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Vol. 39, Nº 71 (2021), 957-971
IEPDP-Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas - LUZ
Recibido el 15/09/2021 Aceptado el 28/11/2021
Standards of fair justice and their
relationship to standards of proof in
criminal proceedings
DOI: https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.3971.58
Serhii Kovalchuk *
Liliia Korytko **
Galyna Kret ***
Serhii Fomin ****
Volodymyr Hryniuk *****
Abstract
The purpose of the article is to dene the concept, system and
content of fair justice standards and outline their relationship to
standards of evidence in criminal proceedings. The purpose of the
study is to reveal the content of the right to a fair trial, distinguish
fair justice standards and establish its relationship with standards
of evidence in criminal proceedings. The research methodology consists of
comparative law, structural system methods and formal legal methods.
The study found that testing standards are covered by justice standards,
expanding, specifying, and clarifying their content. The content of the
fair justice standards “examination of the case by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law”, “adversarial procedure”, “equality of
the parties”, “frankness of the examination of evidence”, “presumption of
innocence” and reveals the “motivation of judicial decisions”. It is concluded
that each of these concepts is a heuristic contribution to test standards. As
a result of the study, the author’s denition of the concept of “fair justice
standards” is formulated and the concept is based on its relationship with
the standards of evidence in criminal proceedings.
* Doctor of Legal Science, Professor, Head of the Department of Criminal Procedure and Criminalistics of
Ivano-Frankivsk Law Institute, National University «Odessa Law Academy», 76000, 13 Maximovycha
str., Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6285-099X
** Doctor of Legal Science, Associate Professor, Head of the Department of General Legal and Human
Sciences of Ivano-Frankivsk Law Institute, National University «Odessa Law Academy», 76000, 13
Maximovycha str., Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3812-205X
*** Doctor of Legal Science, Associate Professor, Judge of Grand Chamber, Supreme Court, 01043, 4
Pylypa Orlyka str., Kyiv, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4906-4799
**** Candidate of Legal Science, Associate Professor, Judge of Criminal Cassation Court, Supreme Court,
01043, 4 Pylypa Orlyka str., Kyiv, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1203-5633
***** Doctor of Legal Science, Associate Professor, Associate Professor of the Department of Criminal
Procedure and Criminalistics, Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University, 01033, 60 Volodymyrska
str., Kyiv, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6340-0584
958
Serhii Kovalchuk, Liliia Korytko, Galyna Kret, Serhii Fomin y Volodymyr Hryniuk
Standards of fair justice and their relationship to standards of proof in criminal proceedings
Keywords: right to a fair trial; standards of impartial justice; test
standards; criminal proceedings; European Court of Human
Rights.
Estándares de justicia justa y su relación con los
estándares de prueba en procesos penales
Resumen
El propósito del artículo es denir el concepto, sistema y contenido de
los estándares de justicia justa y esbozar su relación con los estándares de
prueba en los procesos penales. El objeto del estudio es revelar el contenido
del derecho a un juicio justo, distinguir los estándares de justicia justa y
establecer su relación con los estándares de prueba en los procesos penales.
La metodología de investigación consiste en el derecho comparado, los
métodos estructurales de sistema y los métodos legales formales. El
estudio encontró que los estándares de prueba están cubiertos por los
estándares de justicia, ampliando, especicando y aclarando su contenido.
El contenido de las normas de justicia justa “examen del caso por un
tribunal independiente e imparcial establecido por la ley”, “procedimiento
contradictorio”, “igualdad de las partes”, “franqueza del examen de las
pruebas”, “presunción de inocencia” y se revela la “motivación de las
decisiones judiciales”. Se concluye que cada uno de estos conceptos es
un aporte heurístico para con estándares de prueba. Como resultado del
estudio, se formula la denición del autor del concepto de “estándares de
justicia justa” y se fundamenta el concepto en su relación con los estándares
de prueba en los procesos penales.
Palabras clave: derecho a un juicio justo; estándares de justicia
imparcial; estándares de prueba; procesos penales;
Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos.
