Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Derecho Público "Dr. Humberto J. La Roche"
de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas de la Universidad del Zulia
Maracaibo, Venezuela
Esta publicación cientíca en formato digital es continuidad de la revista impresa
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Vol.39 N° 69
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Diciembre
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Recibido el 15/03/2021 Aceptado el 20/06/2021
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Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas
La re vis ta Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas, es una pu bli ca ción aus pi cia da por el Ins ti tu to
de Es tu dios Po lí ti cos y De re cho Pú bli co “Dr. Hum ber to J. La Ro che” (IEPDP) de la Fa-
cul tad de Cien cias Ju rí di cas y Po lí ti cas de la Uni ver si dad del Zu lia.
En tre sus ob je ti vos fi gu ran: con tri buir con el pro gre so cien tí fi co de las Cien cias
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ti ga do res; es ti mu lar la in ves ti ga ción en es tas áreas del sa ber; y pro pi ciar la pre sen ta-
ción, dis cu sión y con fron ta ción de las ideas y avan ces cien tí fi cos con com pro mi so so cial.
Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas apa re ce dos ve ces al año y pu bli ca tra ba jos ori gi na les con
avan ces o re sul ta dos de in ves ti ga ción en las áreas de Cien cia Po lí ti ca y De re cho Pú bli-
co, los cua les son so me ti dos a la con si de ra ción de ár bi tros ca li fi ca dos.
ESTA PU BLI CA CIÓN APA RE CE RE SE ÑA DA, EN TRE OTROS ÍN DI CES, EN
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Eduviges Morales Villalobos
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Co mi té Ase sor
Pedro Bracho Grand
J. M. Del ga do Ocan do
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Re vis ta Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas. Av. Gua ji ra. Uni ver si dad del Zu lia. Nú cleo Hu ma nís ti co. Fa-
cul tad de Cien cias Ju rí di cas y Po lí ti cas. Ins ti tu to de Es tu dios Po lí ti cos y De re cho Pú bli co
“Dr. Hum ber to J. La Ro che”. Ma ra cai bo, Ve ne zue la. E- mail: cues tio nes po li ti cas@gmail.
com ~ loi chi ri nos por til lo@gmail.com. Te le fax: 58- 0261- 4127018.
Vol. 39, Nº 69 (Julio - Diciembre) 2021, 225-236
IEPDP-Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas - LUZ
Judicial Protection of a
Human Dignity Right
DOI: https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.3969.13
Valeriy Mamnitskyi *
Iryna Cherevatenko **
Natalia Horban ***
Abstract
Human dignity has become a central legal concept throughout
the world and is increasingly used in judicial decisions in many
countries that do not include it in their national legislation.
However, due to the acknowledged vagueness of the concept,
academics and judges have identied many diculties in its
implementation and the specic challenges it poses to the rule
of law. Consequently, from a documentary methodology this
article tries to develop and propose, from the analysis of dierent
philosophical approaches to the denition of human dignity, a
series of principles that can be applied in judicial decisions to achieve a
deep common understanding of the usefulness of human dignity and, at
the same time, tries to solve problems that are now widely recognized, both
by supporters and critics of the judicial use of this concept. It is concluded
that the concept of human dignity must have a decisive inuence on the
formation, not only of substantive law but also of procedural law. It must
become a criterion for the need for measures to prevent the abuse of
procedural rights, the distortion of justice and the deliberate evasion of its
main task.
Keywords: rule of law; access to justice; abuse of procedural rights;
human dignity; human rights.
* PhD in Law, Associate Professor at the Civil Process Department, Yaroslav Mudryi National
Law University, Kharkiv, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1455-3883. Email:
Mamnitskyi_v@i.ua
** PhD (Law), Associate Professor of Civil Procedure Department, Yaroslav Mudryi National Law
University, Kharkiv, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2937-1529. Email:
cherevatenko_iryna@meta.ua
*** PhD (Law), Associate Professor, Institute of Law, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv,
Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3201-498Х. Email: horban@online.ua
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Valeriy Mamnitskyi, Iryna Cherevatenko y Natalia Horban
Judicial Protection of a Human Dignity Right
Protección judicial del derecho a la dignidad humana
Resumen
La dignidad humana se ha convertido en un concepto jurídico central en
todo el mundo y se utiliza cada vez más en decisiones judiciales en muchos
países que no la incluyen en su legislación nacional. Sin embargo, debido a
la reconocida vaguedad del concepto, académicos y jueces han identicado
muchas dicultades en su aplicación y los desafíos especícos que plantea
al estado de derecho. En consecuencia, desde una metodología documental
este artículo intenta desarrollar y proponer, a partir del análisis de diferentes
enfoques losócos de la denición de la dignidad humana, una serie de
principios que pueden ser aplicados en las decisiones judiciales para lograr
un profundo entendimiento común de la utilidad de la dignidad humana y,
al mismo tiempo, trata de resolver problemas que ahora son ampliamente
reconocidos, tanto por los partidarios como por los críticos del uso judicial
de este concepto. Se concluye que el concepto de dignidad humana debe
tener una inuencia decisiva en la formación, no sólo del derecho sustantivo
sino también procesal. Debe convertirse en un criterio para la necesidad de
medidas para prevenir el abuso de los derechos procesales, la distorsión de
la justicia y la evasión deliberada de su tarea principal.
