Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Derecho Público "Dr. Humberto J. La Roche"
de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas de la Universidad del Zulia
Maracaibo, Venezuela
Esta publicación cientíca en formato digital es continuidad de la revista impresa
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197402ZU34
ppi 201502ZU4645
Vol.39 N° 68
Enero
Junio
2021
Recibido el 12/11/2020 Aceptado el 08/02/2021
ISSN 0798- 1406 ~ De pó si to le gal pp 198502ZU132
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de Es tu dios Po lí ti cos y De re cho Pú bli co “Dr. Hum ber to J. La Ro che” (IEPDP) de la Fa-
cul tad de Cien cias Ju rí di cas y Po lí ti cas de la Uni ver si dad del Zu lia.
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“Dr. Hum ber to J. La Ro che”. Ma ra cai bo, Ve ne zue la. E- mail: cues tio nes po li ti cas@gmail.
com ~ loi chi ri nos por til lo@gmail.com. Te le fax: 58- 0261- 4127018.
Vol. 39, Nº 68 (Enero - Junio) 2021, 213-224
IEPDP-Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas - LUZ
Egyptian-Israeli Relations during the
Government of Mohamed Morsi
(2012-2013)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.3968.12
Ayrat Halitovich Tuhvatullin *
Vitaly Anatolievich Epshteyn **
Pavel Vladimirovich Pichygin ***
Alina Petrovna Sultanova ****
Abstract
The article highlights the details of the foreign policy of the
Arab Republic of Egypt and its impact on the regional security of
the state of Israel in between 2012-2013. After the Islamists came
to power, they began to dominate expectations that the political
force led by Mohamed Morsi would initiate an active anti-Israel
policy, however, with active anti-Semitic rhetoric, the “Muslim brotherhood”
was able to maintain peaceful relations with Israel. The purpose of this study
was to characterize the relationship between M. Morsi’s government and
the state of Israel during the period 2012 to 2013while revealing the impact
of various factors on the preservation of peace in the region, especially in
the face of the conict situation that intensied in neigh boring countries
such as Libya and Syria. The main approaches to the study of the problem
under consideration were analytical method and content analysis. It is
concluded that the article can also contribute to the study of the history of
the Middle East within the framework of Arab-Israeli relations against the
deterioration of the political situation and the strengthening of religious
radicalism in the region.
* Kazan Federal University, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor, Department of
Historical and Social Studies Education, Institute of International Relations. ORCID ID: http://orcid.
org/0000-0001-6042-5711. Email: tayrat@mail.ru
** Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA, Moscow),
PhD in Sociology, Associate Professor, Department of World Economy and International Relations,
Institute of Business and Business Administration. ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7308-
3351. Email: epshteinv@gmail.com
*** Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA, Moscow),
Master student of the program "International Relations and Integration Processes in Eurasia", Faculty
of International Relations, Institute of Business and Business Administration. ORCID ID: https://
orcid.org/0000-0001-9554-5772. Email: pichuginpavel96@gmail.com
**** Kazan National Research Technical University named after A.N. Tupolev – KAI (Kazan), PhD,
Associate Professor in Comparative-historical, typological, and contrastive linguistics, Department of
foreign languages, Russian, and Russian as a foreign language. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-
0003-2723-4715. Email: alinasultanova@mail.ru
214
Ayrat Halitovich Tuhvatullin, Vitaly Anatolievich Epshteyn, Pavel Vladimirovich Pichygin y
Alina Petrovna Sultanova
Egyptian-Israeli Relations during the Government of Mohamed Morsi (2012-2013)
Keywords: Middle East; Arab-Israeli conict; Egypt-Israel relationship;
terrorism in Sinai; geopolitical studies.
Relaciones egipcio-israelíes durante el gobierno de
Mohamed Morsi (2012-2013)
Resumen
El artículo destaca los detalles de la política exterior de la República Árabe
de Egipto y su impacto en la seguridad regional del estado de Israel entre
2012-2013. Después de que los islamistas llegaron al poder, comenzaron a
dominar las expectativas de que la fuerza política encabezada por Mohamed
Morsi iniciaría una política antiisraelí activa, sin embargo, con la retórica
antisemita activa, la “hermandad musulmana” pudo mantener relaciones
pacícas con Israel. El propósito de este estudio fue caracterizar la relación
entre el gobierno de M. Morsi y el estado de Israel durante el período de
2012 a 2013 y, al mismo tiempo, revelar el impacto de diversos factores en
la preservación de la paz en la región, especialmente frente a la situación
de conicto que se intensicó en los países vecinos como Libia y Siria. Los
principales enfoques para el estudio del problema en consideración fueron
el método analítico y el análisis de contenido. Se concluye que el artículo
puede contribuir además al estudio de la historia de Oriente Medio en el
marco de las relaciones árabe-israelíes contra el deterioro de la situación
política y el fortalecimiento del radicalismo religioso en la región.
