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Political structure and the administration of political system in Iraq (post-ISIS)

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Abstract

The objective of the investigation was to analyze the structure and administration of the political system in Iraq (post-ISIS). After 2003, the Iraqi political system suffered the fundamental problem of its failure to achieve the political and social inclusion that characterizes democratic systems, to guarantee the establishment of a “state for all”, while respecting differences. Political representation has moved from the system of sectarian ethnic components, under the title of consensual democracy, to the representation of leaders and the realization of their interests and the interests of their parties at the expense of the groups that claim to represent them, which complicates the problem. In this sense, the new political system could not represent social pluralism, on the one hand, and could not satisfy the demands of the same components on the other. Methodologically, it is a political investigation in the framework of the analysis of the political system. It was concluded that the search for new balances is a pending issue. While these emerging balances and arrangements are still fragile and immature to the extent required, they represent a clear entry point to reshape the regime’s political structure in one form or another.

Keywords: Iraq’s political structure; post ISIS scenario; admiration of the political system; consensus democracy; ethnic and political differences.
Estructura política y administración del sistema político en Iraq (post-ISIS)

Resumen

El objetivo de la investigación fue analizar la estructura y administración del sistema político en Iraq (post-ISIS). Después de 2003, el sistema político iraquí sufrió el problema fundamental de su fracaso para lograr la inclusión política y social que caracteriza a los sistemas democráticos, para garantizar el establecimiento de un “estado para todos”, respetando las diferencias. La representación política ha pasado del sistema de componentes étnicos sectarios, bajo el título de democracia consensuada, a la representación de los líderes y la realización de sus intereses y los intereses de sus partidos a expensas de los grupos que afirman representarlos, lo que complica el problema. En este sentido el nuevo sistema político, no se pudo representar el pluralismo social, por un lado, y no pudo satisfacer las demandas de los mismos componentes por el otro. En lo metodológico, se trata de una investigación politológica en el marco del análisis del sistema político. Se concluyó que la búsqueda de nuevos equilibrios es una asignatura pendiente. Mientras que estos equilibrios y arreglos emergentes, aún son frágiles e inmaduros en la medida requerida, por lo que representan un claro punto de entrada para remodelar la estructura política del régimen de una forma u otra.

Palabras clave: estructura política de Irak; escenario post ISIS; admiración del sistema político; democracia consensuada; diferencias étnicas y políticas.

Introduction

The democratic system in Iraq was established after 2003 based on political and institutional arrangements for the system of sectarian-ethnic components, in an effort to address social pluralism, and representation of components in power structures and institutions of governance, and to achieve democratic inclusiveness, after the Iraqi state has suffered since its founding from imbalances in the sectarian and ethnic composition, which led to the deviation of the Iraqi regime in previous stages towards the dictatorship.

However, these institutional arrangements and forms that emerged after 2003 were dysfunctional, its lacking for political and economic integration, which led to the failure in achieving tangible improvements in the lives of citizens, and provide basic security for them, and thus did not bring peace and prosperity to the majority of the population.
One of the main imbalances, and most notably in the new governance arrangements, was the political structure that governed the joints of the political system and state institutions, as the social components became hostage to the orientations and interests of the leaders and political parties that they claim to represent. The political structure later turned into a system of component - sectoral leaderships, so political institutions became hollow structures that do not reflect in any way the interests of the groups or citizens, which led to an inability in providing basic services, increase unemployment rate, and widespread corruption, as well as insecurity.

These repercussions led the political system to almost complete political blockage, and the search for an alternative to the administration of the state and the regime became a predominant demand for wide sectors of the masses, and a way out for the political forces from a suffocating crisis, which has matured new changes and alternatives discussed in this research.

1. Factors and Indicators of Change

The post-2003 Iraqi political system witnessed two types of political structure, the first type during the transitional period, which was an expression of the political framework that outlined by the State Transitional Administration Law of 2004. The second type during the stage after the adoption of the permanent constitution in 2005, which is an expression of the political framework that outlined by the permanent constitution. The Transitional Administrative Law has adopted the principle of Consensus democracy as a framework for managing the pluralistic nature of Iraqi society through institutional arrangements for the sharing and exercise of powers among sectoral groups to find a balance in making substantive decisions.