Palabras clave: estado de derecho; acceso a la justiciar; abuso de los
derechos procesales; dignidad humana; derechos
humanos.
Introduction
The main use of human dignity in court decisions is a phenomenon that
has grown signicantly in the second half of the twentieth century, after
the terrible events of World War II and its inclusion in the UN Charter, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and then in national legislation.
The original function of the concept was declarative and not eective.
Political philosopher Jaoques Maritain (1948) explained that the use of
human dignity allows representatives of dierent ideological beliefs to
agree on practical measures to protect human rights on a common basis,
but without abandoning their philosophical worldviews.
This concept is dened neither in international regulations nor in the
national legislation of most countries. Its vagueness, on the one hand,
allows it to be included in international human rights instruments, and on
the other hand, oers dierent interpretations of its meaning and possible
regulatory requirements.
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This article attempts to develop and propose, based on an analysis of
dierent philosophical approaches to the denition of human dignity, a
number of principles that can be applied in judicial decision making in
order to achieve a deep common understanding of the usefulness of human
dignity, tries to solve problems that are now widely recognized by both
supporters and critics of the judicial use of this concept. Proposals have
been made to take into account the criterion for determining decent human
behavior while preventing the abuse of procedural rights.
1. Basic theoretical approaches to understanding the idea of
human dignity
Ronald Dworking (1989) noted that human rights stem from human
dignity, although he acknowledged that the concept was rather vague.
One of the inuential approaches to dignity is the Kantian secular rational
approach, which considers dignity (value) in a person’s ability to think
rationally, and its violation as a violation of autonomy (Hill, 2014). Some
scholars have emphasized the origins of this concept from the Latin word
dignitas, which means honor and status, and calls for an understanding
of human dignity in terms of honor (Weisstub, 2002). Another group of
scholars stressed that human dignity should be used primarily to protect
people from humiliation and other actions that oend human dignity
(Shultziner and Rabinovici, 2012) On the other hand, some researchers
have argued that this concept is ineective, confusing and does not justify
human rights or is even dangerous, and should therefore be replaced by
more precise concepts. These discussions of the historical origins of the
concept of human dignity and its religious and philosophical signicance
can be called not endowed with a legal form in the sense that they are
separated from the legal application of this concept in a court decision
(Rosen, 2013).
Most authors support the dual nature of human dignity: as a
phenomenon objective and common to all people (value, principle, source
of human rights, their purpose or content) and as a subjective right or
interest of a particular person (human dignity). Sometimes researchers,
when describing the essence of human dignity, use several of the above
concepts simultaneously (Gryshchuk, 2018).
There are the following main theoretical approaches to understanding
the idea of human dignity: theological, philosophical and legal.
Representatives of the theological approach consider the idea of human
dignity through the prism of Christianity, which radically changed the
attitude to a person, proclaiming the equality of people before the one God,
regardless of their social status, but not yet among themselves. Human
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dignity is manifested in the fact that man was created in the image and
likeness of God and endowed with the basic features, which are soul, mind
and free will (Maxeiner, 2008).
One of the creators of the theological (Christian) concept of human
dignity was Thomas Aquinas. It is widely known his ideas of human
dignity: that each person has not only divine dignity in its original source,
but also has an integral natural right to dignity; natural law commands
respect for human dignity; the most obvious sign of the social status of the
person through whom human dignity is manifested in freedom; freedom is
most fully respected in civil society; the purpose of the state is to provide
conditions for a dignied human life; recognize the people`s “right to
disobey” the tyrannical government, which degrades their dignity.