Introduction
In the practice of international judicial institutions, the formation of
standards of proof is largely the result of interpretation in specic cases
of the provisions of international legal acts enshrining human rights
and fundamental freedoms, which must be strictly observed by national
authorities, including in criminal proceedings: the right to a fair trial.
consideration, the right to liberty and security of person, the prohibition
of torture, the right to respect for private and family life, housing and
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the secrecy of correspondence, etc. At the same time, the vast majority
of standards of proof are formed by international judicial institutions, in
particular, the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter – the ECHR),
as a result of the interpretation of regulations that enshrine the content of
the right to a fair trial.
The multifaceted nature of this right has led to the development by
international judicial institutions of a wide range of rules related to its
implementation and enforcement, which in the doctrine of criminal
procedure are dened as standards of fair justice. Drawing attention to
their important role in ensuring the proper and eective administration
of justice, scholars note that fair justice standards are a necessary part
of human rights ideology, which, in modern democratic society, cannot
but dene its basic moral, philosophical, social, political and legal values
(Morshchakova, 2012). The vast majority of standards of evidence are
based on standards of fair justice, which necessitates the study of their
concept and system, as well as the disclosure of the content of standards of
fair justice in their relationship with the standards of evidence.
1. Theoretical Framework or Literature Review
In the doctrine of the criminal process, the study of both standards
of fair justice and standards of proof is given considerable attention by
scholars. In particular, to disclose the concept and content of the right
to a fair trial as a basis for distinguishing the system of standards of fair
justice turn Alekseevskaya (2016), Berezhansky (2017), Boggs (1998),
Boryslavska (2021), Brich (2017), Harris (1967), Glovyuk (2011), Langford
(2009), Mahoney (2004), Morshchakova (2012), Perezhniak, Balobanova,
Timoeieva, Tavlui, and Poliuk (2021), Pogoretsky & Hrytsenko (2012),
Rabinovych & Ratushna (2014), Sizam (2012), Tkachuk (2016), Trubnikova
(2016), and Fulei (2015). The works of Basay, Hryniuk & Kovalchuk (2019),
Clermont and Sherwin (2002), Claude (2010), Kret (2020), Vapniarchuk,
Trofymenko, Shylo, and Maryniv (2018), Tuzet (2021) are devoted to
dening the concept, content, and system of standards of proof.
Despite the signicant contribution of scholars to the development
of fair justice and evidentiary standards, a signicant number of its
theoretical and practical aspects in the doctrine of criminal procedure
have not been studied, disclosed insuciently, or are characterized by
debatable approaches to their disclosure. In particular, scholars ignore
the relationship between fair justice standards and standards of proof as
criminal procedural categories, the content of fair justice standards is not
fully disclosed, and their system is ambiguously dened.
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Serhii Kovalchuk, Liliia Korytko, Galyna Kret, Serhii Fomin y Volodymyr Hryniuk
Standards of fair justice and their relationship to standards of proof in criminal proceedings
2. Methodology
The methodological basis of the article was dierent methods of
scientic knowledge: the comparative-legal method, stem-structural
method, formal-legal method. Thus, the comparative-legal method made it
possible to compare the standards of fair justice and the standards of proof.
The application of the system-structural method ensured the disclosure of
the content of the right to a fair trial and the separation of standards of fair
justice.
Further, using the formal-legal method, the authors managed to
formulate new denitions, used in this article.
3. Results and Discussion
Standards of fair justice in relation to standards of proof in the
context of ECHR practice
In the doctrine of criminal procedure, the standards of fair justice are
dened in close connection with the elements of the right to a fair trial. On
the one hand, the combination of these elements, according to scientists,
is the standard of a fair trial (Alekseevskaya, 2016). On the other hand, the
right to a fair trial is the basis for distinguishing standards of fair justice: it
is the elements of the content of this right that constitute the standards of
fair justice.