The permanent constitution bypassed that formula through the adoption of a new political formula or another compromise that ensure the weakness of Consensual arrangements and strengthen the logic of the constituent majority in governance, in exchange for a trade off with a pattern of expanded administrative and political decentralization, and the latter approaching to the Confederacy. Consequently, the regime’s management has moved from political-institutional Consensus to partisan partnership, which is dominated by the logic of party transactions governed by receptive and changing political interests and balances, and which are directly influenced by external factors to frame this pattern of political tradition. Overall, the political practice in both types failed to achieve political stability and improve institutional performance, which came at the expense of the state-building process, which became weak cohesion and performance. So political and security instability, widespread corruption, and state fragility
were the prelude to the military and security collapse that paved the way for the invasion of ISIS and its control over large areas of Iraq. This made the Iraqi political system in the face of existential challenges reflected its effects on the political process, and led to the emergence of several indicators are maturing in the post-ISIS phase, which were changes in the political structure through the repositioning and change the orientations and political discourse of the political forces. The most important changes can be indicated by:

a) Change of major political alliances: the decline of the political components.

b) Choose an independent prime minister (the crisis of the largest bloc).

c) Change the location of the Kurdish blocs (the referendum and its political implications).

d) The emergence of parliamentary opposition.

e) Declining sectarian polarization.

The above-mentioned indicators were imposed by new political facts whose features began to appear during the legislative elections of 2018, are the result of internal factors mentioned above, and external factors resulting from the repercussions of international positions on the crises of the region, and their repercussions on the course of the regional and international conflict in Iraq as one of the most important pillars of the international approach to the region. Therefore, the political formula expected during the last elections called for a way out, a deal or a compromise as described by the theories of democratic transition. Where the political arena is witnessing the fragmentation of the major political forces, as a result of the successive political and security setbacks since 2003, and the high costs in terms of material and human losses resulting from these setbacks, especially the enormous amount of destruction resulting from the war against ISIS. Moreover, the coincidence with the financial crisis as a result of the decline in oil prices for previous years, which made political change a demand that garnered wide support from the civil and popular sectors, and political parties, as well as the Shiite Supreme authority and large segments of a devastated Sunni community that reject many of the Sunni political forces which were part of the factors of collapse, whose disastrous consequences were most tolerated by these societies. In addition, international attitudes in support of reform demands for different purposes - with varying attitudes -, especially in light of the pressures referred to above, which pushed the regime to seek international support in the security, economic and political aspects.
2. New variables:

a) Change of major political alliances: the decline of political components

The legislative elections of 2018 witnessed many divisions in the political map, characterized by being vertical divisions, unlike the horizontal divisions which represented by the political map since 2003. These divisions reflected in three main political components (Shiite, Sunni, Kurdish), Shiite forces were divided into five major coalitions Are (Al Fatah, Al Naser, State of Law, Sa’aroon coalition, Al Hikma), these coalitions, some of which resulted from internal party splits preceded its formation (Al Da’awa party, Al Hikma), or splits after the subsequent electoral alliances (Al Fatah, Al Naser and Al Hikma), others resulted from alliances on different bases, such as the Sa’aroon coalition, which represents an alliance between the forces of the right, left and center, which represented by the Sadrist (a major Shiite populist religious trend), with the Communist Party, and other civilian forces representing the protest movement. The Kurdish arena has witnessed sharp divisions after the failure of the Kurdistan referendum in September 2017, which reflected negatively on the ability of Kurdish political parties to form a unified coalition in the parliamentary elections, and this led to the participation of most Kurdish parties independently in the elections, and enhanced the presence of political forces with different weights such as: the Movement for Change (Koran), the list of the new generation headed by Shaswar Abdul Wahid, and the coalition of justice and democracy headed by Mr. Barham Saleh, and this in turn reflected on the formula of alliances or understandings with other parties. Several letters were exchanged between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) with Vice President Nuri al-Maliki in mid-December 2017, which included references to the possibility of rapprochement with Maliki, who was accused of cutting salaries and imposing sanctions on the Kurdistan territory during his rule, to face the intransigence of Haider al-Abadi as Kurdish described. On the other hand, leaders of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the Alliance for Democracy and Justice, and the new generation, made many visits to meet Prime Minister Haider al - Abadi, and some directly supported Abadi’s stay as prime minister in the coming period (AL-Qarra Dagi, Shaho, 2018).