The philosophical approach to the idea of human dignity is most
prominently represented in the philosophy of I. Kant, J. Rawls and J.
Habermas. In particular, Kant proposed a holistic concept of human
dignity and in fact made it part of the European culture. One of the central
elements of the modern concept of human dignity has been the recognition
of the object of dignity as an end in itself and the recognition that the object
of dignity cannot be considered in a purely instrumental way (Hennettee-
Vauchez, 2014).
J. Rawls proved that self-esteem is an important primary good and
includes two aspects: 1) it includes a person’s sense of self-importance and
the belief that their concept of self-worth, life plan deserves to be realized,
and they are respected by other people; 2) self-esteem includes condence
in one’s own abilities and fulllment of one’s own intentions. In addition,
each person seeks to avoid social conditions that undermine his or her self-
esteem (Rhoda, 1992).
According to the concept of J. Habermas, the normative source of
modern human rights is the idea of human dignity. Human rights are
seen as those that should serve to protect human dignity. This evokes
human self-esteem and social recognition of the international status of a
democratic state. Human dignity is seen as a realistic utopia, the necessary
goal of which is the realization of social justice inherent in the institutions
of a democratic state (Weisstub, 2002).
The legal approach considers human dignity in two ways: as an objective
phenomenon (anthropic dignity, dignity as a value, principle, source of
human rights, their purpose or content) and as a subjective phenomenon
(human right).
Human dignity as an objective phenomenon (anthropic dignity, dignity
as a value, principle, source of human rights, their purpose or content) is
considered through the relationship with the system of human rights and
freedoms. To explain the nature of this connection, it is appropriate to apply
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the often-used comparison of human dignity with a tree, “the branches of
which are human rights. Human dignity pulsates in human rights, which
means that it is the deepest reason for their protection” (Granat, 2016).
Such a metaphor helps to understand the absolute nature of human dignity,
regardless of the peculiarities of the legal regulation of human rights and
freedoms, and also emphasizes its supranational or suprapositive nature.
Recognition of the innateness and integral nature of human dignity means
the recognition of its natural law nature. Dignity is something given,
objective, not created, but a recognized positive right. Recognition of
dignity is the recognition of a legally signicant certain property of a person,
especially important for determining the conditions of human development
(Piechowiak, 2012).
It should be agreed that human dignity is a common constitutional value,
which is the source, basis and principle of the entire constitutional order.
This is the basic norm in the logical, ontological and hermeneutic senses.
Therefore, not only other principles of the system of human rights and
freedoms, but also certain specic rights and freedoms should be interpreted
through the prism of the principle of dignity and should be used to ensure
its implementation (following the constitutional denition of dignity as a
source of freedom and human and civil rights), but also all other norms,
principles and values contained in the constitution must be interpreted and
applied in accordance with the principle of dignity (Garkicki, 2015).
The constitutional signicance of human dignity has a central normative
role. Human dignity as a constitutional value is a factor that unites human
rights into a single whole, which ensures their normative unity. This
normative unity is expressed in three ways: rst, the value of human dignity
serves as the normative basis of the constitutional rights set forth in the
constitution; second, it serves as an explanatory principle for determining
the scope of constitutional rights, including the right to human dignity;
third, the value of human dignity plays an important role in determining the
proportionality of the statute that limits constitutional law (Barak, 2015).
In addition to scientic and philosophical views, judges are increasingly
turning to the concept of human dignity in various areas of law. However,
with the increase in its use, especially since the 1990s, there have also
been diculties in its application. Judges of dierent legal systems have
recognized that this concept is dicult to dene, and this creates problems
for the interpretation of law, legal certainty and the principle of the rule of
law. European Court of Human Rights in Vereinigung Bildender Ktlnstler
v. Austria (2007) notes that an abstract or vague notion of human dignity
can be dangerous in itself, as it can be used as an imposition of unacceptable
restrictions on fundamental rights. The Supreme Court of Canada in
R. v. Kapp (2008) acknowledged that “human dignity is an abstract and
subjective concept that can not only be misleading but dicult to apply, it
also conrms the additional burden on those who seek equality.