Palabras clave: Oriente Medio; conicto árabe-israelí; relación Egipto-
Israel; terrorismo en el Sinaí; estudios geopolíticos.
Introduction
After the Arab Spring events in 2011, Islamists came to power in the
Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE). Hosni Mubarak, who had been in power
since 1981, was stripped of all ranks and taken into custody; until June
2012, the country was being governed by the Supreme Council of the armed
forces (SCAF), the former ruling National democratic party being dissolved
and outlawed, and its leaders and activists being removed from power. At
the election to the legislative authority, held from November 2011 until
February 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood won 47.2% of the lower house
seats and 56% of upper house seats in the Egyptian Parliament.
Undoubtedly, one of the main reasons for the election victory, won by
the Democratic Alliance headed by the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) of
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Vol. 39 Nº 68 (Enero - Junio 2021): 213-224
the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood (BM), was due to the absence
of restrictions on the activities of the Islamic opposition that took place in
the previous period.
The history of the “Muslim Brotherhood” movement in the late twentieth
and early twenty-rst centuries shows that at that time it was the dominant
opposition force in the country with an original ideological platform, a well-
developed and well-organized network, and a credible social support (The
times of Israel, 2012).
After coming to power as an opposition to former President Hosni
Mubarak (b. 1928), the FJP criticized the former government on many
issues, and the most acute criticism was on the issue of the gas contract
between Egypt and Israel. The FJP claimed that the government was
seeking to “make Egypt subservient to Israel” because of gas exports at
below-market prices
5
(Election program: The Freedom and Justice Party,
2011).
There were a number of concerns and open questions аbout the new
government:
• How Egypt will build relationships with the world leading powers.
• How Egypt will manage domestic security issues.
• What the future cooperation with Israel will be like and whether it
will be possible.
• How Egypt will build relationships with the Islamic Republic of
Iran in the conditions of cooperation with the Salasts (Haber and
Ighani, 2013).
1. Methods
This article uses such research methods as content analysis and
comparative institutional analysis. The purpose of content analysis is not just
to describe the structural elements of the phenomenon under study but also
to clarify the cause-and-effect relationships that underlie the prevalence,
dynamics, and stability/instability of this phenomenon. Comparative-
institutional analysis studies a set of factors that affect the object of
research, identifying among them the main and secondary, temporary,
and stable, explicit and latent (hidden), managed and unmanaged ones.
These approaches help to reduce the subjectivity in the qualitative analysis
process to obtain the information as the result of the study.
5 In 2005, the agreement on the supply of gas from Egypt to Israel was signed (for a period of 15 years).
According to experts, the market price of gas was much higher, and that agreement was signed for
political reasons. After 2011, deliveries stopped due to terrorists’ constant attacks on the pipeline in the
Sinai Peninsula.
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Alina Petrovna Sultanova
Egyptian-Israeli Relations during the Government of Mohamed Morsi (2012-2013)
2. Results and Discussion
The government of the Muslim Brotherhood, which came to power as
the result of the “color revolution”, sought to support HAMAS, as well as to
establish relations with Iran and Islamic fundamentalists, that is, with all
those who denied the right of Israel to exist. In response, the government of
Benjamin Netanyahu maintained ties with the Egyptian military, which had
disagreements with the new political elite of Egypt. These contacts became
more active during the period of Morsi’s struggle for political power, as in
an interview with the Forbes magazine in 2010, the latter described the
Jews as a collection of “monkeys and pigs”, (Behar, 2013) which naturally
could not but cause discontent in Israeli society.
There was no ofcial response from Israel, however, there were
concerns in the United States about the future foreign policy of BM, and,
consequently, there were suggestions of a possible threat to the freedom of
passage of ships through the Suez Canal. After a warning from the United
States to reduce nancial aid, Morsi said that his words had been “taken out
of context” (The New York Times, 2013).
In the video published by Middle East Media Research Institute
(MEMRI) in 2010, he stated:
The Zionists have no right to the land of Palestine. There is no place for them
in the land of Palestine. What they took in 1947-48 is looting, and what they are
doing now is a continuation of this looting. In no case do we recognize their Green
Line. The land of Palestine belongs to the Palestinians, not to the Zionists (The
Times of Israel, 2013: s/p).