As for the Sunnis, the scene does not seem to be better than anyone else. The Sunni representation in the political process is essentially suffering from a deep crisis, due to the sharp polarization governed by the discourse of narrow factional and regional interests, and the submission to the strongest and influential, so the Sunni parties and entities could not form a unified and a wide political front to participate in general elections, because of
their different orientations, and the intersection of their interests, and the relational gaps between the leaders and elites, and that force’s insistence on division may have been the result of prior alliances with the political and security forces preparing for the arrangements of the political majority, with which reserved seats for the next cabinet (Alzubaid, Bagher, 2018).

Thus, it was expected that these conditions will lead to the low level of electoral participation and below the expected, because of a large package of social and political challenges, and the state of frustration reached by many Iraqis. It was also expected that the elections will not produce a large bloc as passed in the experience of previous years, and we will see political blocs that do not exceed each of them (30-40) seats in the parliament, which makes it difficult to choose the Prime Minister and the formation of the next government. Many observers also predicted that rival blocs are likely to resort to transient alliances, and this is achieved through a compromise that may be the selection of independent personalities for the three presidencies and less polarized sectarian and ethnic figures. It is a development that arose to a lesser extent in the three presidencies at that time (Ma’asom, Al Abadi, Al Jubouri) compared to the previous three presidencies (Talabani, Al Maliki, Al Nujaifi) (Rudaw, 2018).

These expectations have been achieved almost completely. The legislative elections of 2018 led to the exit of more than 200 deputies from the last sessions, while more than 100 deputies from all blocs and parties retained their seats, and this is the total number of seats in the Iraqi parliament for the current session, which amounts to 329 seats. Therefore, the divisions in the constituent alliances, and the absence of a large bloc according to the election results, capable of forming the government as in the past, led to the formation of two large blocs in order to form a government which they are (Building Alliance) and (Al Fatah Al-Mubeen – law alliance), which is politically led by the leader of the Al Fatah Al-Mubeen and the Secretary General of Badr Hadi Al-Amri, which represents a broad coalition of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is the closest to Iran, and (the Alliance for Reform and Reconstruction), and Sa’aroon coalition led by Muqtada al-Sadr (Al-Khanjar and Al-Nujaifi, 2018).

The two blocs formed from different components (Sunni Shiite and others), with reference to the clear Sunni representation within them. In other words, Sunni representation was not only formality, for example, the Building Alliance - the Hawks Shiite leader’s alliance - included Sunni leaders such as Mr. Khamis al-Khanjar, leader of the Arab Project Bloc, who was described by the parties of the Building Alliance as a leader in the alliance, having been excluded from participation in the elections as a result of his previous opposition positions in favor of forces rejecting the political process, some of them terrorist. This led to angry reactions and criticism from some political forces (Sunni and Shiite) emerged later differences,
which are due to political reasons in the first place, the most important
cflict over the representation of the Sunni component, which led to the
separation of his bloc from the Iraqi decision coalition led by Osama Nujaifi,
and the formation of an independent parliamentary bloc, after running
parliamentary elections together in the Iraqi Decision Alliance (Baghdad
Today, 2018), which left its impact on the portfolio of the Ministry of
Education, which is the share of Sunnis, where the dispute over the ministry
between the blocs (Khamis al-Khanjar / Building – Al Nujaifi / Reform), in
the context of the conflict Between the Sunni of Building alliance and the
Sunni of reform around ministerial seats and other positions (Nass Agency,
2019).

On the other hand, Khamis al-Khanjar welcomed the election of a
member of the A’ataa bloc Mansour al-Muraed, led by Faleh al-Fayyad, as
governor of Nineveh. Al-Muraed received support from political blocs in the
province, in the forefront of which is the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
led by Massoud Barzani (Sumeriya News, 2019). This led to criticism and
the exchange of accusations among the Sunni leaders, and led to divisions
in the National Axis bloc - the Sunni of Building - and the reshaping of the
alliance (Iraqi forces) closest to the Sunni of reform (Hamza Mustafa, 2019),
which reflects the larger conflicts of this issue, as stated by Ethel Al Nujaifi,
when he said: “conflicts within Nineveh seemingly local, but each side of
the conflict is supported by one of the parties to the international-Iranian
conflict”, pointing out that one of the parties in his interest to be Nineveh
is Arena of conflict between the parties (Al-Hurra TV, 2018). Therefore,
some considered that the formation of the alliance of forces is a sign of a
change in the regional equation on the one hand, and the emergence of
more national will from other (Zaid Salem, 2019).