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Indeed, increasing attention to human dignity seems to be created by
problems in terms of its compliance with the rule of law. One of the main
problems pointed out by critics is the lack of sucient legal certainty about
respect for human dignity. Legal certainty is a principle that stipulates that
legislation should be clear and suciently predictable so that citizens can
act condently in their lives and without fear of breaking the law without
knowing what it really means. As Joseph Ratz (1977) pointed out, in order
for the law to be obeyed it must be able to guide the behavior of its citizens,
it must be such that they can learn what it is and act accordingly. This
principle is considered to be the international basis of the rule of law. It
requires that laws and their application serve as a guide and “allow those
to whom the law applies to plan their lives with less uncertainty,” and
protect them “from the arbitrary use of state power”. Vague and open legal
norms allow public authorities to prosecute people for breaking the law
without clear criteria. Similarly, the US Supreme Court in City of Akron v.
Akron Ctr. (1983) repealed the ban on abortion in the city of Akron. One
of the provisions was that doctors should dispose of embryo residues “in
a humane and sanitary manner.” The court ruled that the term “humane”,
which is very close to human dignity, was used unconstitutionally and
vaguely as “a denition of conduct to be prosecuted” because doctors could
not understand from the law whether their actions were lawful or not.
The concept of human dignity is quite debatable due to the problem of
legal certainty, its uncertain or unclear nature. The free use of this term in
the preparation of draft laws and judicial decisions is the result of confusion
and uncertainty about the basic meaning of the term “dignity”; this limits
the scope for comparative constitutional analysis and leads to a lack of
harmony between national and international human rights debates. French
judge Christian Byk (2014), who advocates respect for dignity, recognizes
that there is no doubt that the law requires certainty and predictability,
and that an understanding of the concept of human dignity from a more
precise legal point of view would contribute to the implementation of legal
norms. Jack Donnelly (1986) also explains that human dignity cannot in
fact form the basis of human rights in any sense, because there is no logical
connection between human dignity and human rights, either theoretically
or empirically. The main problem with Donelli’s approach is that people
around the world do not always view human rights with the notion of
human dignity. In addition, vague references to any concept to achieve the
desired goal are problematic from the point of view of the rule of law.
This concept has not been dened in international law, national
constitutions, or doctrinal interpretations. The lack of a coherent working
denition of human dignity in any country in the world has led to an
uncontrolled variety of applications. The term is used inconsistently for
the same issues, such as abortion, euthanasia, incitement and freedom of
speech, obscenity, and social rights and free enterprise (Carozza, 2008).
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Vague and inconsistent interpretations of human dignity are a more
serious threat to the rule of law than other broad concepts such as equality,
freedom, freedom of speech and privacy. First, broad rights such as equality
and freedom have a clearer meaning in the enduring doctrines of application
that have evolved over the centuries. On the other hand, human dignity
was reected in legal norms rather late in court decisions in the late 20th
century. Second, human dignity has no clear boundaries. It is not limited to
any particular right or branch of law, but it can be and is linked to almost
all human rights; its vagueness performs a symbolic function that is usually
not suitable for complex legal issues. This is probably why judges in most
countries have failed to develop a doctrine of human dignity or a consensus
on its meaning or limits (Brect, 1980). For example, an attempt to elevate
human dignity to constitutional value in France has been rejected by legal
experts precisely because of its ambiguity and its potential restrictions
on individual freedoms. Third, despite the fact that judges increasingly
refer to the principle of respect for human dignity, despite the lack of
clear operational or eective legal rules governing this concept, it is often
interpreted in dierent ways that do not necessarily comply with the law.
2. Principles of understanding and application of the concept of
“human dignity”
Problems related to the use of human dignity in court decisions can
be solved by developing certain principles that were proposed by Doron
Shultziner (2017). This approach is worthy of support, as well as further
improvement, which we tried to oer in this part of our study.
Thus, according to Doron Shultziner (2017), the purpose of these
principles is to help achieve a deeper understanding of the usefulness of
human dignity from theoretical and philosophical understandings to a more
practical and legal framework. The development of common and agreed
principles for the application of human dignity will allow us to address
the question of how to constructively apply this concept and try to solve
problems that are now widely recognized by both supporters and critics of
the judicial use of this concept. The following principles are complementary,
but each can be useful independently from the others:
Principle 1: The application of the principle of respect for human dignity
in judicial decisions should be based on written law.
Principle 2: Judges should try to dene what constitutes human dignity
and clearly dene its meaning.
Principle 3: Judges should strive to consistently use human dignity in
the same court decisions and in subsequent enforcement.
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Judicial Protection of a Human Dignity Right
Principle 4: Human dignity should promote human rights, not limit
them.
These principles are formalized and quite narrow in terms of their
regulatory requirements, they meet most basic concepts of dignity.