For that statement, Morsihad to justify himself again. During his visit to
Germany in January 2013, he stated that his remarks had been taken out
of the context again, insisting that they had been intended as a criticism of
Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians. Addressing reporters, Morsisaid,
“[I] am not against the Jewish faith or the Jewish people. My comments
were about the behavior that causes blood to be shed and innocent people
to die” (The Times of Israel, 2013: s/p).
After becoming President of Egypt, Morsiattempted to maintain the
position of an independent leader of the largest Arab country, using the
anti-Semitic rhetoric once again, saying, “It is necessary to distinguish
between Judaism and those who belong to it, and violent actions against
defenseless Palestinians” (The New York Times, 2013).
Real foreign policy was different from the public rhetoric. Although Morsi
acknowledged that he would comply with all international agreements of
Egypt, implicitly referring to the agreement of Egypt with Israel at Camp
David, however, on the other hand, he called for the restoration of relations
with Tehran, stating the need to “change the balance” of Egypt’s foreign
policy (Ben Gedalyahu, 2012).
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The Israeli response was not long in coming; Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu launched a joint diplomatic process with Egypt to
nd common ground, saying: “we expect to build cooperation with the new
government on the basis of our peace treaty” (Spencer, 2012: s/p) As an act
of starting a new relationship, Morsi appointed a new Egyptian Ambassador
to Israel, Atef Salem (The Times of Israel, 2012).
The act of appointing a new Ambassador had its own cause for concern.
The letter of accreditation from the Egyptian President to his Israeli
counterpart, Shimon Peres, was not received unambiguously in the Arab
world. The text began with the words “Dear and great friend” and ended with
the phrase “from a loyal friend of Mohammed Morsi”. The letter contained
Morsi’s desire to develop close relations between the two countries
(Alarabiya, 2012). A great number of high-ranking Egyptian ofcials and
representatives of the “BM” claimed that the letter had been falsied, and
M. Morsi initially denied sending the letter (The times of Israel, 2012).
However, later, the presidential spokesperson, Yasser Ali, told the Egyptian
state newspaper “Al-Ahram” that the letter was “100 percent correct” (The
times of Israel, 2012).
It is worth noting that not everything was smooth inside the military
elite of Egypt that anxiously expected to expand cooperation with HAMAS.
The military that has always been part of the country’s ruling elite, regarded
the rapprochement with the group as a threat to national security. Within
the Egyptian elite, there were thoughts that:
Instability and chaos in the Palestinian territory may ow into Egypt with
particularly dangerous consequences in the Sinai. Since HAMAS has been a
problem for a long time, the Gaza Strip being the main worry for the entire region,
free movement between the Gaza Strip and Sinai would contribute to lawlessness,
smuggling of ghters and weapons (Middle East, 2012: s/p).
That view was conrmed by the terrorist attack in August 2012 on the
Egyptian-Israeli border. Attacking the border guards, Islamist militants
killed fteen Egyptian soldiers and captured armored vehicles. Later, they
intended to cross the border and attack the Israeli boundary post. The
Israeli defense Forces’ counter-terrorism actions resulted in the killing
of seven militants: four of them were killed on the Israeli side and three
of them were killed on the territory of Egypt. HAMAS condemned the
attack, however, the situation on the Peninsula deteriorated sharply (The
Guardian, 2012).
Israel, which supported the democratic changes in Egypt, expected
Morsi to start a real dialogue, but the beginning of contacts was not rosy,
since the Prime Minister of the Palestinian authority, Ismail Haniyeh, and
the former head of the HAMAS Political Bureau, Khaled Mashal, visited
Cairo on September 17, 2012. The talks focused on security cooperation,
lifting the blockade of the Gaza Strip, and creating a free trade zone in the
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Ayrat Halitovich Tuhvatullin, Vitaly Anatolievich Epshteyn, Pavel Vladimirovich Pichygin y
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Egyptian-Israeli Relations during the Government of Mohamed Morsi (2012-2013)
border area between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Perhaps, one of the goals of
Khaled Mashal’s visit to Cairo was to discuss further reconciliation between
HAMAS and FATAH with the Egyptian intelligence leadership. However,
judging by the extremely negative reaction of the head of the Palestinian
authority, Mahmoud Abbas, to Ismail Haniyeh’s trip to Cairo, it was
somewhat premature to talk about an early reconciliation (The Times of
Israel, 2012).