What is presented gives a different perspective on the nature of the
political structure at this stage, and thus the management of institutions
at the other joints of the political system will be completed in the following
paragraphs.

b) Choose an independent prime minister (the crisis of the
largest bloc)

The problem of the largest parliamentary bloc nominating the prime
minister in Iraq, is one of the recurrent crises in the Iraqi political system,
which began since the crisis of forming the government in 2010, and
continued in subsequent sessions in various forms, there was no clear
mechanism and specific, and this was because it did not represent the
results of the elections (the first winning bloc in the elections). In the
2018 elections, the Da’awa Party lost its ability to dominate the ruling
Shiite arena, having been in control of the post of prime minister since the first session in 2006, due to the failures already discussed, as well as the emergence of new rival political forces, most notably the PMF, which got clear parliamentary representation, and the overall changes in the Sunni and Kurdish axes, as well as the effects of the international equation, as a result of the coincidence of US economic sanctions on Iran with the election period. This marks a shift in the equation of US-Iranian consensus on the political process in Iraq.

The political blocs suffered another crisis of a constitutional nature, namely the crisis of identifying the “largest bloc”, according to the discrepancy between the two figures, the bloc (Reform and Building) had collected about 177 deputies by the signatures of their bloc heads, based on the interpretation of the Federal Court of Article 76 in 2010, but the Building block was based on the signatures of the deputies themselves, declaring that it has about 145 deputies (Hassan Al-Saeedi, 2018), which makes the Federal Court’s interpretation of Article 76 subject to other controversies.

In the light of the claims of the two largest blocs to own the parliamentary majority, Iraq entered a political crisis, and political forces were unable for more than four months after the parliamentary elections, to reach a solution to the dilemma of the major bloc, which is supposed to form the new Iraqi government, and the Parliament also failed to elect a president and two vice presidents, and postponed its first session on 3/9/2018. Parliament subsequently ended political chaos by electing Mohammed al-Halbousi, a member of the Building Alliance, as its president on September 15, with a secret parliamentary vote, marred by suspicions and accusations of buying office and votes from deputies (Muhammad Abdul-Jabbar al-Shabout, 2018).

The largest parliamentary bloc is one of the most important pillars of the political process because it is constitutionally responsible directly for the formation of the government, as well as being the main driver for the selection of other presidential positions (Presidents of the Republic and Parliament), in other words, the largest bloc is responsible for the rule of Iraq. Therefore, it is a political problem rather than a legal one, and that changing the course of its formation and thus its political choice may lead to the transformation of Iraq into a political system of various features and borders in one way or another, as it seems that the internal and external complexities of the sectarian components system have brought the political process to a crossroads. The previously established options are no longer feasible in preserving the necessary political balances to sustain the political system.

The most suitable and available option to get out of this stalemate, in light of the failure to identify the largest bloc, is the candidate of compromise between the two largest blocs and with different specifications represented
in choosing a prime minister. Moreover, Prime Minister Adel Abdel Mahdi, who was appointed on October 2, 2018, stipulated on the political parties before agreeing to assume the presidency of the Council of Ministers, giving him full freedom to choose ministers, in addition to the freedom to formulate his government program, and arrange its relationship with political forces. As far as he sees fit, and to exclude partisan and political interventions from government action (Harith Hassan, 2017), regardless of the extent to which these conditions were met later, so the current government was described by many political forces as the government of the last chance (Retired Brigadier Nizar Abdel-Qader, 2018), or a government of salvation, and another opinion went further to say that the Presidential Troika of the Political regime (Mohammed al-Halbousi, Barham Salih and Adel Abdul-Mahdi), represents the last chance for the Iraqi political process, and this is an acknowledgment of the failure of the formula of governance that has existed since 2003, and an indication of new political propositions that began to emerge strongly by many political forces in conjunction with the escalation of the protest movement, represented in the need for fundamental amendments, including the amendment of the Constitution and the parliamentary system of government.

c) Change the positions of the Kurdish blocs (the referendum and its political implications)

The Kurdistan referendum came in September 2017, after the extensive extension of the Kurdistan Regional Government in the disputed regions as a result of battles fought by the Peshmerga against ISIS, a unilateral referendum lacking Iraqi and international support, as the Kurdish leadership has declared it non-binding. Moreover, the referendum would not in any way change the geopolitics. The region would remain besieged with no access to the sea, and it would remain subject to Turkish intentions in the bulk of its oil exports. Therefore, the referendum was not practically related to the issue of self-determination, but it used to achieve goals within two axes:

1. The first relates to strengthening the KRG’s influence in the disputed regions, especially Kirkuk and the Nineveh Plain, in the sense of using Kurdish military control as a pressure card on the federal government.