An analysis of the provisions of Article 6 of the Convention and a study of
the case-law of the ECHR, based on it, among the standards of fair justice,
which are inextricably linked with the standards of evidence, allows us to
include the following:
Consideration of the case by an independent and impartial
court established by law
As the analysis of Article 6 of the Convention shows, this standard of
fair justice includes three aspects: the independence of the judiciary; his
impartiality; the creation of a court in the manner prescribed by law (United
Nations, 1950). Along with these aspects, Article 14 of the International
Covenant contains a direct reference to the fourth aspect - the jurisdiction
of the court. At the same time, the requirements for the jurisdiction,
independence, and impartiality of the court in paragraph 19 of General
Comment № 32 to Article 14 of the International Covenant are recognized
as absolute rights that are not subject to any exceptions (Human Rights
Committee, 2007).
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Directly related to the standards of proof are two aspects of the fair justice
standard under study: the impartiality of the court and its jurisdiction.
From the ECHR’s point of view, impartiality means a lack of bias and
commitment (paragraph 113 of the judgment of 11 July 2013 in Rudnichenko
v. Ukraine) (ECHR, 2013). That is, in general, the impartiality of the court
presupposes its lack of bias regarding the results of the criminal proceedings,
which, in turn, leads to the formation of a corresponding belief in the minds
of the participants in the criminal proceedings.
Characterizing the content of the impartiality of the court, the ECHR
points to the existence of two approaches to its denition: subjective, which
aims to establish the personal convictions of a particular judge in this case,
and objective, which allows determining whether he has provided sucient
guarantees to rule out legitimate doubts in this regard (paragraph 41 of
the judgment of 05.07.2007 in Sara Lind Eggertsdóttir v. Iceland) (ECHR,
2007). At the same time, the ECHR notes that there is no clear distinction
between the two concepts, as the judge’s conduct may not only raise objective
doubts about the impartiality of the external observer (objective criterion)
but also be related to his personal beliefs. (subjective criterion) (paragraph
119 of the judgment of 15 December 2005 in Kyprianou v. Cyprus) (ECHR,
2005).
The need to ensure the impartiality of the court has led to the development
in the case-law of the ECHR of standards of evidence, taking into account
the evidence to be formed by the court without a doubt in its impartiality
concerning the results of criminal proceedings.
Disclosing the content of the right to a competent, independent, and
impartial tribunal established by law, the Oce for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights notes that “competence” usually presupposes
compliance with the following three requirements: the competence of
individual judges; jurisdiction of the court to make legally binding decisions
and jurisdictional jurisdiction of the court. The last of these requirements
are related to the standards of proof, according to which the evidence is to
be formed by the court, taking into account the jurisdiction of the relevant
criminal proceedings.
Adversarial proceedings
The provisions of Article 6 of the Convention do not specify the
adversarial nature of the parties, although this standard of fair justice is
widely used by the ECHR.
In the case-law of the ECHR, adversarial proceedings are dened as
the principle of criminal proceedings, which means that in a criminal case,
the prosecution and defense must be allowed to know the other party’s
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Serhii Kovalchuk, Liliia Korytko, Galyna Kret, Serhii Fomin y Volodymyr Hryniuk
Standards of fair justice and their relationship to standards of proof in criminal proceedings
position and evidence and express their views on them (paragraph 103 of
the judgment in case of Mukhutdinov v. Russia) (ECHR, 2010). At the same
time, national courts have a corresponding obligation to ensure these rights
of the parties to criminal proceedings.
An integral prerequisite for the exercise of the rights that constitute the
content of adversarial proceedings is the acquaintance of one party to the
criminal proceedings with the evidence obtained by the other party. First
of all, it concerns the protection of the rights of the defense, in connection
with which the ECHR draws attention to the need to comply with two
guarantees:
1) submission of evidence in the presence of the accused (paragraph 162
of the judgment of 11.12.2008 in Mirilashvili v. Russia) (ECHR, 2008), who
as a general rule should have the right to be present and directly participate
in the court hearing to establish the merits of the criminal charge against
him, which presupposes the very concept of adversarial proceedings and
may also derive from the guarantees established by Article 6 §§ 3 (c), (d)
and (e) of the Convention (paragraph 81 of the judgment of 1 March 2006
in Sejdovic v. Italy) (ECHR, 2006).