Moreover, according to some experts, the HAMAS leadership expressed
the interest in separating the Gaza Strip from the West Bank and creating
an independent state on its territory with the support of Egypt. However,
those events could have added an additional complication to President M.
Morsi’s situation, because, in Washington, the possible strengthening of
HAMAS would have been met with extreme disapproval, not to mention the
creation of a new state within the borders of the Gaza Strip. In this regard,
M. Morsi’sfurther policy in relations with HAMAS was more restrained,
although, aimed at intensifying cooperation. The attempt to initiate a
dialogue between HAMAS and FATAH was not successful; moreover, Egypt
did not have a real material and technical opportunity to reduce the role of
the United States and Israel in resolving the intra-Palestinian conict.
On September 26, 2012, Morsi made a speech at the UN General
Assembly, most of which was devoted to the Palestinian issue. “The rst
issue that the world must make efforts to resolve, on the basis of justice
and dignity, is the Palestinian cause,” Morsi said. Also, the Egyptian leader
recalled the “sacred right of the Palestinians to their own state with its
capital in Jerusalem” (Egypt: Speech by President Morsi to UN General
Assembly, 2012: s/p).
3. Summary
Eric Trager, an expert on the “Muslim Brotherhood” issues at the
Washington Institute for Near East policy, argued that the BM did seek
to renegotiate the Camp David Accords, since every member of the
organization was imbued with anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli hatred for the
Treaty. Moreover, the ideological positions of the Muslim Brotherhood
were principally incompatible with the preservation of the Egyptian-Israeli
peace (Haber and Ighani, 2013).
Glen Segell, a research fellow at Tel Aviv Institute for National Security,
argues that there were more changes in Egyptian-Israeli relations under
Mohammed Morsi than Under G. Nasser, A. Sadat and H. Mubarak.
6
The
6 Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) - President of Egypt (1956-1970), Muhammad Anwar el-Sadat (1918-
1981) - President of Egypt (1970-1981), Muhammad HosniEl SayedMubarak (b. 1928) - President of
Egypt (1981-2011)
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Vol. 39 Nº 68 (Enero - Junio 2021): 213-224
Russian researcher I. M. Mokhova also agrees about it, arguing that the
preservation of the Camp David system and restraint towards Israel were
largely due to Egypt’s domestic realities (Mokhova, 2012).
On the other hand, the Russian researcher Sergey Starkin says that
there emerged a radically new method of implementing foreign policy. The
choice of the Islamic vector of development implied the development of
relationships with the religious leaders of the region. As part of the change
in Egypt’s foreign policy agenda, the new course was aimed at moving
away from “Mubarak’s previous, too Pro-Western course, by expanding the
number of foreign political partners” (Starkin, 2012: 165).
Attempts at rapprochement between Egypt and the Islamic Republic
of Iran were also met with very mixed reactions. It was vital for the
government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to nd a regional ally to counter the
blockade by the United States and Israel. Egypt saw its advantage in that,
since the signing of the Camp David Accords (1982), Cairo has lost its role
and importance among the Arab countries, moreover, it has lost the right of
representation in the League of Arab States, among the founders of which
was the Egyptian state. Mohammed Morsi sought to restore the country’s
position through negotiations with Iran, while maintaining established
relations with Tehran’s opponents. Therefore, at the rst meeting in 30
years, only an agreement on expanding tourism was signed, and that
allowed the speaker of the Iranian Parliament Ali Larijani to state: “For a
long time, Egypt and Iran, as two large Muslim countries, have had close
ties and playedthe key role in Islamic civilization” (The Washington Post,
2012: s/p).
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad paid a return visit to Egypt
only in February 2013, visiting, among other things, Al-Azhar University,
which is considered the main religious and educational center in the Islamic
world.
All of those steps taken by Cairo in the foreign policy arena could not
but cause concern for Israel, whose leadership reacted with restraint to
the counter-coup by the Egyptian military on July 3, 2013. Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu ordered that members of his Cabinet “should not
make public statements or give interviews” on this issue. Israel’s Minister
for Transport Yisrael Katz said in an interview with Israel’s Army Radio:
‘This is an Egyptian issue; we have to worry about our own interests’ (CBC
News, 2013: s/p).