2. The second is related to the Kurdish situation, which is divided into two aspects. First, the use of the referendum as a mechanism for exporting the internal political, financial and service crisis. On the financial and service levels, the provincial government has been unable to pay the salaries of the majority of civil servants, representing 12% of the population of the territory, and the unemployment rate has increased
to high levels (from 6.5% in 2013 to 14% in 2016), and the region has also accumulated debt, which was caused by excessive non-investment expenditures in previous years and oil production partnership contracts (DENIZ Natalie, 2017), estimated at $20 billion (Erm News, 2019). In addition to the inability to secure electricity to the population in the three provinces in the Kurdistan region despite the export of oil independently for three years. Second, securing the position of political leadership inside the territory within the framework of competition for power, revenues and resources among the Kurdish political forces. Competition among Kurdish forces has escalated since the start of the campaign against ISIS, and in light of the challenge posed by the PKK and its affiliated organizations, as well as other Iraqi Kurdish groups. Therefore, a number of Kurdish forces launched a “no” voting campaign in the Kurdish referendum, considering that the aim of the referendum is to expand the authority of Barzani and not achieve Kurdish independence (Abdel-Qader Al-Janabi, 2018).

The failure of the referendum led to the decline of Kurdish influence in general, and undermined the legitimacy of the leaders of the territory, and in the midst of crises in Iraqi Kurdistan as well as the above mentioned, such as the crisis of freezing parliament, and the end of the mandate of the President of the territory, with political unrest of opposition movements and protests coincided with the event, all this contributed to the escalation of political and constitutional blockage in KRG, in return, this event gave impetus to the federal government towards the Kurdish territory, coincided with the victory of Iraq over ISIS, the liberation of Mosul, and resolve the issue of Kirkuk largely after the entry of federal forces, followed by the restoration of Khanaqin and Jalawla’a districts and the Sinjar and other areas in the Nineveh Plain by the Iraqi army and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which led the Kurds to comply with many of Baghdad’s demands, in terms of closing airports, and the deployment of Iraqi forces in the disputed regions, and has already been marked retreat of the position of the Kurdish issue as a whole (Abdul–Nasser Al-Mahdawi, 2018).

Therefore, these indications reflected on the Kurdish position on the formation of the federal government. The Kurdish forces between the PUK and the KDP have been divided on positions reserved for the Kurds, such as the post of President of the Republic, the post of Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, and the Ministry of Justice, as well as the conflict between the two main Kurdish parties over the post of governor of Kirkuk. However, this does not mean that the Kurdish influence in the Iraqi political system has diminished, or that it is no longer a key party, but it has lost much of its qualitative weight and numerical weight due to the previous repercussions. In other words, it is no longer in a negotiating position to gain new gains, or even retain all his previous gains, and this was considered a significant change in the fundamental balances and the mechanisms governing the Iraqi political system post 2003.
d) The emergence of parliamentary opposition

The political process in Iraq has remained since 2003 lacking one of the most important pillars of democratic systems (the parliamentary or political opposition), as no political opposition bloc was formed in the Iraqi parliament. All blocs participated in the government, or opposed some positions without being in the position of opposition. The reason is mostly because most of these parties want to gain benefits from government positions, which they do not get if they resort to the opposition option. However, the current reality has become clearly different. After seven months of the formation of the new Iraqi government, headed by Adel Abdul Mahdi, the signs of failure to deal with many files, including the completion of ministerial portfolios, along with the files of services, corruption and unemployment, in addition to foreign presence in the country, the Iraqi parliament began to witness a movement aimed at establishing an opposition bloc. This movement led by one of the components of the “Reform and Reconstruction” coalition, which was a victory coalition led by former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who declared his “opposition” to the government on 13 June 2019, to be officially the first bloc declared its opposition to the government (Al-Arabiya Net, 2019). However, these dialogues were conducted within the framework of preliminary understandings and did not reach the stage of final agreement. In the meantime, specifically on June 16, 2019 (The Wisdom Stream) led by Ammar al-Hakim, turning to the political opposition, which he called it (constructive opposition).