In general, supporting the proposed concept, we believe that of the four
principles, principle 4 is the most normative or based on certain values.
It requires that human dignity be used to promote human rights, not to
restrict them. The original function of human dignity is revealed primarily
in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and in most national laws. The purpose of this
principle is to bring human dignity into line with human rights so that it is
not tied to functions that restrict human rights.
3. Application of the concept of “human dignity” in the judicial
practice of Ukraine
It is illogical to consider human dignity as a restriction of human rights.
However, as we shall see, the open nature and function of the concept
allows judges to refer to it also as an excuse to restrict rights or it may lead
to such restrictions without intent.
Disrespect for human dignity through the use of oensive words towards
the court or participants in the process, in accordance with the procedural
legislation of Ukraine (Izarova, 2019), is a manifestation of abuse of
procedural rights (Rozhnov, 2020). Thus, in the decision from 13.03.2019
(case № 199/6713/14-c), the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court draws
attention to the fact that the use of obscene language, abusive words or
symbols by court participants and their representatives in documents
submitted to the court and in communication with the court (judges),
other participants in the process and their representatives, as well as the
commission of similar actions is a manifestation of obvious disrespect for
the honor, dignity of these persons by those who commit such acts. These
actions contradict the basic guidelines (principles) of civil proceedings
(paragraphs 2, 11, part 3 of Article 2 of the CPC of Ukraine), as well as its
task, which prevails over any other considerations in the trial (parts one and
two of this articles). In view of this, the court may recognize the commission
of such actions as an abuse of procedural rights and apply the consequences
provided for in part three of Article 44 of the CPC of Ukraine.
The consequences of disrespect for human dignity in civil cases are
to leave the claim without consideration. As an example, we can cite the
decision of the Kryvyi Rih District Court of Dnipropetrovsk Region (2020)
in the case № 216/5339/14-c. Thus, leaving without consideration the
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complaint of PERSON_1 on illegal actions of the state executor, cancellation
of the decision to initiate enforcement proceedings, the court notes that
in his statements in court, the applicant PERSON_1 systematically used
abusive statements and baseless accusations against the presiding judge
and other judges of the Kryvyi Rih District Court of the Dnipropetrovsk
Region, made threats and provocative statements, which is unacceptable.
Such procedural behavior of the applicant PERSON_1 indicates that he
appealed to the court not to protect his violated rights. The mentioned
regards as a ground for procedural rights abusing traditionally (Gajda –
Roszczynialska, 2019).
The statements used by PERSON_1 go beyond normal, specic, and
legitimate criticism, which, in particular, in the understanding of the
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter - ECtHR), is stated as an abuse
of the right to le an application. Thus, the ECtHR, in application of Article
35 clause 3 subclause ‘a’ of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, declares inadmissible any individual
application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that the application is
an abuse of the right to submit an application. For example, the ECtHR nds
an abuse of the right to le an application when the applicant uses insulting,
threatening or provocative statements against the respondent government,
its representative, the respondent State authorities, the ECtHR, its judges,
the ECtHR Secretariat or its sta (decisions on admissibility in Rehak v. the
Czech Republic of 14 May 2004, application № 67208/01); of 4 February
2003 application № 61164/00 and № 18589/02).
Conclusions
The study shows that the concept of human dignity should have a
decisive inuence on the formation of not only substantive law but also
procedural one, in particular, it must become a criterion for the necessity
of measures to prevent procedural rights abuse, distortion of justice and
deliberate evasion of its main task. Fourth, compared to other concepts,
human dignity is more problematic because its understanding includes a
worldview of what it means to be human and what a dignied existence
and decent moral behavior is. This is evidenced by the decisions of national
courts, in which religious and secular, social and liberal conceptions of
human dignity contradict each other. The importance of human dignity is
linked to ideology and, therefore, a higher risk of involving judges’ personal
beliefs in legal interpretation. The repeated use of the applicant’s insulting
statements and accusations, as well as threats and provocative statements
against the court in the application on the merits and in court is considered
by the court as disrespect to the court and other participants in the process
and the court nds that the submission of such statements as behavior of
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Valeriy Mamnitskyi, Iryna Cherevatenko y Natalia Horban
Judicial Protection of a Human Dignity Right
applicant in the process, is an abuse of his last procedural right, failure to
comply with the task of civil proceedings.
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Esta revista fue editada en formato digital y publicada
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Universidad del Zulia. Maracaibo-Venezuela
Vol.39 Nº 69