During the period of instability in the Arab Republic of Egypt, radical
groups became active in the Sinai Peninsula. If, before the main problem
for the stability of the region was the Bedouins, who used the border
territories for smuggling goods, kidnapping and slave trade, then, due to the
weakening of the centralauthority, the main threat was terrorists, and the
220
Ayrat Halitovich Tuhvatullin, Vitaly Anatolievich Epshteyn, Pavel Vladimirovich Pichygin y
Alina Petrovna Sultanova
Egyptian-Israeli Relations during the Government of Mohamed Morsi (2012-2013)
Sinai Peninsula once again became a springboard for supplying the Gaza
Strip. In this regard, for Mohammed Morsi, cooperation with the Israeli
government did not lose its priority (Khizriyev, 2016).
Egypt acted as a mediator in the negotiation process between Israel and
Palestine. The deal demonstrated the pragmatism of President Mohamed
Morsi, who combined support for HAMAS with a desire to maintain
peace with Israel. In the most critical days, demonstrating solidarity with
HAMAS, President Morsi expelled the Israeli Ambassador from Cairo and
sent the Egyptian Prime Minister to the Gaza Strip, but kept channels with
representatives of the United States and Israel open to participate in the
negotiation process (Haber and Ighani, 2013). The President of Egypt, with
his diplomatic pressure, sought to achieve a ceasere, though US Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton had the last word. However, Israel, the United
States and HAMAS appreciated the mediating role, played by the Islamic
government of Egypt (The New York Times, 2012).
Quickly enough, M. Morsi had to switch to events inside the country,
where demonstrations against the constitutional Declaration swept through
all of the major cities. That is why Morsi’s administration took the next
step in the foreign policy eld only in February 2013, when the smugglers
tunnels were ooded, through which, according to the Egyptian authorities,
weapons were transported for terrorists in North Sinai. The actions of the
Morsi government against the tunnels demonstrated the priority of the
national security issue inside the country. However, according to experts,
the authorities unsuccessfully tried to solve domestic security problems
with that foreign policy decision (The New York Times, 2013).
The attempts to completely block the tunnels were doomed to failure,
and only the next regime led by Al-Sisi managed to resist the onslaught
of terrorists in the North of the Peninsula by force. The researcher M. A.
Sapronova speaks about the unresolved goals of domestic and foreign
policy. President Morsi’s tactics without a strategy had consequences not
only on his career but also on the future of political Islamism in Egypt,
which was supported by the country’s population, but after a series of
setbacks, approved of a military coup in 2013 (Sapronova, 2013).
President Morsi had to interrupt not only the participation in the Gaza-
Israel negotiation process, but also new meetings with European leaders.
In 2013, Morsi focused on internal issues, but in June of the same year, he
declared war on two countries – the Syrian Arab Republic and the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. First, he broke off relations with Syria
and expressed a desire to send Egyptian military and volunteers to help
the opposition overthrow Bashar al-Assad (Podtserob, 2017). Doing so,
he violated Egypt’s long - standing principle of non-interference in the
military affairs of other Arab States, which had been developed due to the
costly participation in the civil war in Yemen a decade earlier (Gafurov et
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Vol. 39 Nº 68 (Enero - Junio 2021): 213-224
al., 2019). Second, a security meeting chaired by Morsi raised the issue
of participating in air strikes on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
7
to prevent the threat of a water crisis that might arise from the Nilewater
decrease.
Conclusions
Thus, the period of Egyptian-Israeli relations in 2012-2013 cannot be
called threatening to the security of the Jewish state. Having come to power
with a reputation as an Islamic fundamentalist, anti-Semite and an ally of
the Palestinians, Mohammed Morsi did not destroy the difcult relations
that had been established for years between the Arab Republic of Egypt and
the state of Israel.
The general security problem forced President Morsi to act in accordance
with the national interests of Egypt, which, like Israel, had been repeatedly
attacked by terrorists’ groups that had taken refuge in the Sinai. In addition,
according to the Camp David Accords, Cairo could only increase its military
contingent in the Sinai Peninsula after consulting with Tel Aviv. Moreover,
the Israeli government provided and continued to provide the operations of
the Egyptian army with military support, which needed not only technical
equipment but also information, received by the Israeli intelligence
community.
An important factor in maintaining relations between the Arab Republic
of Egypt and the state of Israel was the close relationship between the ruling
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood party and the Palestinians. Thanks to close
contacts and trusting relations, Morsi could have claimed to be a mediator
between the two irreconcilable rivals, reducing tensions in the Middle East,
which in turn was in the interests of Cairo (Shagalov and Manina, 2016).
Acknowledgements
The work is performed according to the Russian Government Program
of Competitive Growth of Kazan Federal University.
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