial law
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.093 20.186
Weight 0.243 0.15 0.172 0.146 0.089 0.146 0.054
Number of
relationships 2 2 1 - - 3 3
Product of weight and
relationships
0.486 0.3 0.172 0.146 0.089 0.438 0.162
Sum of relationships 22
Sum of products 3.395
Source: authors.
708
Oleksandr Samoilenko, Viktor Bereziuk, Olena Zabolotna, Artem Chornyi y Oleksandr Adamchuk
SWOT analysis to assess the threat of illegal arms tracking on the Ukrainian border with the
Table 4. Correlation of Weaknesses and Threats.
WEAKNESSES
THREATS
Personnel overwork
Insucient capacity of border
crossing points
Insucient number of service
dog instructors specializing in
weapons detection
Stress
(mental-emotional state)
Necessity of personnel rotation
for participation in combat
operations
Personnel corruption
Impossibility of advanced
training under the martial law
Weight
Number of relationships
Product of weight and
relationships
Signicant increase
in passenger and
transport trac on
the border of Ukraine
with EU countries
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.079 50.395
Increase in the
trac of weapons
and ammunition
from Ukraine to
EU countries due
to the rise in their
total number on the
controlled territory
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.143 50.715
Increase in the
probability of illegal
tracking in WAE
in case of a negative
scenario on the
frontline
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.146 50.73
Abrupt changes in
the socio-political
situation in the world
(in neighboring
countries)
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.171 20.342
Intensication of
cross-border criminal
groups in the eld
of illegal tracking
across the border of
WAE
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.214 30.642
Changes in the
legislation of Ukraine
on the circulation of
weapons
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.061 -0.061
Missile Threat 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.186 20.372
Weight 0.243 0.15 0.172 0.146 0.089 0.146 0.054
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CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
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Number of
relationships 53 3 6 - 5 -
Product of weight and
relationships 1.215 0.45 0.516 0.876 0.089 0.73 0.054
Sum of relationships 44
Sum of products 7.187
Source: authors.
Table 1 shows the weights and relationships between the factors of
strengths (inuenced by SBGSU) and opportunities (beyond the control of
the border guard agency).
The information presented in Table 2 reveals the relationships between
the factors of strengths (inuenced by SBGSU) and threats (not directly
dependent on the border guard agency), as well as the weight indicators of
each factor.
The data presented in Table 3 shows the presence or absence of
relationships between the factors of weaknesses (inuenced by SBGSU)
and opportunities (dependent not only on the border agency) and the level
of inuence of each of them.
The information given in Table 4 indicates the weight of weaknesses
(inuenced by SBGSU) and threats (beyond the direct control of the border
guard agency) and the relationships between them.
Summarizing the data from Tables 1-4, we created a general summary
and reected the relevant results in it (Table 5).
Table 5. SWOT – comparison of the results.
Correlation Sum of relationships Sum of products
Strengths /Opportunities (SO) 52 7.384
Strengths / Threats (ST) 28 4.023
Weaknesses/ Opportunities (WO) 22 3.395
Weaknesses / Threats (WT) 44 7.187
Source: authors.
The largest sum of the products of the total summary indicates which
strategy we should choose. It follows from the analysis that the optimal
strategy to combat illicit tracking in WAE is an AGGRESSIVE strategy
of expansion and development, which eectively uses both the strengths
710
Oleksandr Samoilenko, Viktor Bereziuk, Olena Zabolotna, Artem Chornyi y Oleksandr Adamchuk
SWOT analysis to assess the threat of illegal arms tracking on the Ukrainian border with the
of SBGSU and the opportunities in the environment around it. It should be
noted that the dierence in the returns of the aggressive strategy (SO) and
the defensive strategy (WT) is not signicant. This fact requires processing
of specic actions depending on the interaction between the factors and
focusing on those factors that are highly dependent on each other or
intensively inuence each other. For this purpose, our expert team has
developed recommendations that could reduce the impact of weaknesses
of SBGSU in combating the threat of illegal tracking in WAE at border
crossing points with EU countries and ensure the leadership of the
aggressive strategy as the most eective under the martial law, according to
the results of our research.
During the third (nal) stage, practical recommendations have been
developed for SBGSU ocials to improve the eectiveness of border guard
units in order to combat the threat of illegal tracking in WAE at border
crossing points with EU countries under the martial law.
We consider it reasonable to provide the following practical
recommendations to reduce the inuence of the main factors of weaknesses
regarding the threat of illegal tracking WAE at border crossing points:
1. in order to avoid personnel overwork, it is necessary to increase
the number of personnel of the border units that carry out border
checks on the border with EU countries to 100% or the maximum
possible level;
2. in order to compensate for the insucient capacity of border crossing
points, the principle of electronic queuing should be introduced
at all land border crossing points, which will allow to distribute
proportionally the trac of dierent categories of vehicles leaving
Ukraine;
3. it is necessary to make changes to the training program for service
dog instructors specializing in weapons detection to accelerate the
timing and optimize the process of their training in special canters
(the factor is the insucient number of service dog instructors
specializing in weapons detection);
4. in order to eliminate the causes and conditions that facilitate the
emergence of stressful situations, it is necessary to intensify the
work of sta psychologists at the level of the state border guard
agencies; to introduce a position of a psychologist in the sta of
border guard units that have border crossing points in their area
of responsibility in order to increase the stability of the personnel’s
psycho-emotional state due to nervousness for relatives and friends
because of the war;
711
CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 40 Nº 75 (2022): 694-716
5. in order to minimize the impact of such a factor as the necessity of
rotation for participation in combat operations (constant changes of
personnel of border guard units, which negatively aects the level
of coherence and interaction during the fullment of border checks
tasks at border crossing points), the rotation process should be
carried out in an organized manner, without reducing the overall
capacity to perform border checks tasks in general, and vehicles
inspection in particular.