Therefore, the bi-pro-opposition began to emerge (Parliament, 2019), although the opposition is still a minority in parliament, and the government still holds a parliamentary majority at that time, with reference to the waving of Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Sa’aroon alliance on 9/8/2018 to resort to the opposition if the government does not respond to reforms (Middle East Online, 2019), which was happened later after the start of the protests in early October 2019, and the demanding of Muqtada al-Sadr, to resign the government as a result of the popular opposition, and the loss of a large number of victims in those demonstrations (22).

In this context, the Federal Supreme Court ruled that the parliamentary opposition is constitutionally guaranteed, stressing that its members enjoy full constitutional guarantees.

Regardless of the various estimates of the reasons for declaring or adopting these blocs opposition position, or credibility, and the extent of its ability to pressure on the government to reform, or even topple it, but what is important is the emergence of this missing link in the Iraqi political system after 2003, as one of the fundamental guarantees of the democratic system, and one of the main mechanisms of parliamentary work.
e) Declining sectarian - ethnic polarization

During this phase, a number of factors emerged that indicated the decline of sectarian polarization in the first place, and the ethnic in the second place. The war against IS led to the unification of Sunnis and Shiites, bridging the big gap between them, and thus repairing the rifts of national unity, which were subsequently reinforced through subsequent events. The crisis of the Kurdistan referendum represented another opportunity for a Shiite-Sunni rapprochement materialized by passing a resolution rejecting the referendum from the Iraqi parliament, dismissing the governor of Kirkuk (in two sessions from which the Kurdish blocs withdrew), and the Shiite coalition and the main Sunni forces issuing statements rejecting the referendum.

Moreover, a decision was issued by the Federal Court disrupted the referendum procedures, and the crises experienced by the territory produced positions opposed to the dominance and uniqueness of the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Massoud Barzani, which led many Kurdish opposition forces and personalities to rapprochement with the Iraqi political forces nearby or in line with their orientations, as mentioned above. In addition, different political priorities and agendas have divided minorities in the Kurdistan territory, such as the Yazidis, Assyrians, Sunni Arabs, and Turkmen, between loyal factions to the KDP and others opposed to it. Those who oppose the KRG or the KDP generally support Baghdad or an Iraqi state where they can enjoy wider local autonomy.

In the same context, the parliamentary elections and the subsequent political movement led to the re-formation of major alliances outside the constituent divisions of the political process since 2003, and then the formation of the government in the manner mentioned above, and the emergence of parliamentary opposition to the government in general and its president in particular, from the Shiite forces against the most prominent position of the Shiite component, the Prime Minister, and this adds another sign to this change. All this was framed in the October 2019 protests, which came out mostly from Shiite areas, and reflected purely nationalist tendencies, where most of the protesters sought to avoid sectarian slogans, and raising Iraqi flags, as slogans showed that the anger was directed at a political class not a particular sect because of corruption, unemployment and the deterioration of the of services reality, in contrast to the protests that took place in 2012 and 2013, which used by the ISIS to gain support.

Consequently, the political discourse and alliances reveal different starting points in the management of the political system, and indicate a state of political maturity in one way or another. Where the criteria on which political performance is based become more linked to societal tasks
The needs of citizens, not only the requirements of political parties and politicians, in terms of services, security, tackling unemployment and fighting corruption, etc., in conjunction with the public rights and freedoms that frame these needs and associated with them, without ignoring the struggle of political parties and forces to maintain their positions and privileges, but in the context of growing awareness of the strength of popular demands and the need to identify its with them, even at a minimum level, to maintain the positions of those forces and parties, which inevitably pushes forward the process of state-building and national unity.

Conclusion

The repercussions of the post-IS period are a reflection of structural imbalances in the new governance arrangements after 2003, which brought the country into comprehensive political, economic and security crises, and allowed the ISIS to invade Iraqi territories with its devastating effects, as well as the exorbitant costs of the battles to liberate the cities and territories. However, these repercussions on the other hand, strongly imposed on the political system to search for a way out of its worsening crises, having exhausted most of its options to continue the status quo, which pushed the political forces under the pressure of these developments accompanied by discontent and widespread popular protests, towards new directions and options, in order to achieving a degree of political and economic inclusiveness, through the creation of new political balances, ensuring fair representation and institutional effectiveness. Although these new balances and arrangements are still fragile and immature to the extent required, but they represent a clear entry point to reshape the political structure of the regime in one way or another.

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