2) the disclosure to the defense of the evidence obtained by the
prosecution (paragraph 36 of the judgment of 16 December 1992 in
Edwards v. The United Kingdom) (ECHR, 1992) and, in the event of non-
disclosure, the provision by the trial court of its compliance with Article 6
of the Convention, the balance of interests: the public interest, on the one
hand, and the interests of the defense, on the other, and its establishment
of the urgency that led to the non-disclosure (paragraphs 62, 63 and Davis
v. the United Kingdom) (ECHR, 2000).
The need to guarantee the adversarial nature of the trial has led to the
development in the practice of the ECHR of certain standards of evidence,
according to which: 1) the parties to the criminal proceedings are provided
with equal opportunities to review the evidence submitted by another
party; 2) the parties to the criminal proceedings shall be provided with
equal opportunities to express their position on the evidence submitted by
the other party, including the implementation of their assessment.
Examining the case-law of the ECHR on fair justice standards, scholars
note the relationship between the two: adversarial proceedings as a
standard developed by the ECHR and ensuring the rights of the accused,
necessary and sucient for protection, as a standard enshrined in Article 6
§ 3 of the Convention.
Thus, they point out that adversarial proceedings are seen by the ECHR
as providing the party with a genuine opportunity to review the opposing
party’s arguments, challenge the evidence provided by it (including by
personally questioning or participating in its interrogation), presenting its
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evidence, and proving its position in court. a case that the court would be
entitled to and obliged to take into account when deciding the case, i.e. as
ensuring the real possibility of a dispute between the parties (Trubnikova,
2016).
Directly related to the standards of proof is the right of the accused
person to interrogate or demand the examination of prosecution witnesses,
as well as to summon and examine defense witnesses on the same terms as
prosecution witnesses (Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention). In particular,
this right of the accused person corresponds to the standard of evidence
formation.
Equality of the parties
Adversarial proceedings and equality of arms are quite rightly regarded
as independent standards of fair justice, as they reect dierent elements
of the right to a fair trial. According to scholars, the dierence between the
requirement of procedural equality and adversarial proceedings requires
that in the rst case it is about the absolute rules of examination of evidence
by the defense before the court, while in the second – the relative capabilities
of the two parties in the process of submitting evidence to the court and
their examination (Morshchakova, 2012).
The immediacy of the evidence research
Article 6 of the Convention does not contain a direct reference to this
standard of fair justice, but in the case-law of the ECHR, it is based on the
requirements of that article.
Based on the content of Article 6 § 1 and subparagraph (d) of the
Convention, the ECHR states that an important element of a fair criminal
proceeding is also the possibility for the accused to face a witness in
the presence of a judge who nally decides the case. Such a principle
of immediacy is an essential guarantee in criminal proceedings, as
observations made by a court concerning the conduct of a witness and the
veracity of his testimony may have signicant consequences for the accused
(ECHR, 2002, P.K v. Finland). Concerning Article 6 § 3 (d) of the ECHR
Convention, it notes that it contains references to “witnesses” and, on strict
interpretation, should not be applied to other evidence.
However, this term should be interpreted autonomously. It may also
include victims, expert witnesses, and others who testify in court. In
addition, there is clear evidence in the case law that this provision may
apply not only to “witnesses” but also to other evidence (paragraphs 158
and 159 of the judgment of 11 December 2008 in Mirilashvili v. Russia)
(ECHR, 2008), including material evidence (paragraphs 31, 37 – 40 of the
judgment of 09.05.2003 in the case of Georgios Papageorgiou v. Greece)
(ECHR, 2003).