3. Discussion
The authors of the article have conducted a SWOT analysis, identied
the factors of strengths, weaknesses, as well as opportunities and threats,
which, according to the experts, have the greatest impact on the threat of
illegal tracking in WAE on the border of Ukraine with EU countries in war
conditions.
The factors of these criteria identied in the study partially correspond
to the criteria specied by Bratko et al., (2021), namely, such strengths as
ensuring the rhythmic crossing the border by persons and vehicles, the use
of databases and risk proles to identify threats to national security on the
state border of Ukraine (obtaining of advanced information), high level of
personnel training, the use of the latest equipment and service dogs, clear
interaction with other subjects of integrated border management; as well
as international crime threats, in particular, in the sphere of illegal WAE
tracking, increase of trac etc. Similar is the use of the research tools
by scientist Farion (2021) in the process of assessing threats to Ukrainian
border security related to crime.
Our conclusions on the threat assessment coincide with those of Peterka-
Benton (2012), who researched Transnistria from the point of view of the
threat to national security, in particular, the illegal tracking in weapons.
The conclusions on the activation of cross-border criminal groups in
the eld of illegal WAE tracking across the border can be opposed to the
conclusions of Prezelj and Gaber (2005), who considered the problem of
cross-border ows in Slovenia and measures to combat illegal tracking in
weapons. The researchers considered this problem from the point of view
of the high demand for weapons and their illegal trade on the black market
(economic component), as well as paid great attention to dierent levels of
interaction to combat the illicit WAE tracking, including the use of a risk
analysis system.
The conclusions obtained by the authors in the process of the formation
of a model for assessing the threat of illegal WAE tracking on the border
712
Oleksandr Samoilenko, Viktor Bereziuk, Olena Zabolotna, Artem Chornyi y Oleksandr Adamchuk
SWOT analysis to assess the threat of illegal arms tracking on the Ukrainian border with the
of Ukraine with EU countries under the martial law are closely connected
with the conclusions of Horii (2016) concerning strategic risk analysis by
the FRONTEX Agency and Csaba (2012), who analyzed the problems of risk
proling at dierent levels.
The authors of the article agree with the conclusions of Makhnyuk
and Kyrychenko (2012) and Rudyk et al., (2022) on the monitoring and
classication of threats, the results of Mosov et al. (2020), who during the
research identied challenges, dangers and threats to the border security
of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Reznikova (2022) on the assessment of
the state of the security environment of Ukraine. However, the authors of
the article do not agree with Seniora and Poitevin (2010) on the approach
to assessing possible threats.
The conclusions reached by the authors of the article do not correlate
with the results of the research of these scientists, namely, the relationship
between the illicit tracking in small arms and light weapons and the
specics of the border residents, as well as the determining role of the
unsatisfactory level of interaction with local authorities and the threat of
corruption among personnel.
Conclusions
Thus, the research conducted by the authors made it possible to identify
a group of factors, the impact of which should be reduced in order to
increase the eectiveness of border checks at border crossing points for
illegal tracking in weapons, ammunition and explosives across the state
border of Ukraine with EU countries that pose a threat to the security of the
state under the martial law.
Existing research works investigate general issues related to the analysis
and assessment of the threat of illegal tracking in prohibited items and
materials across the state border and do not take into account the specic
factors aecting this type of illegal activity on the state border and the
peculiarities and conditions of the martial law in Ukraine.
Based on the results of the SWOT analysis, the optimal strategy has
been determined and practical recommendations have been developed
for SBGSU ocials to improve the eectiveness of border guard units to
combat the threat of illegal WAE tracking at border crossing points with
EU countries under the martial law. In order to obtain the results, the
group of experts has analyzed all the main factors of strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats that currently exist in Ukraine in the conditions
of war.
713
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The conducted research does not cover all the aspects of this problem. A
perspective area of the research is the development of a technology for risk
and threats assessment regarding possible attempts to illegally trac WAE
at border crossing points on the western border of Ukraine.
The results of the study are not perfect, due to the fact that most of the
factors that were taken into account by the experts in the process of SWOT
analysis, are relevant exactly during the martial law in Ukraine. Also, the
results of the research cannot be applied to the areas of the Ukrainian
border with such countries as RF, Belarus and Moldova.
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Esta revista fue editada en formato digital y publicada
en diciembre de 2022, por el Fondo Editorial Serbiluz,
Universidad del Zulia. Maracaibo-Venezuela
Vol.40 Nº 75