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Serhii Kovalchuk, Liliia Korytko, Galyna Kret, Serhii Fomin y Volodymyr Hryniuk
Standards of fair justice and their relationship to standards of proof in criminal proceedings
Given the importance of the immediacy of the examination of the
evidence for further judgment, the ECHR focuses on three aspects of its
content:
1) as a duty of national courts to examine the evidence directly. In his
view, judgments should be based on the evidence examined by national
courts during a public hearing in the presence of the accused. At the same
time, the ECHR does not exclude the possibility of using derivative evidence,
although it pays attention to the peculiarities of their use. Initially, he
repeatedly pointed out that the conviction should not be based solely or
decisively on anonymous allegations (paragraph 76 of the judgment of 26
March 1996 in Doorson v. The Netherlands) (ECHR, 1996).
While acknowledging the exibility of this approach, the ECHR eventually
noted that accepting as evidence from a witness who did not appear in
court, whose testimony obtained during the pre-trial investigation was
the sole or decisive evidence of the defendant’s guilt, did not automatically
violate 1 of Article 6 of the Convention. The court based this nding on the
fact that the inexible application of the so-called “single or decisive rule”
(according to which a trial is considered unfair if the conviction is based
solely or decisively on evidence provided by a witness whom the accused
was unable to question at any stage proceedings) would run counter to the
Court’s traditional approach to examining complaints of violations of the
right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which is
to determine whether the proceedings as a whole were fair. However, the
adoption of such evidence, given the imminent risks to the fairness of the
trial, is an important factor to be taken into account in balancing interests
(paragraphs 146, 147 of the judgment of 15 December 2011 in Al-Khawaja
and Tahery v. the United Kingdom») (ECHR, 2011).
To determine whether Article 6 § 1 (1) (d) of the Convention complied
with a trial in which the testimony of witnesses who did not appear in court
and were not questioned by the court was used as evidence, the ECHR
carried out a three-stage test consistently providing them with answers
to the following questions: i) whether there were good reasons for the
witness not to appear in court and, accordingly, to accept as evidence the
unveried testimony of the witness who did not appear; (ii) whether the
testimony of a witness who did not appear was the sole or decisive basis for
the conviction of the accused; (iii) whether there were sucient balancing
factors, including important procedural safeguards, to compensate for
the diculties encountered by the defense as a result of the admission
of unveried evidence and to ensure the fairness of the trial as a whole
(paragraph 107 of 15.12. 2015 in Case of Schatschaschwili v. Germany)
(ECHR, 2015).
2) as requirements for the examination of evidence in this particular
criminal proceeding. According to the ECHR, given the principle of the
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presumption of innocence and the right of the defendant to challenge any
evidence against him, the criminal court must conduct a full, independent
and comprehensive examination and assessment of the admissibility and
reliability of evidence relating to the determination of the defendant’s
guilt, regardless of how the same evidence may be assessed in any other
proceedings against other defendants (paragraph 212 of the judgment of 26
July 2011 in Huseyn and Others v. Azerbaijan) (ECHR, 2011).
3) as requirements for the invariability of the composition of the court.
According to the ECHR, a change in the composition of the court of the rst
instance after hearing an important witness should normally lead to the re-
examination of that witness (decision of 09.07.2002 in the case of P.K. v.
Finland) (ECHR, 2002).
The need to guarantee the immediacy of the examination of evidence
has led to the development in the practice of the ECHR of certain standards
of proof, according to which:
1) evidence is subject to the formation by the court with the participation
of the parties to the criminal proceedings, provided that the
composition of the court remains unchanged.
2) data provided by absent witnesses will be carefully examined by
national courts, taking into account all the circumstances of the case.
3) data provided by anonymous persons cannot be decisive for a court
decision.
4) the evaluation of evidence is a function of national courts.
5) the appellate instance may not evaluate the evidence examined by
the lower court if it does not carry out their direct examination.
Presumption of innocence
This standard of fair justice is enshrined in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention
(United Nations, 1950).
The ECHR draws attention to the important role of the presumption of
innocence in criminal proceedings, in the practice of which it is considered
as an independent element of the right to a fair trial, which must be taken
into account in any assessment of the fairness of the trial as a whole
(paragraph 35 of 10.02. 1995 in the case of Allenet de Ribemont v. France)
(ECHR, 1995).
These provisions are based on a wide range of elements of the studied
standard of fair justice, which include:
1) imposing on the prosecution the burden of proving the guilt of a
person in committing a criminal oense.
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Serhii Kovalchuk, Liliia Korytko, Galyna Kret, Serhii Fomin y Volodymyr Hryniuk
Standards of fair justice and their relationship to standards of proof in criminal proceedings
2) inadmissibility of imposing on the accused the obligation to prove his
innocence in committing a criminal oense.
3) ensuring the proof of a person’s guilt in committing a criminal oense
beyond a reasonable doubt.
4) inadmissibility of substantiation of accusation based on inadmissible
evidence.
5) interpretation of all doubts in favor of the accused.
6) treatment of a person accused of committing a criminal oense as
innocent.
The need to ensure the presumption of innocence has led to the use in
the practice of the ECHR of one of the standards of formation of the level
of persuasion required for a procedural decision – the standard of proof
“beyond reasonable doubt”, as well as other standards of evidence.
Motivation of court decisions
This standard of fair justice is not provided for in the provisions of
Article 6 of the Convention but has found its application in the practice of
the ECHR.
Recalling the importance of ensuring that national courts give reasons
for judgments, the ECHR emphasizes that judgments of courts and
litigation bodies must properly set out the grounds on which they are based
(paragraph 26 of the judgment of 21 January 1999 in García Ruiz v. Spain)
(ECHR, 1999). Although Article 6 § 1 of the Convention obliges courts to
state reasons for their decisions, this cannot be construed as requiring a
detailed answer to every argument (paragraph 107 of the judgment of 08
April 2008 in Grădinar v. Moldova) (ECHR, 2008).
The extent to which the obligation to state reasons for a decision
applies may vary depending on the nature of the decision itself and should
be determined by the circumstances of the case (paragraph 272 of the
judgment of 21 April 2011 in Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v. Ukraine) (ECHR,
2011). At the same time, from the ECHR’s point of view, courts have to
consider arguments that the parties can present in court, as well as the
dierences between the High Contracting Parties in their laws, customs,
legal doctrines, content and drafting. court decisions (paragraph 34 of the
judgment of 1 July 2003 in Suominen v. Finland) (ECHR, 2003).
According to the ECHR, as scholars point out, a court decision can
be considered motivated, which not only provides proper and sucient
reasons and grounds for its adoption but also provides an answer to the
signicant arguments of the criminal proceedings. This answer should not
be formal, supercial, and abstract, but specic and reasoned on issues of
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both fact and law, relating to criminal-legal qualication, application of
measures of criminal-legal nature, and the eld of proof (Brich, 2017).
In this regard, the motivation of court decisions provides for the reasons
and grounds for their adoption, including the reasons on which the court
took into account the evidence submitted by one party to the criminal
proceedings and rejected the evidence submitted by the other.
Conclusions
The standards of fair justice are a system of rules enshrined in the
provisions of international legal acts and established in the practice of
international judicial institutions, ensuring the proper administration of
justice based on the right to a fair trial with strict observance of universally
recognized human rights. Among the standards of fair justice are: 1) the
right of access to justice; 2) consideration of the case by an independent
and impartial court established by law; 3) ensuring a reasonable time for
consideration of the case; 4) the right to a public hearing (publicity of the
trial); 5) adversarial proceedings; 6) equality of the parties; 7) the immediacy
of the study of evidence; 8) presumption of innocence; 9) ensuring the
rights of the accused, necessary and sucient for the exercise of protection;
10) guarantees of the right to question witnesses set out in Article 6 § 3 (d)
of the Convention; 11) motivation of court decisions; 12) legal certainty.
The interdependence of the right to a fair trial and the standard of fair
justice is that the elements of this right are the standards of fair justice.
An analysis of the provisions of the Convention and the case-law of the
ECHR shows the close interrelationship and interdependence of several
fair justice and evidentiary standards. On the other hand, standards of
evidence are covered by the standards of fair justice, expanding, specifying
and clarifying their content in terms of forming by the subject of evidence
the appropriate amount of relevant evidence and achieving a sucient level
of conviction sucient to make a procedural decision.
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